



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

# **Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD**

## **Volume I: Main Report**

James S. Thomason, Project Leader

Robert J. Atwell

Robert Bovey

William E. Cralley

James Delaney

Michael P. Fischerkeller

Kongdan Oh Hassig

Charles Hawkins

Gene Porter

July 2002

Approved for public release;  
distribution unlimited.

IDA Paper P-3707

Log: H 02-002390

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

This work was conducted under contract DASW01 98 C 0067, Task BE-6-2046, for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.

© 2002, 2003 Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000.

This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (NOV 95).

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

IDA Paper P-3707

# **Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD**

## **Volume I: Main Report**

Robert J. Atwell  
Robert Bovey  
William E. Cralley  
James Delaney

Michael P. Fischerkeller  
Kongdan Oh Hassig  
Charles Hawkins  
Gene Porter



## **PREFACE**

This paper has been prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in partial fulfillment of a task being performed for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). The task, entitled “Effects-Based Assessments of US Presence and Deployment Patterns,” is being conducted to help the DoD identify evidence of the effects that actual and potential alternative US overseas military presence postures and activities have or may have in promoting key US defense and national security strategy goals. A related major goal is to identify how the DoD may be able to strengthen this evidence base and employ it in an increasingly systematic process for making military presence posture decisions.

The authors alone are accountable for the final content of the report, but many people have made important contributions. The open, receptive atmosphere that the study sponsors, Dr. David Chu and Mrs. Jeanne Fites, created helped enormously throughout. A wide range of senior U.S. security professionals—both within and outside the government—gave generously of their time, experiences and ideas, as did the many foreign security experts with whom we talked regarding overseas military presence and the security conditions in their countries and regions.

Many individuals contributed to this study by sharing their experiences and ideas with us on a “not for attribution” basis. Without their candor and generosity, the study would not have been possible. We interviewed many of these people extensively; others participated on a more limited basis. We are grateful to all of them for their time and cooperation.

The strong support of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is also hereby acknowledged, including the provision of very helpful background information and advice throughout the study.

At IDA, many people provided valuable observations and recommendations at various stages of the project. The study team would especially like to acknowledge the participation and advice of Mr. Ray Bonoan, Dr. Michael Freiders, Dr. Jeff Grotte, Dr. Wade Hinkle, Mr. Stanley Horowitz, Mr. James Kurtz, Mr. Karl Lowe, Dr. Robert Mahoney, Mr. Larry Morton, Mr. Larry Sampler, Mr. Robert Soule, Mr. John Tillson,

General Larry Welch, and Ms. Caroline Ziemke. Mr. Michael Leonard and Dr. Victor Utgoff provided constructive comments and reviews of the paper. Mrs. Jackie Evans contributed fine secretarial and production help, and Ms. Shelley Smith provided outstanding editorial support throughout the study.

## CONTENTS

Preface.....	iii
Executive Summary .....	S-1
I. Introduction.....	I-1
What is Overseas Military Presence?.....	I-2
Key Military/Security Objectives.....	I-3
Effects of Overseas Presence on Key Security Objectives .....	I-4
Study Rationale .....	I-4
Approach.....	I-7
Relative Cost-Effectiveness of Presence Options.....	I-8
II. Literature Review.....	II-1
General Arguments and Hypotheses.....	II-2
Beyond All-or-Nothing Arguments about the Value of Presence.....	II-6
Specific Recommendations for Changes (and Continuity) in Presence Postures.....	II-6
Evidence as to Effects of Adopting Alternative Presence Postures and Approaches.....	II-12
Evidence Regarding Presence and Crisis Response/Combat Outcomes.....	II-12
Evidence Regarding Presence and Assurance.....	II-14
Evidence Regarding Presence and Deterrence.....	II-18
Historical Assessments.....	II-19
Evidence Regarding Presence and Dissuasion.....	II-20
Evidence Regarding Presence and Stability.....	II-21
Regional Stability .....	II-21
Internal Stability .....	II-22
Resource Implications of Alternative Presence Postures.....	II-24
Summary .....	II-25
III. Assessing the Effects of Alternative Presence Postures on Combat Outcomes.....	III-1

IV.	Assessing the Effects of Alternative Presence Postures on Deterrence .....	IV-1
	Huth's Cases, Methods, and Findings.....	IV-2
	Applying Huth's Evidence and Insights.....	IV-7
	Northeast Asia Assessments.....	IV-10
	Southwest Asia Assessments.....	IV-11
	Next Steps in Developing and Applying Huth's Evidence and Insights.....	IV-12
	New Case Studies of Extended-Immediate Deterrence.....	IV-13
	The Performance of Huth's Specification in Recent Cases.....	IV-14
	The Defender's Response.....	IV-15
	Case Study Results .....	IV-16
	Conclusion .....	IV-17
V.	Discussions with Foreign Experts.....	V-1
	Methodology .....	V-1
	Overall Evaluations of Continuous US Military Presence.....	V-3
	Comparing Views Regarding Threats and Presence .....	V-6
	Comparing Views on Presence and on Deterring Threats .....	V-8
	Where US Presence is Valued, the Types Most Valued .....	V-10
	Where it is Valued, Why Us Military Presence is Valued .....	V-11
	Evaluations of US Presence Activities .....	V-15
	Conclusions.....	V-17
	Recommendations.....	V-20
VI.	Discussions with US Experts .....	VI-1
	Background and Methodology .....	VI-1
	The Interlocutors .....	VI-1
	The Discussion Questions and Format .....	VI-3
	Analysis of Discussions .....	VI-4
	Consensus Observations .....	VI-5
	Important Underpinning .....	VI-5
	Building Long-Term Relationships .....	VI-6
	Demonstrated Rapid Deployment and Reinforcement Capability .....	VI-8
	The Need for Better Planning and Assessment of US Military Presence.....	VI-9
	Peacekeeping Forces.....	VI-10
	Opportunities for Reductions .....	VI-10
	Europe .....	VI-10

Okinawa.....	VI-11
Naval Forces.....	VI-11
Options Without Consensus .....	VI-12
Saudi Arabia.....	VI-12
Korea .....	VI-13
The Sinai.....	VI-14
Presence Recommendation Highlights by Expert Group Category.....	VI-14
VII. An Effects-Based Presence Planning and Evaluation Process.....	VII-1
Foundation for Joint Presence Planning .....	VII-2
A Six-Step Process.....	VII-2
A Simplified Logic.....	VII-3
Moving Forward .....	VII-5
Structuring Strong Capabilities.....	VII-7
Option Evaluation Criteria.....	VII-7
Organization of the Process .....	VII-7
VIII. An Illustrative Option for US Military Presence in NATO Europe.....	VIII-1
Background .....	VIII-1
Presence Option Recommendations .....	VIII-2
Dealing with Change, Based on Discussions with our Allies.....	VIII-7
Strategic Impact of Changes .....	VIII-10
Crisis Response.....	VIII-10
Deterrence .....	VIII-10
Assurance .....	VIII-11
Dissuasion.....	VIII-11
Presence Option Costs .....	VIII-12
Establishing Bases in Turkey and on Crete and Support in Southeastern Europe .....	VIII-12
Rotating Units to Turkey and Crete Over the Years .....	VIII-13
Relocating Military Personnel and Dependents from Germany to CONUS .....	VIII-14
Nonmilitary Costs of Operating Bases in Turkey and on Crete.....	VIII-15
Other Costs of Altering the Posture .....	VIII-16
Conclusions.....	VIII-18

IX.	An Illustrative Option for US Military Presence in Okinawa.....	IX-1
	Background .....	IX-1
	Personnel Tempo Considerations .....	IX-2
	Meeting US Security Goals.....	IX-3
	The Korean Contingency .....	IX-3
	Other Contingencies.....	IX-4
	The Option .....	IX-5
	Summary .....	IX-5
	Specifics.....	IX-6
	Effects of Adopting the Option.....	IX-9
	Assurance .....	IX-9
	Dissuasion/Deterrence/Combat Capability .....	IX-10
	Resources .....	IX-11
X.	An Illustrative Option for US Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula .....	X-1
	Background .....	X-1
	Selected Problems.....	X-1
	Quality of Life Issues .....	X-1
	Perverse Readiness Priorities? .....	X-2
	Inefficiencies in the Status Quo Posture .....	X-3
	Alternatives to the Status Quo .....	X-3
	Option A.....	X-3
	Expand Capabilities .....	X-3
	More Frequently Demonstrate US Capability and Commitment to Deploy Ready Forces to Korea .....	X-4
	Implement a 6-month Unaccompanied Tour Maximum.....	X-4
	Strengthen Relationships .....	X-4
	Assessment of Option A .....	X-5
	Combat Outcomes.....	X-5
	Deterrence and Dissuasion.....	X-5
	Assurance .....	X-6
	Effects on Personnel QoL .....	X-7
	Readiness and Risk .....	X-7
	Resource Implications.....	X-7
	Other Options.....	X-8

Improving Upon the Status Quo in Korea .....	X-9
XI. Transforming US Overseas Military Presence.....	XI-1
Seek Evidence of Effects of Alternative Presence Postures on Security Objectives .....	XI-1
Identify Less Manpower-Intensive Presence Options.....	XI-1
Establishing a Presence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation Process .....	XI-3
Achieving Objectives with Only Modest Reinforcements.....	XI-4
Developing Presence Options for the Global War on Terrorism.....	XI-5
Constructing Presence Postures as Part of an Integrated Defense Strategy .....	XI-6
Addressing Near- and Longer-Term Risks .....	XI-6
Conclusion .....	XI-7

## APPENDIXES

- A. List of US National Security Professionals Who Participated in the IDA “Effects-Based” Presence Discussions (For Official Use Only—Issued Separately in Volume III)
- B. List of Foreign Security Professionals Who Participated in the IDA “Effects-Based” Presence Discussions (For Official Use Only—Issued Separately in Volume III)
- C. Letter of Introduction from OSD (Policy)
- D. Assessing the Effects of Alternative Presence Postures on Combat Outcomes (Classified—Issued Separately as Volume II)
- E. Trends in US Military Forces Serving Overseas, 1986–2000
- F. Presence Discussion Topics for US Security Professionals
- G. A Review of the Deterrence Literature
- H. List of Case Studies from Huth’s Research
- I. Views of the Chinese Security Experts
- J. Bibliography
- K. Glossary

## TABLES

III-1.	Effects on Combat Outcomes of Selected Alternative US Presence Postures.....	III-3
IV-1.	Mispredicted Cases .....	IV-6
IV-2.	List of Case Studies .....	IV-13
VI-1.	Majorities in Various US Security Expert Categories Actively Supporting Selected Proposals for Changes in US Presence Posture .....	VI-16
VII-1.	Minimum Needed of Most Cost-Effective Military Capabilities to Meet Desired Standards .....	VII-4

## FIGURES

IV-1.	Logistic Regression Specification.....	IV-5
IV-2.	Performance of the Specification.....	IV-6
IV-3.	Example A: Significance of Local Military Balance .....	IV-8
IV-4.	Example B: Significance of Strategy .....	IV-9
IV-5.	NEA Assessments.....	IV-11
IV-6.	Case Study Results.....	IV-17
V-1.	Evaluations of Continuous US Military Presence.....	V-4
V-2.	Views of Threats and on Presence .....	V-7
V-3.	Views on Threats and Deterrence, and Presence .....	V-9
V-4.	Most Valued Force Types .....	V-11
V-5.	Why US Military Presence is Valued .....	V-12
IX-1.	Images of Successful 6-Month Test of “Theater Support Vessel” .....	IX-7
IX-2.	“Joint Venture” HSV-X1 with Military Features Concept for Future 112M Joint HSV .....	IX-7

## **SUMMARY**

This study is intended to provide senior DoD and US government decision-makers with a compendium of the best available evidence concerning how alternative US presence postures are likely to affect key US security objectives.

### **GOALS**

The study has three specific goals. The primary goal is to identify evidence of the actual effects, on the margin, of different levels, types, and frequencies of US overseas military presence in promoting key US security objectives. That is, how has the deployment and use of US military assets overseas in relatively routine, non-combat activities supported such key security objectives as those laid out in the 2001 QDR: assuring friends and allies of our commitment and ability to help defend our mutual interests, deterring adversaries, dissuading potential adversaries from challenging us, and providing a strong initial crisis response capability should deterrence fail. The second goal is to determine the feasibility of developing viable US presence options that use fewer military personnel continuously forward. The third objective is to provide insights regarding the sorts of presence postures that would be most responsive to the emerging security environment.

### **APPROACH**

Our approach in this study has been threefold. First, we have searched the existing literature and analytic documentation for evidence of the effects of presence in promoting key security objectives.

Second, we have conducted two sets of new tests to evaluate the potential effects of alternative presence postures upon key security objectives. In the first set, IDA has prepared illustrative analyses of the potential effects on combat outcomes of several alternative US presence postures, including several types of combat capability enhancements to current postures as well as some routinely less manpower-intensive presence postures. These combat assessments were created using an analytic technique devised for this study. To build the second set of test assessments, IDA developed an

historically based framework and then estimated the potential effects of some alternative US presence postures upon the likelihood of successful US deterrence of cross-border aggression by N. Korea and by Iraq. These deterrence analyses are based upon inferences from studies of over 60 historical cases as to what combinations of power projection, presence, and military and diplomatic strategies have and have not worked to deter aggressors over the last hundred years.

Third, we have held not-for-attribution talks with approximately three dozen senior US security experts (current and former officials) as well as with over 50 foreign experts from 23 countries.<sup>1</sup> In each interview, we sought: 1) evidence of likely effects of alternative US presence postures on key security objectives such as combat outcomes, deterrence, dissuasion, assurance, etc.; and 2) recommendations regarding promising alternative US presence postures. Of US experts, we also asked for ideas regarding a future presence requirements process for DoD.

## **KEY FINDINGS**

Two key findings arise from IDA’s study of effects-based presence assessments, as well as a suggestion regarding several near-term steps that DoD may want to consider.

First, the weight of evidence shows that DoD has opportunities to transform current presence postures in ways that could simultaneously improve US performance with respect to key security objectives, upgrade conditions for service members and their families, reduce routine manpower requirements, and increase efficiency over time. Promising opportunities to transform presence postures in this way emerge from our literature review, from the combat simulations and deterrence assessments conducted, and from the discussions with both US and foreign security experts.

Second, we recommend that DoD develop a deliberate strategy to transform its presence posture from what may be thought of as a “mass force” approach today toward an approach that would emphasize regional and global partnerships of “networked capabilities” and “massed effects.”

---

<sup>1</sup> US experts with whom we talked include, among others, former and current senior civilian and military officials from the Department of Defense, Department of State (DoS), and National Security Council (NSC). Foreign experts include primarily serving ambassadors and defense attachés to the United States. For complete lists of participants in these discussions, see appendixes A and B.

This transformation could include:

- Building joint and combined enhancements in command, control, communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) in key forward areas as well as globally; implementing aggressive unmanned aerial vehicle programs; and integrating long-range precision strike and surge deployments fully into the presence planning equation
- Using more aggressive prepositioning programs (of equipment and precision weapons) at salient locations; experimenting with more intermittent presence, including more frequent short deployments and exercise programs
- Employing privatization schemes for a variety of support functions; using innovative “reach-back” concepts (such as the US has used in East Timor)
- Strengthening military-to-military contact programs (both overseas and at home) and coalition liaison teams; building highly-skilled, combined special operations teams; promoting ISR sharing with key allies/friends
- Reducing unnecessary burdens and risks faced by US service members and their families, such as by eliminating “forced” one year unaccompanied tours in peacetime and minimizing needlessly weak personnel readiness levels in high threat zones such as the Korean Peninsula. (Chapter X discusses these issues with respect to Korea.)

To enable and energize a broad-gauged transformation of presence, IDA recommends that DoD consider developing and leading an effects-based, interagency presence planning and evaluation process. It would be led by OSD and monitored by the NSC, with input from DoD (combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Services), DoS, and allied/friendly nations. It would draw upon the best evidence available in each cycle as to the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative ways of promoting key security objectives. (Chapters VII and XI offer specific recommendations regarding such a process.)

## **NOTIONAL US PRESENCE OPTIONS**

Based upon these findings, at the sponsor’s request IDA has built three strawman options that could be examined in detail by DoD using the presence evaluation process proposed here. We have devised options for the NATO arena, Okinawa, and the Korean Peninsula. All three are designed, to varying degrees, to move today’s postures in the directions indicated above.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

QDR 2001 concluded that the department's presence posture was inappropriate to the new security environment and to DoD's strategy. The Secretary of Defense called for a number of posture changes as well as for the Services to prepare more options for him to consider [DoD, 2001: p. 27]. To evaluate such options, IDA recommends that DoD build and regularly employ an effects-based presence planning and evaluation process.

Today's presence posture and planning process within DoD is still focused largely on what may be called "an inputs-based approach"—seeking to ensure certain numbers of ship-days on station per year, certain numbers of troops in theater (such as 100K), and the ability of military asset type X to be at a designated location within a certain number of hours or to destroy certain targets within X days. Inputs can be useful performance metrics if they are linked evidentially to achieving desired outcomes or effects in cost-effective ways. Unfortunately, such linkages are not always clear in the current approach.

IDA recommends that DoD build a process that focuses greater attention on developing effective, capabilities-based presence postures linked to key security objectives.<sup>2</sup> Doing this rigorously will involve developing the tools and methods (the decision aids), the evidence base, and the organization to make it happen.

Overall, IDA recommends that presence planning and evaluation be a collaborative process aimed at developing better tools, evidence, and insights. This, in turn, should lead to better decision-making and to stronger linkages between presence deployments and US national security strategy.

A constructive next step in such a development effort could be to build several alternatives for each of three major regions and/or functions, and then to conduct structured evaluations of these options using readily available evaluation methods, tools, and data.

---

<sup>2</sup> Beyond the key security objectives laid out in the 2001 QDR, the process envisioned here would also seek to promote capabilities and objectives valuable in dealing with the war on terrorism—in both what may be called its "hard" as well as its "soft" crisis-prevention dimensions.

## **Chapter I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

US overseas military presence consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine non-combat activities or functions. Collectively, these assets constitute one of a set of very important military instruments of national power and influence. It is regularly asserted within the Department of Defense that these overseas military presence activities promote key security objectives, such as deterrence, assurance of friends and allies, the provision of timely crisis response capabilities, regional stability and, generally, security conditions that in turn promote freedom and prosperity. Overall, such claims seem plausible, but hard evidence to support them has been dispersed. Assembling for ready access the evidence regarding such effects, their strength, and the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative ways (presence postures as well as other means) of achieving such effects should aid DoD and the US government in formulating presence postures and policy.

DoD's overseas military presence posture and activities have been crucial elements of the military strategy of the United States for many years. Are the substantial resources that DoD now employs to sustain and conduct presence activities generating effective returns for the nation in the promotion of key security objectives? How do we know? Are there more cost-effective ways for DoD to promote these security objectives than through the current mix of presence activities, other military and, indeed, non-military instruments of influence? Are there any promising methodologies for improving the evidence of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of US presence assets and activities?

To address such questions systematically, we must first define what we are discussing more precisely. What is US presence? What are the key security objectives? What would constitute credible evidence regarding the effectiveness of US presence in promoting these key objectives? The purpose of this chapter is to lay out a conceptual and methodological framework which may then be used to address these questions.

## WHAT IS OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE?

Our working definition of US overseas military presence is that it consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine, regular, non-combat activities or functions.<sup>1</sup> By this definition, forces that are located overseas may or may not be engaging in presence activities. If they are engaging in combat (such as Operation Enduring Freedom), or are involved in a one-time non-combat action (such as an unscheduled carrier battle group deployment from the United States aimed at calming or stabilizing an emerging crisis situation), then they are not engaging in presence activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may not be “engaged in presence activities,” may or may not be “doing presence.”

We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in “negative” terms—what they are not. In more positive terms, what exactly are presence activities, i.e., what do presence activities actually entail doing?

Overseas military presence activities are generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of activities that the US government uses in its efforts to promote important military/security objectives [Dismukes, 1994]. A variety of recurrent, overseas military activities are normally placed under the “umbrella” concept of military presence. These include but are not limited to US military efforts overseas to train foreign militaries; to improve inter-operability of US and friendly forces; to peacefully and visibly demonstrate US commitment and/or ability to defend US interests; to gain intelligence and familiarity with a locale; to conduct peacekeeping activities; and to position relevant, capable US military assets such that they are likely to be available sooner rather than later in case an evolving security operation or contingency should call for them.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> In everyday parlance, to “be present” means that an entity is in a particular place at a particular time. It is the opposite of absence. Being present in this sense does not necessarily mean that the entity is exerting a significant effect upon the immediate surroundings. By contrast, in everyday language, to “have presence” or “have a presence” means that an individual is able to exert and usually is exerting a significant effect on the immediate surroundings.

<sup>2</sup> This is generally consistent, for example, with B. Dismukes’ formulation: “Overseas presence encompasses a variety of activities.... In addition to permanent and rotational forces forward on the ground, forces deployed at sea, and prepositioned equipment, overseas presence includes: exercises and training of US forces with those of friends and allies; unilateral training by US forces on foreign soil; US C3I systems, especially in their bilateral and multilateral roles; arrangements for access by US forces to facilities overseas; stationing and visits abroad by senior US military and defense officials; visits to port and airfields by US naval and air forces; public shows by demonstration teams such as Thunderbirds and a host of public affairs activities, including military musical groups; staff-to-staff talks and studies with foreign military organizations and analytical groups; exchanges of military

## KEY MILITARY/SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review lays out a strategic framework built around four defense policy goals: assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against US interests; and if deterrence fails, defeating any adversary [Department of Defense, 2001b].

As indicated in the QDR, DoD clearly intends presence activities to promote at least three of these major goals. With regard to the assurance goal, the QDR specifies, for example, that the department believes the presence of US forces overseas to be one of the most profound symbols of the US commitment to its allies and friends, and says that DoD will honor its obligations and be a reliable security partner. [p. 11] With regard to deterrence of threats and coercion, the QDR argues for a multifaceted approach, one that places particular “emphasis upon peacetime forward presence in critical areas of the world, coupled with global intelligence, strike, and information assets in order to deter aggression with only modest reinforcement from outside the theater.” [p. 12] As for countering coercion (defeating any adversary), the QDR says that “US forces must maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its allies, or friends.” [p. 13] The document also cites a number of related objectives that DoD intends to promote and achieve through presence activities that it labels security cooperation, saying [they] “will serve as an important means for linking DoD’s strategic direction with those of its allies and friends.... A particular aim of DoD’s security cooperation efforts will be to ensure access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, while expanding the range of preconflict options to available counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on US terms.” [p. 20]

While not explicitly linking presence activities to dissuasion, QDR 2001 makes clear the department’s plans to use well-targeted strategy and policy to dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions with the United States. And many in DoD may well believe that highly visible demonstrations in forward areas of exceptionally advanced US military capabilities will have a dissuasive effect. [p. 12]

---

people between the US and friends and allies; military training of foreign personnel in the US and in their home countries; training of military officers of former totalitarian and some developing states in the roles of the military in a civil society; foreign military sales and funding and co-production of military equipment with other nations.” [pp. 13–14]

## **EFFECTS OF OVERSEAS PRESENCE ON KEY SECURITY OBJECTIVES**

QDR 2001 is a recent official manifestation of a long-standing general hypothesis regarding US military presence activities: that they can and regularly do help promote fundamental security objectives of the nation. Another illustration of this kind of belief and hypothesis appears in a recent doctrinal publication of the Joint Staff: “In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access.” [Joint Staff, n.d.(1)]

Such claims seem generally plausible. Yet even assuming that current US overseas presence activities and postures are routinely helpful in promoting important security objectives of this kind, it would seem valuable for DoD—and indeed the US government—to acquire as much credible evidence as possible as to just how *strong* such effects are. It would also be useful to know whether any particular types, levels or frequencies of presence are more or less helpful than others.

## **STUDY RATIONALE**

What if the US could ensure combat outcomes at least as favorable as expected today in major conflict scenarios by developing a more firepower-rich presence posture, one that featured fewer military personnel continuously present overseas while still maintaining a significant, trip-wire deterrent force in key areas? What if the type of deterrent strategy the US employs in an evolving crisis matters more than the specific presence forces that are routinely present in the given area at the outset of the crisis? What if some forms of military presence are more effective than others in strengthening US crisis response capabilities for one type of crisis, while other forms of military presence are far more effective for others? What if the US could develop a crisis response capability deployable into a region and to a crisis scene faster than the presence assets that commanders now keep in the region continuously, and could develop and operate it at less cost than today’s presence asset? What if the US could use other means, such as hiring private firms, to provide significantly more of the peacekeeping and support services that now engage a considerable proportion of US military forces abroad, at less cost than today’s arrangements? What if military-to-military contact programs provide a relatively cost-effective way of building relationships that can come in very handy in handling unexpected contingencies in a timely manner?

Given solid evidence to support propositions such as these, the DoD would presumably want to take advantage of it in crafting its presence posture and activities. By doing so, it could get more security bang for its buck, manage risks better, and reduce the chances that its policies impose needless burdens and risks upon service members and their families.

Overall, the general research hypothesis investigated in this study is that more US presence assets and activities will promote the key security objectives cited above. It is not a foregone conclusion that this hypothesis will be supported by the evidence. Some favorable effects of presence are far easier to demonstrate than others. For example, the mere physical presence of some military assets that would be relevant to a particular type of initial crisis response is often taken as strong evidence—if not proof—of the ability of presence assets to promote or advance the security objective of effective initial crisis response. Indeed, in the face of an immediate problem, it is a relatively simple matter to demonstrate that if the relevant assets are in place, on hand, under our control, then we are virtually always better off than if we must wait for those assets to arrive.<sup>3</sup>

Yet even in a case as straightforward as this, there are still numerous practical issues, such as: What constitutes “relevant assets” for the commander? How much of which assets does it make sense to have continuously in place, versus having assets that are deployable relatively quickly? What mixes of assets are appropriate, for what conditions? What are the relative costs of various alternatives? What has happened historically when such assets have or have not been available? What, if anything, may be done to reduce the likelihood of future crises of the sort that the commander quite rightly believes—based upon historical circumstances—drive him to need particular assets? A variety of useful analyses along these lines could be—and in some cases have been—conducted (as we shall see in chapter II) to obtain relevant evidence for this class of presence-related issues and planning problems.

Consider now a more subjective issue regarding the relationship between presence and a security objective. If the security objective is defined as “visibly demonstrating US resolve and commitment to support a friend or ally,” then many observers will take the mere presence of some military assets in a region as an indicator, symbol, or even proof that this objective is in fact being promoted. In that formulation, the “effect” is basically a

---

<sup>3</sup> The manifest advantages of having the services of paramedics, firemen, and police available in a matter of minutes versus hours or days are illustrative.

tautology. On the other hand, for some observers there are still a number of potentially relevant issues in this instance: Are allies and friends actually getting the message that the US intends to send? How often does the US need to reinforce the message to achieve a high level of assurance? Just what types or levels of presence and what specific activities are especially helpful in demonstrating US resolve and commitment? Are there more and less cost-effective ways to achieve the same effect?

Another important issue concerns how to properly assess the value, on the margin, of more (or fewer) presence assets in promoting a favorable outcome for the United States in potential combat situations. The added value of more assets/activities is often simply assumed. The more the better. But in a true effects-based assessment, the extra value of more presence assets should not just be assumed; the form and strength of the relationships should be matters for careful, sustained investigation.

Similarly, the contribution of one or another US military presence activity, asset, or posture to the promotion of an effective deterrence posture should not be assumed; rather, its contribution on the margin should be assessed systematically wherever possible.

The presence of one or another type of US military capability may actually reduce the likelihood of the US achieving or even advancing an important security goal. How could this happen? It is possible that US military presence in a friendly country could stimulate serious protest or instability, thereby contributing to a regime change that is quite unfavorable as far as the US is concerned. This effect would be neither reassuring nor necessarily conducive to the dissuasion of potential adversaries. A robust US military presence might actually reduce a friendly or allied state's incentives to strengthen its own military capabilities. The ready presence of one type of US military capability may reduce the incentives of a friendly or allied state to provide access or bases for the US to use in a crisis in which the US and the friend or ally share common objectives.<sup>4</sup>

A presence activity of one kind may be considerably more effective in promoting one military/security objective than it is in promoting another. For instance, person-to-person military interactions and relationship building activities may be more likely to lead to the availability of access to military facilities for contingencies than the routine presence of one or another US military combat unit in a region. Similarly, tangible US

---

<sup>4</sup> For example, if the US is very willing to provide sea-based presence in an area, this may reduce an ally's or friend's perceived need to facilitate US use of land-based facilities.

efforts to rent militarily relevant facilities in host countries, coupled with high-quality, person-to-person relationship building efforts, may enable the US to increase its initial crisis responsiveness at lower resource cost than a large standing US military presence in a region.

Activities/factors other than US military presence have effects upon key security objectives. Examples include projectable US power (conventional and or nuclear), US military and diplomatic strategies, US economic incentives and strategies (positive inducements as well as sanctions), as well as the reputation that the US has for keeping its word, rewarding friends, punishing adversaries, and so forth. Each of these factors may be more, less, or as important as US military presence in promoting one or more key security objectives.

What credible evidence is or might be available regarding the effects and effectiveness of overseas military presence? In short, if US military forces that are continuously or regularly engaged in presence promote the key security objectives described above, are the effects weak or strong? Do the marginal effects vary with the context? How do we know?

## **APPROACH**

To evaluate our basic working hypothesis with regard to each of the key security objectives, we pursued a multifaceted approach and several types of evidence:

- 1) A review of the literature on US military presence to glean arguments and hypotheses, proposals for changing US presence postures, and existing evidence regarding the effects of presence that might be used to evaluate proposals for change (chapter II).
- 2) Structured military operations simulations, models, or games to assess the effects of alternative presence options on combat outcomes (see chapter III).
- 3) A historical analysis of the difference that various levels and types of presence assets have actually made with respect to the deterrence of aggression (see chapter IV).
- 4) Discussions with senior US and foreign security experts to gain their insights and perspectives (chapters V and VI).

All of these types of evidence have advantages and limitations. None offers a final word as to the effectiveness of one or another set of presence activities/postures in promoting one or more key military/security objectives. All are likely to be relevant in helping DoD and the broader US government determine the effects and, even more important, the relative cost-effectiveness of overseas military presence activities and other instruments of national power.

## **RELATIVE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESENCE OPTIONS**

The idea of having relevant presence activities in key areas of US interest around the globe has great common-sense appeal—as an instrument of both operational capability and for providing other, less direct forms of “influence.” This is because, in a very fundamental sense, having the relevant resources available immediately if you should need them has almost always got to be better than having such resources at your disposal only after a delay.

But what are the right types and levels of presence activities to best promote key security objectives? Determining the right forms and levels of presence is a significant decision-making challenge. It is all the more important to assess these issues since presence involves significant resources—people and dollars. Presence today involves numerous servicemen and women on lengthy assignments, away from family and loved ones in peacetime. Understanding what works, the relative effectiveness of alternatives, the relative cost-effectiveness of alternatives, and the relative burdens of alternatives upon our service members are thus very important and continuing challenges.

There will never be enough resources to eliminate altogether the risk of unfavorable events that can damage US security. As a result, for the foreseeable future, senior governmental decision-makers will face hard choices—such as the relative importance of being able to respond to a crisis overseas more quickly than is possible today versus being able to respond to a crisis at home more rapidly than is possible now. These are very real and continuing issues of risk management. Thus the department needs to pay strong, continuing attention to the management of risk. The only rational way to manage risk under uncertainty is to push hard to develop estimates of whether DoD is underinsuring in some areas and overinsuring in others.

Clarifying the evidence as to effects, relative effects, and relative cost-effectiveness of alternatives constitutes an important step along this path. This study focuses upon these kinds of issues with respect to the effectiveness of overseas military

presence. Chapter VII outlines the concept of an effects-based presence requirements process and describes how the techniques and findings we have identified might be employed in such a process, both in the presence option development phase and in the evaluation phase. Chapters VIII through X briefly characterize three strawman presence options and provide partial assessments of how well they compare to the status quo in terms of one possible set of evaluation criteria. Chapter XI summarizes our findings and recommendations.

This page intentionally left blank

## **Chapter II**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The literature on US overseas military presence is at once extensive and quite limited. Many promising arguments and hypotheses about the effects of presence are offered, often eloquently, and recommendations for changes to the current US military presence posture are advanced. Yet there is a striking shortage of systematic, replicable evidence as to the utility of different types, levels, and frequencies of US military presence—especially but not exclusively with regard to their specific effects upon crisis/combat outcomes, assurance, deterrence, dissuasion, and stability of the security environment. This is a somewhat surprising state of affairs, since US overseas military presence has for decades been one of the fundamental pillars of US defense and national security strategy.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the shelf is not completely bare. Several existing empirical studies may be developed and used by DoD to assess some of the likely effects of alternative presence postures. Some analytic techniques we have found could be used to develop credible estimates of the likely utility of one or another presence package in promoting key objectives. And some of the approaches for gathering expert opinion and perspectives that IDA has identified through its literature search and other investigations for this project could be used more systematically by DoD to help the US plan and evaluate overseas military presence options.

This chapter provides an unclassified overview of the literature on US military presence.<sup>2</sup> It begins with a description of the chief strands of this literature. Three categories are identified: 1) arguments and hypotheses; 2) selected proposals for changing US presence postures; and 3) existing evidence regarding the effects of presence that might be used to evaluate proposals for change. We then advance several concepts for improving understanding of the effects of US overseas military presence and for evaluating proposals for change.

---

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, the White House's *National Security Strategy* and DoD's *National Military Strategy* throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

<sup>2</sup> The classified analyses we have reviewed refine and sharpen the conclusions drawn from unclassified work, but do not generate different conclusions at the level of detail addressed in this report.

## GENERAL ARGUMENTS AND HYPOTHESES

An overwhelming majority of US commentators and students of US foreign policy and military activities favor an internationalist role for the United States as well as some kind of continuing overseas military presence.<sup>3</sup> Virtually all contend in broad terms that some US overseas military presence will continue to help advance US interests and security objectives.

Most experienced observers believe that US overseas military presence is effective (to some degree) in strengthening deterrence, assuring friends and allies, positioning the US to be able to protect key interests in crisis situations, stabilizing the security environment, preserving an open international economic environment, and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons.

The arguments and hypotheses of Colin Powell, Joseph Nye, Robert Art, Bradford Dismukes, and Richard Haass over the last decade are illustrative.

### Colin Powell

Writing in 1991 in *Foreign Affairs*, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered an eloquent statement of the importance of a continuing overseas military presence.

Our forward presence is a given—to signal our commitment to our allies and to give second thoughts to any disturber of the peace.... Economic power is essential; political and diplomatic skills are needed; the power of our beliefs and values is fundamental to any success we might achieve; but the presence of our arms to buttress these other elements is as critical to us as the freedom we so adore. [p. 36]

### Joseph Nye

Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has argued for many years that the United States should take a strong leadership role in building new, broader security structures in key parts of the world.

---

<sup>3</sup> In sharp contrast, neo-isolationists such as Patrick Buchanan, and scholars at some libertarian organizations, e.g., the Cato Institute, favor a minimal US military role other than that of homeland defense. Accordingly, they would drastically cut back a wide variety of US military activities abroad, including participation in military alliances such as NATO.

In the mid-1990s, he was the principal author of the “Nye Report” [Nye, 1995], which called for maintaining at least 100,000 US troops in East Asia on a peacetime basis, as a clear symbol of a continuing US commitment to security and stability in the region.

In recent years, Nye has focused again upon East Asia and reasserted the criticality of continued US military engagement in East Asia and the Pacific:

US power remains central to the security of East Asia...America’s great diplomatic challenge is to build a new concert of Pacific powers, based on a strong US-Japan alliance, normal relations with China, and a reconciliation between Japan and China. China will not be a global challenger to the United States, nor will it be able to exercise regional hegemony, so long as the United States stays involved in East Asia and maintains its alliance with Japan. [Nye, 2000]

### **Robert Art**

Robert Art, writing in *International Security* over a decade ago, developed an extensive argument for a continuing but significantly reduced US military presence in the Post-Cold war era. He began by asserting that the US had a major choice to consider:

The Cold War is over and the United States won it. Now, after its forty-five year battle with the Soviet Union, what should the United States do with its power? Exactly where on the continuum between the two grand alternatives—unbridled internationalism and constricted isolationism—should the United States draw the line? [Art, 1991]

In other statements he asserted: “Although I argue against an isolationist policy, I do prescribe retrenchment. I call for a residual, not a warfighting, US overseas military presence.” [p. 71] “A residual American presence in both regions (Europe and the Far East) adds insurance to two stable situations at a small price in order to hedge against a highly unlikely but terribly costly possibility.” [p. 110] “Besides retarding nuclear spread and preserving economic openness, there are two other goals for which an overseas presence can be of help: spreading democracy and imposing peace. The United States should, however, be restrained about using military power for either objective.” [p. 105]

## **Bradford Dismukes**

In several studies conducted midway through the 1990s, Bradford Dismukes of the Center for Naval Analyses argued on behalf of a forward military presence posture over one centered in the United States and deployed only as needed [Dismukes, 1994].

“The posture of overseas presence is superior to one centered on forces in CONUS in capacity to support the objectives of the national strategy.” [p. 49] “CONUS forces are indeed influential, including in the deterrence of adversaries who know that forces overseas can be augmented by forces from CONUS.... But...that is not to say that CONUS-based forces would be as effective in either deterrence or military action as forces overseas.” [p. 38] “Military power is but one of many instruments available to US policy makers. The fact that what follows focuses on the manifestation of military power in the form of forces forward does not indicate that it is the leading instrument. It is not. In today’s world, primacy rests with the economic and political. But military power in the form of overseas presence is an essential component of US policy without which political and economic means of influence will not remain effective.” [p. 14]

While asserting the superiority of a forward posture, Dismukes contended that it is also extremely difficult to determine the consequences, on the margin, of a smaller or larger US military presence in advancing such security objectives as deterrence.

Effective deterrence depends on an adversary’s perception that you have the required military capabilities and the political will to use them. It is difficult at best, and usually impossible, to determine when an action that would otherwise be taken has been deterred. Beyond the difficulty of knowing what the presumed deteree sees, thinks and expects, negative evidence (things that don’t happen) rarely (if ever) lets us conclude much about cause and effect. One way to get around this problem is to amass the judgments of experts—i.e., what specialists in a region judge to be the deterrent effects of US forces present in it. [p. 36]

Overall, he saw deterrence as the leading purpose of presence:

Many feel that the reason for the existence of military forces is purely and simply to fight and so logically focus on crisis response and war. There is no question that overseas forces must possess genuine combat capabilities, and these must be used successfully when needed. The greatest utility of the armed forces in the new era, however, lies in three other strategic functions that are at the heart of overseas presence: deter adversaries; make common cause with friends on behalf of security; provide stable conditions so that the US and the world economies can flourish, and

inhibit the development of trade restrictions that limit both. The first, to deter...is the leading purpose of presence. Deterrence also reassures allies, a major benefit in its own right. [pp. 15–16]

Finally, Dismukes argued that overseas presence forces alone are not sufficient to deter an adversary: the US must use an effective deterrence strategy as well:

[T]he presence of US forces forward does not always deter; among the cases usually cited are Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and Serbia's expansion in ex-Yugoslavia. (In the writer's [Dismukes'] opinion, these cases can be more satisfactorily interpreted as resulting from a failure by the US to express convincingly what actions it has regarded as unacceptable—that is either from ambiguity about the geographic line the US was prepared to defend (Saddam) or about US political will to defend a stated position (Serbia) —than about shortcomings in the forces themselves.) [p. 37]

### **Richard Haass**

Also writing in the mid-1990s, Richard Haass, then of the Brookings Institution, alluded explicitly to what he viewed as the use of US forces deployed and stationed forward in a deterrent role and, implicitly at least, to their value in that role [Haass, 1999].

Force is used every day [by the US] for deterrence; examples include maintaining strategic nuclear forces on some kind of alert, stationing large numbers of forces in Europe and Korea, and the US Navy sailing the high seas to signal US interests and a readiness to act on their behalf. [p. 20]

Haass, like Dismukes, alluded to the importance of appropriate signaling behavior in successful deterrence:

The movement and use of military forces is obviously a critical component of a deterrent strategy. Forces can be positioned, deployed, and/or exercised to signal the existence of interests and the readiness to respond militarily if those interests are either threatened or attacked....Deterrence can be the purpose behind long-term deployments, such as the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula or in Europe since the end of World War II. Such deployments are structural, to remain until the political map or international situation fundamentally changes....Deterrence can also take the form of a response to a specific or tactical situation that emerges suddenly—say the perceived threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980's when the United States decided to reflag Kuwaiti vessels, or the stationing of US and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia under Desert Shield to deter Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia following the invasion of Kuwait. [pp. 50–51].

## **BEYOND ALL-OR-NOTHING ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE VALUE OF PRESENCE**

As these and various other proponents eloquently testify, having some degree of US overseas military presence is more likely to promote US security objectives than is having no presence at all. As a practical matter, though, it would be useful if decision-makers in DoD had tangible evidence as to the differences that alternative types, levels, degrees and frequencies of overseas military presence might make. Such evidence could then help DoD better assess the pros and cons of various proposals for changes in US military presence posture conceived within the department or recommended by others. For example, it would help to know whether additional routine presence of one kind or another would be very helpful in advancing security objectives, or, alternatively, only minimally helpful. It would be useful to know whether a less continuous routine presence in one place or another would be quite harmful to US interests or, alternatively, make little difference.

US military presence assets and activities are not ends in and of themselves. In a very real sense, the nation can never have too much security, freedom, democracy and peace. But US military presence is only a potential means to such ends. The extent and forms of these relationships between means and ends are, in a very practical sense, the basic questions here. For example, more presence may confer strong deterrence, or assurance, or stabilization, or crisis response benefits up to a point, after which the benefits diminish sharply. If the US continues to invest resources well beyond a point of sharply diminishing returns, then it may not be getting its best security return for its buck.<sup>4</sup>

Over the last decade, a number of specific suggestions have been made to modify, not eliminate, US overseas military presence in various regions. For discussion purposes here, the following proposals may be taken as illustrative.

### **SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES (AND CONTINUITY) IN PRESENCE POSTURES**

In 1991, Robert Art argued that the United States should adopt what he called a “residual,” not a war-fighting US military presence. About the same time, Richard Kugler

---

<sup>4</sup> Ultimately, this will also depend upon how important it is judged to be to get even these diminishing extra returns with DoD’s investments versus the extra returns in other possible areas of DoD investment.

of RAND outlined (and evaluated) a set of US military presence options for the European theater. Within the last couple of years, but prior to September 11, Michelle Flournoy and her study team at the National Defense University (NDU), as well as Michael O'Hanlon of Brookings, each offered region-by-region presence recommendations for the US government to consider.<sup>5</sup>

### **Robert Art**

Ten years ago, Robert Art's "residual" US overseas presence posture proposal looked roughly as follows [Art, 1992]:

If the United States cuts its European force to 50-70,000, including the forces afloat; reduces, when appropriate, its Western Pacific and East Asian contingent to 50,000; and stations 5,000-10,000 forces in Israel, it would have an overseas force, exclusive of what may be needed in the Persian Gulf, of 150,000-175,000, compared to 510,000 at the end of FY 1989. [p. 116]

A routine posture of this sort, Art argued, would be a useful form of insurance for the United States and would be quite viable, so long as the forward forces are quickly reinforceable from the United States.

### **Richard Kugler**

At about the same time, Richard Kugler of RAND developed a set of proposals for a US presence posture in Europe [Kugler, 1992]. Four specific options were outlined: "forward presence" (150,000 US service members); "dual based forward presence" (100,000 service members); "limited presence" (70,000 service members), and symbolic presence (40,000 service members).

By contrast with Art, Kugler concluded that a US posture in Europe could not readily be reduced below 150,000 without "sacrificing some important capabilities. Additional cutbacks would either pare back some combat forces that are a key element of the DoD plan or further reduce a support posture that already is about 25 percent short." [p. 31]

---

<sup>5</sup> Since the events of September 11, a wide variety of proposals for change in US routine military overseas presence have emerged. Chapters V and VI describe the post-September 11 views on US presence of a range of US and foreign security experts.

**Michelle Flournoy (with Cliff, Tangredi and Wormuth)**

In 1999–2000, Michelle Flournoy and her study team at NDU prepared a number of recommendations for consideration in QDR 2001, including a variety of suggestions regarding US military presence [Flournoy, 2000]. The group offered proposals with regard to Europe, the Middle East, and the East Asia-Pacific region.

Concerning Europe, Flournoy et al. argued that the United States would continue to have critical “shaping” tasks, that it should maintain strong partnerships in the region, that a significant presence is essential, and that a greatly reduced US presence would not be likely to spur Europeans to do more. They went on to assert that the mission for US forces in Europe had changed, that “containment is out, and engagement is in,” with NATO now doing peace enforcement side by side with the Russians. But they claimed, too, that current US forces in Europe were not appropriate for the changed mission. They hypothesized that emplacing Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) in Europe would greatly improve US ability to respond to contingencies there and elsewhere. They encouraged DoD to shift toward medium forces and more support forces, e.g., for small-scale contingencies (SSCs), placing emphasis on medical, construction, and communications units and gear, and urging the addition of more gear to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD), more WMD sensors, a robust Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and more Special Operations Forces (SOF).

In short, although they did not recommend eliminating heavy Army US units altogether in Europe—saying that would be “extremely unwise”—they did call for more agile and deployable ground forces. By contrast, the NDU team argued that the US Navy forces in the region as of 2000 were already “inherently agile,” and offered no specific recommendations for change in that respect. Finally, with regard to the European Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), the study group hypothesized that it simply would not succeed without strong (on the scene) US leadership.

As for the Middle East, the NDU study emphasized a likely increasing threat to maritime forces there, a need for better TMD, force protection, more WMD detectors, an increase in naval presence (especially TMD-capable surface ships), and a possible shift to more amphibious forces in lieu of some ground forces in the region. Flournoy’s group considered the value of increasing long-range strike capabilities (from Diego Garcia) as well, but warned that a “reduction in visible presence” in the region could have “a severe and deleterious political effect, eroding both deterrence and regional support.” The threat environment in the Middle East was said to be increasingly likely to feature WMD; the

study team expressed serious concerns regarding WMD attacks on US forces, host nation citizens and others, including Host Nation Support (HNS) personnel. Overall, the study concluded that the long-term US ground presence prospects in the region are quite uncertain.

Turning to the Asia-Pacific region, the NDU study team offered a number of specific recommendations regarding US foreign policy and overseas military presence. As for Japan, they urged the US to “treat Japan as an equal,” asserting, rather starkly, that the situation “will explode” otherwise. Among US bases and units in Japan, the authors argued that Yokusaka and Kadena are unusually valuable (with Kadena said to be especially important for tactical aircraft capability in any scenarios involving Taiwan). They asserted that Misawa is very “important” for tactical air refueling en route from Alaska, that the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa is important but not vital, and that the Air Force base at Yokota is the least vital.

Concerning Korea, Flournoy’s group argued that the US is “well-positioned now.” But they went on to argue that “significant change” in the security situation is likely in the decade; that a collapse of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is more likely than an attack upon the Republic of Korea (South Korea); and that any North Korean attack scenario would get especially complex if China were to intervene over refugees. After reunification, they said that while the US should not withdraw, significant reductions in US presence should be feasible. And to ensure that Koreans understand the purpose of having US forces there, the US should consider building a vigorous public relations campaign to that effect—sooner rather than later.

Regarding the People’s Republic of China, the NDU study group said Chinese military capability was growing and that Taiwan was an “increasing concern.”

As for Southeast Asia and South Asia, they encouraged the United States to seek ways to increase its presence, perhaps using the “Singapore model.” (The US uses Singapore’s facilities and services on a contractual basis but does not have its own base.) They said the US should expand its relations with Australia; upgrade facilities at Diego Garcia; and seek to refurbish its air and naval facilities at Guam.

In sum, the NDU group recommended some changes in the mix of US presence assets in the European context (lighter assets, more WMD-relevant capabilities); an enhancement of maritime assets in the Persian Gulf as well as of long-range strike

capabilities at Diego Garcia; a stronger presence in Southeast Asia and South Asia (along the lines of the arrangements with Singapore); and some reductions in Marine presence in Okinawa (if necessary).

### **Michael O'Hanlon**

Michael O'Hanlon, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 2001, argued for a continuing US military presence in a significant number of areas, but for selective reductions as well.

Regarding the Balkans, O'Hanlon urged that any cuts be made very carefully. He said that continuing US participation is necessary there, not only for the US to maintain its leadership in NATO, but to ensure adequate stability in the region.

Pulling all US troops out of the region would fly in the face of the lessons learned from the consequences of America's delayed participation in the two world wars and in the Bosnian war of 1992-95. If the United States wishes to maintain its leadership of the NATO alliance, it must participate in difficult and dangerous European security operations such as the Balkan interventions...cuts in American forces in the Balkans should focus on Bosnia [not Kosovo]. The Bush administration could pare the current US deployment—5,000 to 6,000 troops—roughly in half during its first term without causing significant harm. [p. 2]

In East Asia, O'Hanlon encouraged the US to reduce but not eliminate the Marine presence in Okinawa. Two principal reasons were advanced. First, he claimed that the [20,000 US] marines on Okinawa are not so much forward-deployed as they are marooned. Okinawa itself is not at risk, and Japanese forces have the capacity to defend it even if it were. Furthermore, the three amphibious ships based in Japan can transport only the 2,000 marines of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which patrols the region, to areas of actual threat elsewhere in the Pacific. [p. 3]

Second, O'Hanlon argued that keeping so many marines on Okinawa also places a major strain on US-Japan relations. He cites recent polls that showed more than 80 percent of all Japanese consider the Okinawa arrangement undesirable and unfair to local citizens. By trying to hold on to all of its bases in Japan, he contends, the United States risks causing a backlash and ultimately losing everything, including those facilities with the greatest military benefit for crises in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, or elsewhere—notably, the Kadena Air Force base on Okinawa and US Navy and Air Force facilities on Japan's main islands. Washington should therefore scale back the number of marines on Okinawa to about 5,000. [p. 3]

As for US global naval carrier presence, O'Hanlon argued that there is a continuing need for regular and potentially continuous presence in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, but that the Mediterranean Sea is another matter.

"The US Navy maintains a nearly continuous aircraft carrier presence in both the western Pacific Ocean and the Persian Gulf. For six to eight months of the year, it also keeps a carrier in the Mediterranean.<sup>6</sup> The Persian Gulf and western Pacific deployments remain strategically important. But the US naval presence in the Mediterranean lost much of its justification with the end of the Cold War." "Maintaining a US aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean for six or more months a year is excessive. In the future, both deterrence and war-fighting purposes would be better served by a more flexible naval presence that would allow for carriers to be sped to the Mediterranean when necessary." [pp. 4, 5]

And as for the operations labeled N. and S. Watch in Southwest Asia, O'Hanlon argued they have "been demanding, particularly for the US Air Force.... The United States should still keep fighter aircraft in the region to deter Saddam's moves against his neighbors and his own minority groups. But the numbers of aircraft can be reduced and less emphasis placed on maintaining constant airborne patrols over Iraq... Instead, the United States should use robust air-to-ground attacks to punish large-scale Iraqi aggression or evidence of renewed Iraqi pursuit of weapons of mass destruction... Strikes against airfields could occur if Iraq violated the no-fly zone.... Bombers operating out of Europe or Diego Garcia (a British-American naval support base in the Indian Ocean) could participate in such attacks as well, especially if larger stocks of precision munitions were allocated to those locations. This proposal would cut the US military presence in the Persian Gulf region from 25,000 to less than 20,000 service personnel. The relief would be greatest for the Air Force, the service that has suffered the most from deployments to the Persian Gulf: its aircraft now maintaining the southern no-fly zone might be reduced by roughly 50 percent. That single step would essentially solve the service's ongoing equipment and personnel problems, caused by the demands of a high operational tempo...." [pp. 5-6]

"Together, these proposed cuts in overseas US military forces would allow the United States to bring home 25,000 of its 250,000 troops now based or deployed abroad. Most would be taken not from the Balkans but from Okinawa and the Persian Gulf, where

---

<sup>6</sup> This is no longer the case. US CVBGs still transit through the Mediterranean en route to the Indian Ocean, but as of mid-2001 they no longer maintained a regular presence in that area.

US interests are less humanitarian than strategic. Making all these reductions at once could raise eyebrows around the world and require special efforts to reassure friends and foes alike that the United States was not disengaging overseas. But the 25,000 troops in question amount to just ten percent of the existing overseas force posture in its entirety—hardly an overbearing fraction. They would account for about a quarter of all US military personnel routinely deployed away from home bases and families, however, and so the impact on troop morale, and military readiness, would be significant.”

In short, O’Hanlon recommended careful reductions, if any, in Bosnia, and significant reductions in US naval presence in the Mediterranean, in the continuous Air Force presence in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and in the Marine presence in Okinawa.

## **EVIDENCE AS TO EFFECTS OF ADOPTING ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE POSTURES AND APPROACHES**

The aforementioned studies, as well as a number of others,<sup>7</sup> offer a range of proposals for adjustments to the US overseas military presence posture (and to the types of platforms, equipment, and skill types that should be positioned forward routinely) in the years ahead. What evidence and arguments are available from the existing literature in order to evaluate such proposals?

### **Evidence Regarding Presence and Crisis Response/Combat Outcomes**

Not surprisingly, there is considerable evidence in the literature that, if there is a fast-breaking need in a forward area for a US crisis response capability, presence assets will ordinarily (though not always) provide the commander with the greatest flexibility and crisis responsiveness. Indeed, the most obvious advantage that more US military presence assets offer is a greater ability for a US commander to respond quickly to a very time-sensitive problem than if the assets must first be brought in from elsewhere.<sup>8</sup>

In concrete terms, the “crisis-response-value” added by an extra US military presence asset of one particular kind or another is likely to hinge upon several things: the nature of the crisis (a ship at risk, an impending terrorist attack, a non-combatant

---

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Miskel, 2001; Goure, 2001; Congressional Budget Office, 2002b; Downing and Thomason, 2001; Leonard, 2000; Korb, 2000; Singer et al., 1972; US Navy Study, 1999–2000; Cebrowski and Hughes, 1999; Barnett and Thomason, 1999; and Thomason et al., 2001.

<sup>8</sup> Adam Siegel provides a good illustration of just how effective such presence assets can be [Siegel, 1991].

evacuation of an embassy, an impending cross-border invasion, etc.); the expected timing of the crisis; the level of threat or challenge; the other capabilities likely to be available, etc. In short, is the presence asset the right kind of asset? How much is needed, how fast, and why? What other capability “supply” possibilities are there besides this extra US military presence? And what are the relative costs to the US of maintaining these various options?

At this finer level of detail, IDA has not found much off-the shelf evidence of the comparative crisis responsiveness of various presence and power projection approaches to particular types of crises. Several methodologies for conducting such assessments have been located, and a few illustrative assessments have been identified. The work in Thomason et al., 1995, and Thomason and Barnett, 1995, is illustrative, as is Ruskin’s [1995]. Thomason et al. estimated the relative crisis responsiveness of various types of military force packages under alternative logistical and operational policy constraints. Using a stochastic (Monte Carlo simulation) approach, they assessed the relative speeds with which the US could bring different crisis-relevant military assets to bear from each of several presence postures and under several increasingly challenging logistical scenarios. In addition, beginning in 1996 the Joint Staff, in the context of its Dynamic Commitment series, developed (and encouraged the Services and USTRANSCOM to develop) tools and data bases for estimating the ability of US forces to deploy to Major Theater Wars (MTWs) on a timely basis from various starting positions in peacekeeping/stability operations and SSCs [Carter et al., 1997]. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N81) has also done a variety of stochastic assessments along these lines (with a focus on the starting positions of maritime assets) [Free, 1998]. Illustrative, too, is the RAND Arroyo Center’s work [Chu, 2001] assessing the crisis responsiveness of new Army units (e.g., IBCTs) from Germany to various potential hotspots (Balkans, SWA).

Analyses of this kind can certainly provide DoD with useful information, and can suggest various mixes of military capabilities that may be helpful for crises of various kinds. But an important limitation of many of these approaches is that they do not really demonstrate how important having one or more extra US presence assets more quickly (rather than less) is likely to be in achieving successful crisis (including major combat) outcomes. In this sense, many of these assessments are still more “input-” than “output-” or effects-oriented.

Thus, for example, the US currently has a number of assets already on or near potential conflict scenes, such as in Korea or the Persian Gulf. For potential combat scenarios such as these, what difference would having more (or fewer) of these assets available sooner rather than later make to the likely outcome of a crisis or conflict?

IDA has searched the literature for evidence bearing on this question, as well as for appropriate methods for developing such estimates. IDA has found references to a few analyses of this sort, but no actual assessments.<sup>9</sup> Because this seems like a potentially promising evaluation technique for DoD, IDA has developed some illustrative evidence using this approach.<sup>10</sup> Based on our initial tests, we believe it will be feasible, at least in a simulated environment, for DoD to readily assess the combat implications or effects of starting from one or another US presence posture. Chapter III provides a very brief unclassified overview of this methodological approach as well as of the “proof of concept” tests that IDA has conducted. Appendix D, issued separately, provides classified-level detail on these findings.

### **Evidence Regarding Presence and Assurance**

A second major hypothesis in the literature posits that more presence assets (of one kind or another) can and do promote higher levels of allied and friendly assurance (or reassurance)<sup>11</sup> that the US is committed to helping protect them against potential threats. Assurance of allies and friends as to our commitment and ability to help them is a key security goal of the United States. What evidence exists as to how much military presence, of what kinds, is necessary, or desirable, in order to assure friends and allies on these points?

In a 1992 study of various US presence posture alternatives for the Asia Pacific region, Winnefeld et al. characterized the views of major foreign governments’ and

---

<sup>9</sup> DAWMs may have conducted some such analyses. See Department of Defense, 1994.

<sup>10</sup> In this approach, the analyst would, for example, systematically compare the results of a simulation that assumes more distant starting positions for some assets (that are now routinely present overseas) with the results of a case that assumes those assets continue to be routinely present. The difference in results between the cases is considered to be the “combat effect,” on the margin, of adopting the more distant presence posture. In this manner, the effects on the margin of more and less robust forward presence postures may be compared with a base case. In this manner, it may thus be feasible for DoD to generate a range of credible, effects-based evidence of a variety of potential alternatives to the status quo. Analogous, effects-based approaches might also be developed with regard to relevant crisis types other than major combat scenarios.

<sup>11</sup> We use these two terms, “assurance” and “reassurance,” more or less interchangeably in this report.

opposition parties' views toward regional security issues and toward US military presence. Then the authors assessed the likely foreign responses of key regional players to the postulated presence alternatives. To develop their assessments, the study team drew upon a variety of sources, including public statements of foreign officials, regional specialists' assessments, and off-the record discussions.

To illustrate their findings, they depicted the situation in Northeast Asia at the time as follows:

For US allies like Japan and South Korea, [political, military and economic] uncertainties clearly argue in favor of continued close political and military links with the United States, including a long term military presence in Northeast Asia. Even for states whose views of the United States are currently more complex or even oppositional (i.e., North Korea, China, and the former Soviet Union), the 'Japan factor,' growing internal problems, and the likelihood of significant changes in the overall regional security environment all underscore the need to avoid sudden, destabilizing external shifts, particularly in military force levels. China and Russia in particular may increasingly recognize the positive role played by US regional forces. [p. 42].

"Support for a visible, forward-deployed US force presence will remain strong, both to reassure and to deter." [p. 53] "there will probably be pressure to reduce those aspects of the US presence especially provocative in a Japanese and South Korean domestic context." "There will probably be greater overall acceptance of a considerably smaller forward deployed presence, as long as the security alliance with Japan remains intact and some significant US air and naval presence remains based on the Japanese islands." "Extreme changes would be viewed as highly destabilizing; less drastic reductions will likely produce a more mixed response." "All changes will require the United States to take a sophisticated approach that employs appropriate compensating policy and program initiatives." [p. 51]... "The most destabilizing US force posture for Northeast Asia would be ...the elimination of virtually all bases in the western Pacific. [p. 53] "...this change would likely produce a range of negative military and political responses—such as pressures in Japan for full-scale rearmament, greater Chinese emphasis on military development, closer RoK political and military association with the former USSR." "A gradual withdrawal, over a longer period, might produce a less destabilizing set of reactions, but significant tensions would remain—most notably intense rivalry between Japan and Korea and the overall issue of Japanese remilitarization." [p. 57]

In the mid-1990s, Zakheim et al. [1996] conducted an extensive assessment. Based upon a variety of interviews with foreign representatives, they concluded that US presence, especially naval presence, provides strong assurance value to friends and allies in many parts of the world. The study team found that interviewees shared the view that US military presence is crucial to preserving stability, which in turn is crucial to regional economic growth, itself a US economic and national security interest. Many respondents were even more explicit about the linkage between military presence and the preservation, indeed enhancement, of their own and US economic interests. This feeling was said to be widespread throughout each of the regions.

In 1995, Thomason et al. found two principal things: first, US allies and friends indicated very clearly that they were more assured by greater, rather than less, US military presence. Second, in some parts of the world (Western Europe and Korea) land-based presence was considered much more helpful, all things considered, than sea-based presence in providing assurance, whereas in other parts of the world (e.g., much of the Persian Gulf), just the opposite appeared to be true.

Overall, friends and allies want help, presence, but on their own terms, which means, increasingly, as unobtrusively as possible in most instances; and they want to be recognized as political equals. [p. 8]

As a part of the same study, Thomason et al. also conducted off-the-record interviews with approximately three dozen US security experts in the mid-1990s to assess the “assurance” and other values these experts assigned to various levels and types of US presence, power projection capability, and other factors (for a synopsis, see Thomason, 2001). Current and former Service chiefs, commanders in chief of Unified Commands, and other senior policy makers and diplomats were interviewed as to the effectiveness of various kinds of presence and other instruments of national power in promoting the principal objectives of presence.

Overall, these US decision-makers saw reassurance of friends and allies as a vital part of our foreign policy and national security strategy. They viewed reassurance as a complex, ongoing process, calling for high-quality and, frequently, high-level attention. They cited continuous, face-to-face involvement and relationships—both military and civilian—as necessary in establishing the trust and understanding that underpins strong friendships, partnerships, and coalitions. Many of the interviewees noted that the

establishment of an ongoing dialogue helps both parties to avoid misinterpreting one another's intentions and contributes to an understanding of the way in which both parties think.

Strong personal relationships, while necessary, were by no means viewed as sufficient for reassurance. Most respondents said that an essential part of effective reassurance is a demonstrable, credible US ability to “be there” for friends and allies when they need specific help, and the ability to provide assistance of the right kind at the right time. In short, there was virtual unanimity that some combat-credible presence forces were important to reassurance. A number of respondents mentioned various forms and levels of ground forces as most helpful for reassurance purposes. Others mentioned maritime assets as most helpful. Still others cited the importance of land-based air forces.

Among these senior US decision-makers, a firm, widely shared belief was evident: strong, continuous, high-quality personal level interactions and relationships are necessary to promote the reassurance objective. But they are not sufficient. They need to be combined with some regular, credible evidence of US will and ability to be there to help when needed. On this latter point, however, no real consensus was evident regarding the essentiality of any one particular level (or type) of presence forces for effective reassurance. This finding may be explained in part by the possibility that what respondents viewed as “credible” may have been—at least broadly—a function of what they viewed as either the current or latent threat level in a particular region at the time. It may also have been due to genuine uncertainty as to what “works” to offset various perceived threat levels.

Foreign military interaction (mil-to-mil) programs have been cited by many experienced observers as being high pay-off presence activities in reassuring allies and friends as well as being very useful in establishing the relationships that can help lay the groundwork for timely US access to local, militarily-relevant facilities in the event of a contingency. One study of the leverage that such programs and relationship building efforts have provided the US was conducted by James Winnefeld in the mid-1990s [1994]. His key finding:

We have been most struck by the importance of influence and the high payoff afforded by the relatively small US investments: IMET, FMS training, exercises, and exercise related construction. If we did nothing else programmatically in the Central Command AOR, these programs would make eminent sense strategically and be a good buy for the taxpayer. [p. 35]

## **Evidence Regarding Presence and Deterrence**

A major rationale for a robust US military presence is that it is hypothesized to strengthen deterrence. A number of observers cite deterrence as a critical role of US forward presence forces and activities. Yet as Dismukes and others have indicated, obtaining tangible evidence as to the value on the margin of one or another type or level of military presence is difficult, context dependent and, most likely, time dependent as well.

In the early 1990s, in order to elicit some empirical evidence on this matter, Dismukes surveyed 14 US country teams to at least indirectly probe what sorts of US military presence key European allies thought was needed in that region as a deterrent. Based on his results, Dismukes recommended great caution in reducing US military presence there: the country teams he interviewed not only unanimously argued for the efficacy of US military forward presence; they also said that it would be too risky to reduce US forces there any further [Dismukes, 1994].

About the same time, Thomason et al. [1995] conducted off-the-record interviews with approximately three dozen US security experts in order to assess the value these experts assigned to various levels of US presence, power projection capability and other major factors in creating a high probability of deterrence. Virtually all respondents argued that *some* level of credible combat power in a presence mode was a useful deterrent. There was general agreement that the optimal mix (and levels) of power projection and military presence capabilities for effective deterrence was very “context dependent.” For effective deterrence, the respondents generally viewed clear, frequent US statements of commitment to defend our interests, including our friends and allies, backed by some tangible evidence of our ability and will to punish aggression swiftly and severely—as the best prescription. Agreement as to specifics—just what types of US statements of commitment were believed to be clearest, just what particular evidence is necessary in order to demonstrate our ability to punish aggression swiftly and severely—was much harder to find. There were some areas of agreement. For example, some combat credible capabilities on the scene were almost always regarded as better than none. Larger numbers of combat-credible presence forces were viewed as almost certainly more likely to deter than fewer of such assets. A strong, timely US ability to project power rapidly into a region was viewed by virtually all respondents as more likely to deter than a less capable or less timely projection capability. As for particular regions, however, the group offered no compelling evidence about how many or how frequently

presence assets were needed in order to provide an adequate degree of deterrence. Respondents did not indicate a clear consensus as to even the rough mix of power projection and presence activities that they thought would suffice, or be necessary to deter aggression, in any particular foreign area. They clearly did emphasize the importance and complexity of getting deterrence right, the context-dependence of any judgments as to what is enough, and the interplay of a variety of political and military factors.

In this same study, senior defense attachés from 12 countries in various regions were also canvassed by Thomason et al. regarding what difference they believed one or another US presence posture would make in deterring local adversaries. Most emphasized that visible, combat credible military assets were likely to be more of a deterrent than forces back in the United States or even than forces that were in the area but kept well over the horizon.

Overall, virtually all of the expert testimony that IDA identified in our literature search emphasizes the complexities associated with determining how much presence is enough to provide an adequate deterrent, at least in any context where threat assessments indicate that a regime is hostile and has significant military capabilities of one sort or another.<sup>12</sup>

### **Historical Assessments**

Expert testimony regarding the deterrent utility of alternative forms and levels of presence may potentially be supplemented with historically based, or game-based,<sup>13</sup> analyses of what has worked, and might work, to promote deterrence.

Historical analyses can help to identify the conditions and factors that have obtained in situations where a potential aggressor was deterred, and those that prevailed when the aggressor was not deterred. Of the numerous historically based assessments that were reviewed for this project,<sup>14</sup> IDA has found one very promising study. In particular, Paul Huth [1988] studied 58 separate historical attempts to deter challengers

---

<sup>12</sup> For another perspective on this, see Rhodes [1999], who argues that the empirical evidence suggests that US military presence has no clear deterrent value.

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Thurber, 2001.

<sup>14</sup> Appendix G of this report provides a summary of that literature.

and drew specific conclusions regarding the effects of various levels of presence, power projection capability, and of different military and diplomatic strategies on the likelihood of deterrence success.<sup>15</sup>

To determine whether Huth's assessments could be employed by DoD in order to assess the deterrence implications of alternative US presence postures in various regions or threat contexts, IDA conducted some test applications of his estimates in two current threat contexts (NEA and SWA). The results seem promising, and they will be described in Chapter IV.<sup>16</sup>

### **Evidence Regarding Presence and Dissuasion**

Some scholars and statesmen hypothesize that a strong US presence posture is more likely than a more modest routine US presence posture to reduce the chance that rival powers might arise in the future. Some, such as James Schlesinger [1998], have argued that whether rival powers will arise will have more to do with the way the US treats potential adversaries than with one or another specific US troop level (or other form of presence) in a region. Others, such as Nye, argue that a strong presence and a firm but non-threatening US strategy are the keys to dissuasion. Still others [Gingrich, 1999; Marshall (interviewed in Schwartz, 1995)] argue for a strong presence, a firm military and diplomatic strategy, and defense spending that allows the US to maintain such a wide edge in military strength over the rest of the world that no potential rival will see it as even possible to catch up.

Each of these arguments seems plausible. Our literature review, however, has found no historically based assessments of what difference one or another level (or frequency) of US military presence has made or is likely to make in terms of dissuading potential future hegemons.

---

<sup>15</sup> Huth's work has been reviewed and critiqued by several scholars of deterrence. Chapter IV will address both the strengths and limitations of Huth's assessments.

<sup>16</sup> As will be discussed in Chapter IV, the results of these strawman tests suggest that DoD may have latitude to develop less manpower-intensive, yet still highly effective, "1st layer" (forward) deterrence postures in these regions. Overall, Huth's findings imply that if the US applies historically effective military and diplomatic strategies and maintains its current power projection capabilities, it can provide a high (90%, 95%) degree of US confidence of successful deterrence in these threat contexts even after drawing down routine troop levels in these regions by 25 percent or more.

## **Evidence Regarding Presence and Stability**

### **Regional Stability**

A number of observers have posited a relationship between US military presence and regional stability. More presence is most often hypothesized to be more stabilizing than less presence. This is certainly not a foregone conclusion. For example, some US friends, such as Saudi Arabia, appear to believe that a US ground-based presence is having a somewhat destabilizing, not stabilizing, effect in their country [Kaiser and Ottaway, 2002].

Several studies have assessed various aspects of this broad, hypothesized relationship. They fall into two categories. The first concerns stability in international conflict situations. Zakheim et al. [1996], Looney et al. [2001], and Heybey and Stewart [2001] have each developed interesting empirical evidence regarding this relationship.<sup>17</sup>

Zakheim et al., in a study for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1996, assessed whether US naval non-combat activity had a stabilizing effect on markets during the Taiwan crisis of early 1996. Using an events analysis approach, they conclude that such an effect was strong and positive. In particular, Zakheim shows that, in the Taiwan crisis of early 1996, a key Hong Kong market—one that had plummeted over 7% on a single day during the crisis—stabilized after the US announced that a second aircraft carrier, the Nimitz, would be deployed to the area to join the US carrier Independence that was already present there.

In several studies [1997, 2001], Looney et al. of the Naval Post-Graduate School conducted a similar set of assessments, analyzing whether US naval non-combat actions in each of several crises (including the Taiwan crisis) had stabilizing effects on markets. They too conclude that the movements of naval forces to the crisis sites had clear, stabilizing effects.

Hebey and Stewart of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNAC) have also examined the impact of naval non-combat actions upon the stability—both political and economic—of countries experiencing crises of one sort or another. Their results are

---

<sup>17</sup> IDA also found a recent empirical study by Whiteneck [2001] that asserted and apparently tested for a positive correlation between US naval presence and stability. Unfortunately, no statistical relationships were reported.

somewhat mixed—showing an initially negative relationship, followed by a positive, albeit temporally declining relationship.

Overall, these types of studies are methodologically promising. All of them can serve as a useful means of collecting increasingly credible evidence. One limit of these particular studies for our immediate purposes is that they focus on the effects of US military assets that were moved to address a crisis—not upon the US military assets that were present initially versus others. As a result, these specific studies do not permit us to readily differentiate the stabilizing effects of naval forces that were routinely present in the areas of interest prior to the crises, on the one hand, from the stabilizing effects of forces that were rushed or surged to the scenes from elsewhere.

There is no reason, however, that the methods employed in these studies could not be turned more specifically to the study of the distinctive effects of presence versus other instruments of military power and national influence.<sup>18</sup> For purposes of building an effects-based evidence data base for use by DoD, research designs that help the Department sort out the relative effects of presence assets and assets that are surged to crises from elsewhere would be especially useful.

### **Internal Stability**

The use of the US military for internal stability operations has been one of the most hotly contested issues in the defense community during the 1990s. Some scholars and statesmen hypothesize that the US military can be very effective in producing greater internal stability in key states, and that it should be involved in a number of such efforts. Others agree that the US military can be effective in such a role, but argue that it should not be so used unless there is a very compelling need to do so. Still others hypothesize that it is very difficult to use the US military to achieve lasting, stabilizing effects and so are very wary of expending scarce, valuable military resources with the likelihood of a very low payoff.

IDA has found little systematic data and few empirical studies that can shed light on how effective various levels and types of US military forces have been in promoting the internal stability of key states.<sup>19</sup> Some individual case studies of specific

---

<sup>18</sup> Heybey and Stewart [2001] explicitly indicate an intention to conduct such assessments in the future, should they be funded to do so.

<sup>19</sup> Taylor Seybolt of SIPRI has done a study [2001] that empirically compares and contrasts the effectiveness of operations in Iraqi Kurdistan (1991–95), Somalia (1992–95), Bosnia (1992–95),

peacekeeping operations do suggest that the ongoing presence of the US military has, on balance, contributed to internal stability.<sup>20</sup> A recent survey of a number of senior US military officers indicates that many of them believe that US military forces have not only been effective in a peacekeeping/stabilizing role, they can be even more effective in such a role in the future, especially if they can work as part of a larger team, one including other US and international organizations that can provide rule of law capabilities (police, judges, security facilities, etc.) sooner rather than later in an intervention process.<sup>21</sup>

To obtain a more coherent picture of how effective US military forces of various types and levels have or have not been used to date in internal peacekeeping and stabilizing roles, DoD (or some other part of the federal government) could begin assembling a cumulative empirical data base allowing assessments of the temporal relationships, if any, between the presence of US military (and/or other security and “rule of law”) assets in particular countries, or parts of such countries, such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, and the stability of those countries (as judged by a variety of measures).<sup>22</sup> Even more useful could be comparisons of the stability of those countries with the stability over the same periods of other countries that had started the period at roughly the same level of instability as these cases but did not have any US military forces present in a stabilizing role. We have found no such analyses, of either kind, in our literature review to date. Such a data base, and tests of this kind, could be devised. The results of such systematic analyses could prove quite instructive for DoD and other elements of the US government.<sup>23</sup>

---

Rwanda (1994), Kosovo (1999) and East Timor (1999) with respect to lives saved. His methodology is promising, and it may be able to serve as a basis for a set of cumulative, effects-based assessments of such operations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) may also have some solid empirical analyses along these lines. Haass [1999] provides a useful overview of a number of the cases that would be more closely examined in the research design suggested here.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, studies on East Timor [United Nations, 2002]; Bosnia [Cirafici, 1997]; and Kosovo [Serwer, 2001].

<sup>21</sup> Peace Through Law and Education Fund, 2002.

<sup>22</sup> Potential indices include levels of violence, crime, health levels, attitudes, educational opportunities, sanitation, jobs, infrastructure, etc.

<sup>23</sup> Given the potential for terrorist cells such as al Qaeda to find sanctuary in failed or very weak states, senior decision-makers in the US may place a higher priority upon promoting internal stability in a number of states, such as Somalia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Indonesia, than they did before September 11. In planning new initiatives, it would be useful for decision-makers to have a cumulative record and analysis of what efforts have worked better (and less well) in the past.

## Resource Implications of Alternative Presence Postures

Important elements of a methodology for assessing major resource implications of alternative presence postures have been developed by Horowitz and Tyson. Many of the core concepts in that methodology have been incorporated in a model recently developed by IDA, one that may be usable by DoD to assess at least some resource implications of alternative presence postures in an organized, ongoing manner.<sup>24</sup> Chapter VIII will describe the results of several test applications of this model.

In another line of analysis, some credible evidence and arguments have been developed suggesting that there are considerably more efficient ways for DoD to achieve given levels of presence. One major implication of this work, especially that of William Morgan of CNAC, is that there are likely to be more efficient ways than some of today's approaches to deliver whatever effects a given level of presence generates, e.g., crisis responsiveness, favorable combat outcomes, deterrence, dissuasion, stability, etc.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> The "COST" model that IDA has developed for the Comptroller's office within OSD is the one referred to here [Frieders et al., 2002]. In a regular presence evaluation process, several different models (lift, rotation base, base operation costs, etc.) will most probably need to be brought together in order for DoD to be able to readily conduct comparisons of the resource implications of one or another presence alternative. IDA has come across a number of possibilities along these lines in its literature search for this project. In Chapter VII of this report, we discuss how some assessment techniques such as these might be brought together into a coherent process.

<sup>25</sup> In several studies conducted by CNAC in the mid-1990s, William Morgan argued that alternative rotation and maintenance and operational policies are very likely to be more efficient (less resource intensive) ways to obtain identical levels of a given kind of naval presence activity or posture. In one study [June 1994] Morgan asserted that the Department of the Navy could reap efficiency savings of up to 50 percent by shifting from its general policy of rotating ships and crews on 6-month deployments to a policy that would rotate only the crews on 6-month deployments. In Morgan's scheme, crews would fly to ships that would themselves stay in regions such as the Persian Gulf for up to two years at a time. In another study [May 1994] Morgan also argued that by adopting a "phased-maintenance" policy—rather than the one that was prevalent at the time—the Navy could achieve considerably greater efficiency in its provision of naval presence. Morgan's second study outlined several other efficiency-enhancing techniques too—reducing transit times en route to key areas as well as lengthening deployment times. Thomason et al. [1995] independently assessed some of Morgan's assertions and found them to be generally plausible and promising as well. The CBO has recently made a set of similar arguments with regard to naval submarines, in particular arguing for the greater efficiency of stationing a higher fraction of Navy submarines in Guam. See Woods, 2002; Congressional Budget Office, 2002b.

## **SUMMARY**

A number of important hypotheses have been advanced regarding the effects of US military presence upon key security objectives.

The levels and types of presence that will suffice to reassure allies and friends are likely to be very context and time dependent. What will suffice to deter a threat also seems likely to depend heavily upon the level and nature of the particular threat. As for capabilities that DoD would like to have available for crisis response and for combat scenarios in various parts of the world, coherently specifying these would seem to hinge upon identifying the tasks to be done, the desired capabilities, and then identifying the most cost-effective ways of achieving them at any given point in time.

Relatively few of the studies we reviewed have developed approaches that are sufficiently general and flexible that they may be applied, as is, in order to evaluate the implications of one or another presence posture in today's security context in various regions of the world, let alone tomorrow's. On the other hand, we have identified several potentially important techniques that DoD may be able to use to develop a credible, more cumulative evidence base for evaluating presence proposals.

Accordingly, the next several chapters lay out a set of techniques and evidence that may be used to supplement the best judgments of senior DoD and other relevant US government decision-makers in planning and evaluating overseas military presence options. Chapter III outlines an approach for assessing the effects on combat outcomes (and potentially other types of crisis and stability operation outcomes) of adopting one or another presence posture. Chapter IV then describes at some length a technique for assessing the impact on extended immediate deterrence of the United States's adopting one or another US military presence posture. Chapters V and VI summarize the evidence and ideas IDA has gathered through off-the record discussions with over 50 foreign experts from 23 countries as well as with more than three dozen US security experts with whom we have recently met. After reviewing these techniques, evidence, and ideas, Chapter VII develops a concept for drawing together these approaches and findings in a framework that DoD and other parts of the government could use in a regular presence planning and evaluation process in the months and years ahead.

This page intentionally left blank

### **Chapter III**

## **ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE POSTURES ON COMBAT OUTCOMES**

Today, DoD often states its presence objectives in “input” language, such as ensuring that specific military assets—like ships, aircraft, or ground units—are “present” in a particular forward area (such as the Persian Gulf or on the Korean Peninsula) for a certain fraction of the year, and that for most or all of the rest of the year they be able to get to the area within a certain number of days or hours.<sup>1</sup> Simple and understandable as they are, such presence “targets” leave unanswered several underlying questions: Why these assets? Why on these particular timelines? In short, what difference is it likely to make whether such US assets are available there by one point in time or another—in terms of their effects on the outcomes of potential conflicts? This chapter offers DoD a straightforward but potentially powerful technique for systematically and transparently addressing such questions. The approach outlined here would make use of regularly scheduled, departmental, multitheater computer simulation supported analyses. These analyses would begin from well-established base cases that have been agreed to by the Services, the combatant commanders, and the Secretary of Defense. Several illustrative applications of the technique are described briefly here in unclassified terms. (Appendix D, published separately, provides classified details for a number of these applications.) While assessments of this sort can never replace military judgment, they may provide some useful supplementary evidence for the important process of making military presence posture decisions.

In the approach envisioned here, analysts and decision-makers would systematically compare the results of computer simulations that feature changes in the US presence posture assumed in a study base case with the results of the base case. One major type of variant, or sensitivity case, for example, would assume more distant starting positions for some of the military assets than the base case features. The difference in

---

<sup>1</sup> This is the “coverage” and “tether” language of the Global Naval Forces Planning Policy, for example. See Department of Defense, 2001.

combat outcomes between the sensitivity case and the base case could be thought of as the “combat effects,” on the margin, of adopting the alternative presence posture. If these effects are adverse and large, then DoD would be well advised not to consider adopting the alternative, at least not without identifying other, potentially more cost-effective ways to compensate, or “offsets.” If, on the other hand, the adverse effects of the alternative were found to be small, DoD may want to study the alternative more closely and consider adopting it. In this manner, the potential combat effects of more modest as well as more robust presence postures may be systematically estimated relative to a base case. Ideally, a wide range of such sensitivity tests would be conducted, using several different types of simulation models. Through an ongoing research and evaluation process of this sort, DoD could generate a body of credible, effects-based evidence regarding a variety of potential alternatives to the status quo.

Employing an approach of this type, IDA has estimated, for illustrative purposes, the effects on simulated combat outcomes of several types of presence alternatives to a base planning case. For this purpose, we obtained from DoD a base case conflict scenario data set, key assumptions, and their recommended combat model.<sup>2</sup> Then we conducted several simple experiments. In the first set of (three) tests, we “delayed” by at least a week (relative to their assignments in the base case) the entry into a major theater conflict of several maneuver battalions (test A), a major ship type (test B), and several maneuver battalions and several squadrons of land-based aircraft units (test C).<sup>3</sup> As suggested in Table III-1, we then systematically compared the results of these sensitivity cases with those in the base case using several fairly standard measures of combat performance. Chief among the outcome measures were days to achieve each of two key milestones in the conflict (complete the “halt;” complete the “counteroffensive”); maximum total FEBA penetration (in kilometers across all combat sectors); and “Blue” casualties (close-in and overall, by country, and by type of weapon that produced the casualty).

---

<sup>2</sup> The specific data base is described in appendix D. The combat model is the long-established configuration control version of TACWAR. [Atwell, 1994]

<sup>3</sup> In test A, several elements of a major Army combat unit were introduced into the conflict a week later than in the base case. In test B, several major combat ships were delayed in their entry into the combat scenario by 7 days relative to the base case. In test C, we delayed the entry of Army combat elements as in test A and also delayed by a week the entry into the combat scenario of several squadrons of tactical combat aircraft relative to the base case.

**Table III-1. Effects on Combat Outcomes of Selected Alternative US Presence Postures  
(Relative to base case)**

Test	Attributes	Days to Achieve Key Milestones	Max. Opponent Penetration	Blue Casualties
A	Delay entry of X Bns by 7 days	Same	Slightly worse	Better
A2	Test A plus double the firing rate of select tactical aircraft for several days	Same	Better	Much better
B	Delay entry of Y ships by 7 days	Same	Same	Very slightly worse
B2	Test B plus double the firing rate of select tactical aircraft for several days	Better	Better	Better
C	Delay entry of X Bns and Z tactical a/c by 7 days	Same	Slightly worse	Slightly worse
C2	Test C plus double the firing rate of select tactical aircraft for several days	Same	Better	Better

The precise results of these first three tests are classified. As shown at an unclassified level in Table III-1, they do reveal some degree of sensitivity of combat outcomes to alternative presence postures: Maximum opponent Penetration is slightly worse than the base case in tests A and C; Blue Casualties are lower in test A than in the base case, and slightly or very slightly worse than the base case in tests B and C). On the other hand, overall, the combat outcomes were *not* very significantly degraded (in percentage terms) in cases A, B and C relative to the base case.

The next set of tests (A2, B2, C2) proved even more instructive and promising. The unclassified results are also shown in the table. In these experiments, IDA assessed whether any or all of the adverse combat effects that were identified in the first three assessments could be offset by upgrading the firepower capabilities of some of the *other* presence assets that had remained in place in each of the first three tests. In each test, it proved feasible to *more than offset* any of the adverse effects observed in the first three tests by using other potential or actual presence assets (chiefly more precision guided munitions). While the detailed cost-comparisons have not yet been conducted, it is at

least possible that these PGM enhancement options could be *significantly* less expensive to keep in place than the presence assets they were assigned to substitute for in these tests.<sup>4</sup>

Beyond these simple illustrations of the approach, a wide range of other specific tests could and should be conducted, such as analyses that would shed light on whether outcomes would suffer if the assets whose arrivals are delayed in the tests shown in Table III-1 were not employed in the conflict at all.

While these simulation results are primarily intended to merely illustrate the basic methodological approach, they do offer some interesting initial evidence that there is a much broader class of presence approaches that DoD may want to consider closely as a means of less expensively maintaining or even enhancing the combat capability of US and alliance forces in key theaters while employing fewer military personnel continuously forward in the process.

The 2001 QDR called for a more capabilities-oriented approach to force planning. In the years ahead, adopting a presence alternative evaluation approach of the sort envisioned here should allow DoD to focus more clearly on the likely combat effects of having more, fewer, or different capabilities in a forward-presence or a power-projection mode. This, in turn, should help the Department identify more cost-effective ways of providing key capabilities for specific purposes and missions or combinations thereof.

---

<sup>4</sup> See classified appendix D (issued separately) for details on the results of these tests.

## **Chapter IV**

### **ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE POSTURES ON DETERRENCE**

The most comprehensive historically based analysis of factors that promote successful deterrence of state-level attacks upon friends and allies of a major power such as the United States, assuming that the major power actively attempts to deter such attacks, was conducted by Paul Huth and published in 1988. To provide this assessment, Huth built upon a wealth of earlier deterrence studies and did an empirical analysis of all known historical cases of extended deterrence over the preceding century (through 1984). Through this work, Huth demonstrated unequivocally that forward presence, over-the-horizon power projection capability, and several very specific military and diplomatic strategies all have systematically and positively affected the success that a defender such as the United States is likely to have in deterring other nations from attacking its friends and interests overseas. Using a probit/regression technique, Huth was able to estimate the respective historical strengths or potencies of these various factors, both on the margin individually and in combination, in promoting the successful extended-immediate deterrence of a challenger.<sup>1</sup>

The insights and evidence from Huth's study may be of value to DoD and to other US government decision-makers in building and implementing an effects-based presence planning process.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, in this chapter we first summarize the main methods and

---

<sup>1</sup> Extended immediate deterrence attempts are active efforts by a major power (the defender) to deter another state (the potential challenger) from launching a significant military attack upon a friend or ally (protégé). In such cases, the potential challenger has already demonstrated that it is preparing for an attack upon the protégé. Moreover, the major power has signaled that such an attack would be unacceptable and that it intends to retaliate should the attack occur. Attempts of this sort to deter a potential challenger are known as attempts at extended-immediate deterrence. They may fail to deter the challenger or they may succeed. Huth's study focused on explaining why some deterrence efforts succeeded while others failed.

<sup>2</sup> Just as combat simulations are no substitute for expert judgment in estimating the impact of alternative presence postures upon warfare outcomes, inferences based on the method presented here can never replace expert insight and qualitative analysis. They may, however, be able to help. Systematic application of this method (and use of the underlying evidence of historical effects the method helps

findings of that study. Then we demonstrate how Huth's existing analysis could be applied to estimate the extent to which alternative US military presence postures might succeed in deterring attacks by other states upon US friends and allies in several key regions. We conduct several tests of how well Huth's initial estimation procedure explains the outcomes of four deterrence attempts by the United States in the 1990s. We conclude by offering a set of recommendations for strengthening Huth's basic model so that it will be of greatest value to US decision-makers in the years ahead.

## HUTH'S CASES, METHODS, AND FINDINGS

Huth focused upon all (58) known *extended-immediate deterrence* attempts between 1885 and 1983. They are listed in appendix H. Twenty-five of these attempts at deterrence ended in failure: the challenger launched a significant military attack. Thirty-three of these deterrence attempts ended in success; the challenger did not ultimately launch a significant military attack. Huth's cases are all called *extended-immediate deterrence* attempts because they involve efforts by a major outside power (called a "defender" by Huth) to extend its immediate deterrence efforts to cover its friends and allies (called "protégés"). They are all called *extended-immediate deterrence* efforts because *general* deterrence has already failed in all these cases; by standard definition, *general* deterrence failed as soon as a potential challenger in a case began clearly *preparing* to attack a protégé that the major power defender had been generally seeking to deter attacks upon. They are called *extended-immediate deterrence* attempts because, in each case, at least the major power defender responded to the potential challenger's actual preparations for attack by indicating the unacceptability of such an attack—normally by at least threatening to mount some clear retaliation in order to deter an actual attack.

Analyses of these kinds of cases, that is, of the success of various *extended* deterrence efforts, and of the potential role that a major power's routine military presence may have in promoting such successes, appear to be very germane to our overall study of the effects of alternative presence postures in the furtherance of key US military strategy goals such as deterrence. But why focus here only upon *immediate* deterrence attempts, rather than upon the broader category of efforts aimed at promoting *general* deterrence?

---

develop) ought to provide some useful additional insights for US decision-makers as they weigh the pros and cons of various presence options.

There is no intrinsic reason not to study conditions and postures promoting general deterrence; indeed, the results of such studies could be quite illuminating for DoD. But IDA found no broad-scale empirical analyses of this larger topic through our literature review. Moreover, extended-immediate deterrence attempts represent an important part of the larger issue in their own right. In addition, achieving immediate deterrence success in cases where general deterrence has already failed may be an even more daunting task than maintaining a condition of general deterrence.

From prior theory regarding conditions and strategies promoting deterrence, Huth operationalized a variety of potential explanatory variables and tested their contributions to the success of extended-immediate deterrence attempts among his 58 cases. The most powerful explanatory variables that he identified, using a logistic regression technique, are defined as follows:

**The Local Balance:** The local balance of forces is defined as the ratio of opposing forces (defender and protégé versus challenger) that are already concentrated for action at the likely point of attack, or are capable of very rapid mobilization (up to a week) for combat from nearby forward positions. (Huth refers to this force balance as the “immediate balance.”) The challenger’s forces in this balance are only those that are ready to engage (attack) at the point of contention, or capable of very rapid mobilization to that point. The protégé’s forces are also those ready to engage (defend) at the point of contention, or are capable of very rapid mobilization to that point of contention. As the defender state in these 58 cases is geographically located out of the immediate locale, its contribution to this local balance are those of its forces that are routinely present in the local area (either routinely deployed or permanently stationed). A local balance favorable to the defender and protégé was found to promote success in extended-immediate deterrence attempts.

**The Overall Balance:** The overall balance of forces is defined as the ratio of opposing capacities that can *augment* those in the local balance of forces at the point of contention—through the mobilization of additional air, ground, and naval forces, after the first week but within no more than 6 months. (Huth refers to this force balance as the “short-term balance.”) The challenger’s forces in this balance are those *extra* forces that can be mobilized within this time frame to engage at the point of contention. The protégé’s forces in this balance are those extra forces that can be mobilized within this time frame to engage at the point of contention. Again, as the defender state is geographically located out of the immediate locale, its contribution to this balance comprises those forces that can be mobilized (within this time frame) and projected from elsewhere into the theater, i.e., its power projection capability. An overall balance favorable to the defender and protégé was also found to promote success in extended-immediate deterrence attempts.

**A Firm-but-Flexible (FBF) Diplomatic Strategy:** This strategy is defined by Huth as a defender adopting a “mixed” diplomatic strategy of standing firm in response to the repeated demands of the challenger while nevertheless also showing some limited willingness to compromise and negotiate. The only diplomatic strategy strongly associated with extended deterrence success was a Firm-But-Flexible one. Two other diplomatic strategies were also tested by Huth but were found to be ineffective: 1) a diplomatic strategy of “intransigence” in which the defender adopted a totally unyielding position and would not reciprocate any accommodative initiatives by the challenger; and 2) a diplomatic strategy of “unilateral conciliation” in which the defender adopted a policy of significant concessions and accommodation despite no reciprocation by the challenger.

**Proportional Response (PR) Military Strategy:**<sup>3</sup> Huth defined this as a defender responding “in-kind” to the challenger’s military actions in the extended-immediate deterrence episode. A defender’s military strategy was coded as responding in-kind (a proportional response) if the challenger’s initial action and the defender’s response both fell into the same one of the following four coding categories: (1) Statement of intent to use force: a verbal threat to use force; (2) Show of military force: exercises held near the border or off the coast of the challenger/protégé; (3) Buildup of military force for potential use: the reinforcement and movement of forces near the border or off the coast of the challenger/protégé; (4) Preparation of military forces for imminent use: the concentration and alerting of forces near the border. If the challenger’s and defender’s actions did not fall into the same coding category, then the defender’s military strategy was coded as a “non-proportional “ response. Huth defined two kinds of non-proportional defender military strategies or responses: an “aggressive military strategy”—in which the defender initiates military activity in response to a (mere) verbal threat by the challenger or responds to a challenger’s military activity with *greater than equal* levels of military activity; a “cautious military strategy”—in which a defender does not respond to the military activity of a challenger or, generally, responds with *less than equal* levels of military activity. The only strategy strongly associated with deterrence success was a “proportional response” (PR) military strategy.

**Challenger’s Perception of Defender’s Past Behavior:** Huth identified two important types of challenger perceptions of defender’s behavior in any past crises with the challenger. The perceptions were found by Huth to be important in terms of their effects upon the success of the defender’s *current* extended-immediate deterrence attempt. They are a challenger’s perception of defender’s past diplomatic behavior as *either* “conciliatory” (tending toward appeasement) or as totally “intransigent” with regard to the defense of its protégés. In Huth’s analysis, if the challenger had either of these two perceptions of a defender’s past behavior with the challenger, then the defender’s *current*

---

<sup>3</sup> Huth refers to this strategy as a “tit-for-tat military strategy.”

deterrence effort was less likely to succeed than if the challenger's perception of this past behavior was one of a firm-but-flexible negotiator.<sup>4</sup>

In order to determine the historical strength and direction of association between his variables and deterrence outcomes, Huth used a logistic regression. The method allows one to estimate the effect of one variable (or several) on the likelihood of an event occurring.<sup>5</sup> The best specification returned by the logistic regression in Huth's work is presented in Figure IV-1, below. All explanatory variables shown in the specification were statistically significant at the .05 level or better.<sup>6</sup>

$$y = -1.67 + 0.55(x_1) + 0.83(x_2) + 0.97(x_3) + 0.98(x_4) - 1.15(x_5) - 0.86(x_6)^*$$

Where:

y = index

x<sub>1</sub> = local balance of forces; x<sub>2</sub> = overall balance

x<sub>3</sub> = firm-but-flexible diplomacy; x<sub>4</sub> = proportional response strategy

x<sub>5</sub> = defender appeasement; x<sub>6</sub> = defender intransigence

\* p < .05 for all variables

To calculate probability of success for a single case:

$$\text{Probability of success} = 1 / (1 + e^{-y})$$

**Figure IV-1. Logistic Regression Specification**

<sup>4</sup> Since the challenger's perception of the defender's past behavior is a variable that is unlikely to be controllable by a defender in current crises, this variable receives less attention in the remainder of this chapter than others. However, a defender should be aware of a challenger's perceptions of past behaviors and take account of whether that perception will increase or decrease the likelihood of deterrence success in a future conflict.

<sup>5</sup> Logistic regressions are a function of a binary dependent variable and some explanatory variables. The function is logistic rather than linear; it resembles an escalator rather than a straight line. Coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood, which gives the values that maximize the likelihood of getting the data actually observed. A probit analysis allows one to calculate the marginal effect that changes in one explanatory variable have on the likelihood of an outcome, holding all other explanatory variables constant at their means. See Menard, 2001.

<sup>6</sup> While the overall balance includes the military personnel captured in the local balance of forces, colinearity concerns that readers may have are not supported by the analyses. The best measures of the degree of colinearity among the independent variables in a multivariate regression analysis are the auxiliary r<sup>2</sup> values. Multicollinearity among the indicators of the independent variables for the specification was low, with auxiliary r<sup>2</sup> values of: local military balance = 0.13; overall military balance = 0.15, diplomatic strategy = 0.03; military strategy = 0.08; defender conciliation = 0.13; and defender intransigence = 0.12.

This specification correctly accounted for 49 (84%) of the outcomes in the 58 cases examined. Figure IV-2 shows the number of cases predicted correctly and the number mispredicted (9), by type of prediction and outcome.

		<b>Predicted Deterrence Result</b>	
		<i>Failure</i>	<i>Success</i>
<b>Actual Deterrence Result</b>	<i>Failure</i>	19	6
	<i>Success</i>	3	30

84% of predictions were correct, N=58

**Figure IV-2. Performance of the Specification**

It is instructive to review the cases that were mispredicted. Six cases were predicted to be successes but were actually failures; three cases were predicted to be failures but were actually successes. These cases are listed individually in Table IV-1 along with Huth's predicted probabilities of success or failure for each.

**Table IV-1. Mispredicted Cases**

Year	Challenger	Protégé	Defender	Probability of Outcome
<i>Predicted to be Successes but were Failures</i>				
1913	Bulgaria	Greece	Serbia	70%
1914	Germany	France	Britain/Russia	52%
1964	Indonesia	Malaysia	Britain	51%
1964	N. Vietnam	S. Vietnam	USA	99%
1967	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	55%
1975	Morocco	W. Sahara	Spain	65%
<i>Predicted to be Failures but were Successes</i>				
1885	Russia	Afghanistan	Britain/India	49%
1964	USA	N. Vietnam	China	40%
1971	India	Kashmir	China	1%


Table IV-1 shows that four of these cases (by year, see 1914, 1964, 1967, and 1885) were predicted by Huth to be toss-ups (“too close to call”)—each with a predicted outcome very near 50%. Moreover, subsequent intelligence (not available to Huth at the time) shows that one other of these cases (1964, with N. Vietnam as challenger) was miscoded by Huth. When the new intelligence specification is used to code the case, the outcome is predicted correctly. Aside from these five cases, only 4 cases of the 58 were mispredicted by this specification. Important too is that only two cases were solidly predicted to lead to deterrence that did not result in a deterrence success. Yet of those two, neither was *very* strongly predicted to lead to deterrence. Indeed, among these 58 cases not even a single case that was very strongly predicted by this specification to lead to deterrence (say at a higher-than-75% level) was incorrectly predicted. In this type of research, this is an impressive record indeed.

#### **APPLYING HUTH’S EVIDENCE AND INSIGHTS**

The probit methodology, in conjunction with a logistic regression form, allows one to assess the change in the likelihood of an event occurring assuming a change in one of the explanatory variables while holding the other variables constant. For example, in Huth’s work one could identify the effects on the chance of success in an immediate extended deterrence attempt of an increasingly favorable local military balance ratio for the defender and protégé, holding other major variables constant at some specific levels. To illustrate, consider first a purely hypothetical case involving the United States as defender, a near-peer challenger, and a US protégé. The effect of the US and protégé together having an increasingly favorable local military balance relative to the challenger is shown in Figure IV-3. In this illustration, the local military balance (defender and protégé over challenger) is posited to increase in steps from 0.25 to 5.00 (by 0.25 increments), while all other variables are held constant.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> The values for all but the local balance are as follows: overall military balance = 1:1; the diplomatic strategy of firm-but-flexible was not adopted; the proportional response military strategy was not adopted (Set the variable’s value to 1 if a firm-but-flexible strategy is used, to 0 if not. The same rules apply to the military strategy—1 if a proportional response strategy is used, 0 if not.); past behavior by the US (between the US and the near-peer competitor) was not judged by the challenger as either conciliatory or intransigent.




**Figure IV-3. Example A: Significance of Local Military Balance**

When a near-peer challenger possesses the local military balance advantage, i.e., when the value on the horizontal axis in Figure IV-3 is less than 1, the probability of successful deterrence by the defender is estimated as in the “Lo” (20% to 35%) range. As the defender and protégé gain a local force advantage, such as 2:1, the chance of successful deterrence of the challenger increases to approximately 50% (Med). With a significant local balance advantage, 3:1, a defender’s chance of deterrence success increases to Hi (70% to 100%).

For real cases, a chart such as this could become a useful decision-aid. With it, a policy-maker could readily explore the deterrence implications of selecting a particular alternative US presence posture.<sup>8</sup>

The previous hypothetical example may be expanded in order to illustrate how diplomatic and military strategies also interact with local force balances to affect the probability of deterrence success. Figure IV-4 details the relationships.

<sup>8</sup> This would be defined in terms of the number of the defender’s military personnel routinely present in a foreign area, since the number of military personnel (for each party) is the basis of the ratio in Huth’s “Local Balance” variable, as described earlier.



**Figure IV-4. Example B: Significance of Strategy**

Figure IV-4 is identical to Figure IV-3 except that it includes the effects of various diplomatic and military strategies that might be employed by the US. The bottom curve in Figure IV-4 is the same as that in Figure IV-3. Other curves reflect other combinations of a defender's diplomatic and military strategies in the hypothetical episode.<sup>9</sup> The dramatic effects that specific defender strategies are estimated to have had historically upon the chances of successful deterrence are vividly shown here. Even when the defender is at an initial local military balance disadvantage, i.e., the local military balance is less than 1.0, if the defender is able to and does adopt both the FBF and PR deterrence strategies (the top-most or "X" curve in the figure), then the probability of deterrence success increases by a factor of four—to over 80%—compared with the case in which neither the FBF nor the PR strategy was adopted (the lowermost curve). Indeed, so long as the defender adopts even one of the two "best" strategies (FBF or PR), the probability

<sup>9</sup> Rather than simply set them both as constants with values of "not used," we also consider conditions in which each strategy is used in isolation or both are used in combination. This is represented by the entries in the legend where "No FBF and No PR" is the condition in which neither strategy was adopted; "PR and No FBF" is the condition in which a proportional response military strategy is adopted but a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy is not adopted; "FBF and No PR" is the condition in which a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy is adopted but a proportional response military strategy is not adopted; and "FBF and PR" is the condition in which both a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy and a proportional response military strategy is adopted.

of deterrence success is still estimated to increase twofold over a neither-FBF-nor-PR strategy approach.

These charts illustrate how, in a hypothetical extended-immediate deterrence episode, some of the major variables from Huth's historical research are estimated to affect the chance of a defender's success. In the next section these abstract examples are replaced with several real, current cases. Two cases will receive particular attention: Northeast Asia (NEA) and Southwest Asia (SWA).


### **Northeast Asia Assessments**

To examine some presence policy alternatives that may be available to the United States in Northeast Asia while still maintaining a high probability of extended-immediate deterrence success, the “known” values for the current overall military balance, for North Korean perceptions of past US behavior (with North Korea), and for the current local military balance were all applied to Huth's specification.<sup>10</sup> On this basis, Figure IV-5 shows the probabilities of US deterrence success estimated to be associated with various combinations of US deterrence strategy and local military balance.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> The sources of these data are the Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 2001; and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001. The values are as follows. For the local balance calculation: US NEA military personnel = 110,695; RoK military personnel = 568,733; DPRK military personnel = 556,225 (at the point of contention and quickly mobilizable for attack). The local balance = 1.22 in favor of the US and South Korea. The overall military balance was calculated as follows. For the United States, the number of military personnel is 2,577,300; for the RoK it is 1,483,000; and for the DPRK it is 1,747,000. The overall military balance, therefore, is 2.3:1 in favor of the US and RoK. US past behavior toward North Korea was coded as “intransigent” because IDA NEA area experts agree that this is the dominant perception of the US in North Korea.

<sup>11</sup> The combinations include each pair of possible military and diplomatic strategies, along with each of three local military balance values—representing (1) the current local balance, (2) a local balance reflecting a 25% reduction in US forces in NEA, and (3) a local balance embodying a 50% or greater reduction in US forces in NEA.



**Figure IV-5. NEA Assessments**

Two important points may be taken from Figure IV-5. First, the figure reveals the large effect that the choice of strategies has on the probability of deterrence success. At any US peacetime presence level shown, adopting an FBF diplomatic strategy and a PR military strategy increases the probability of extended-immediate deterrence success by about 20 percentage points over the “No FBF/No PR” choice. Second, even where the “worst strategy” is adopted, i.e., No FBF and No PR, there is still a Med-Hi (70% to 75%) chance of deterrence success—even if US forces in the region are reduced by 50% or more. This case again highlights the contribution that the overall military balance, or the power projection capability of the US military, makes to the probability of deterrence success, both in general and in this case.<sup>12</sup>

### Southwest Asia Assessments

In the Southwest Asia Theater, the power projection capability that the US now possesses is estimated to have an even greater effect on the chance of deterrence success than in the NEA theater. While the local military balance between the US and Kuwait vs. Iraq is substantially in Iraq’s favor (0.29:1), the *overall military balance* overwhelmingly

<sup>12</sup> Note that the overall military balance in this relationship is 2.3:1 in favor of the US and RoK.

favors the US and Kuwait (5.97:1). Given this enormous advantage, the estimated probability of the US deterring future acts of aggression by the Iraqi regime is  $H_i$  even if the US were to reduce its contribution to the local force balance by 50% or more. As in the NEA assessment, this high probability estimated by Huth's approach is primarily a function of the huge advantage that the US and Kuwait possess in the overall military balance, once again illustrating the important role that Huth has shown power projection to play in extended-immediate deterrence.

## **NEXT STEPS IN DEVELOPING AND APPLYING HUTH'S EVIDENCE AND INSIGHTS**

Huth's data base of 58 cases of extended deterrence episodes, while impressive compared with most individual deterrence studies, is still too small to generalize from with confidence without applying appropriate adjustment procedures [King and Zeng, 2000: pp. 1–26]. Accordingly, we reestimated Huth's specification using one recommended procedure. We found that Huth's estimates changed only marginally. On this basis, we consider the conclusions drawn regarding the potency in the deterrence equation of power projection, presence, political and military strategy, and past behavior to be quite robust [King and Zeng, 2001: pp. 21–35].

Huth's operationalization of the local military balance is quite straightforward but does not take *explicit* account of the relative quality of different countries' forces. Recall that his measure was based solely on the number of forces in the area of contention, not the *types* of forces. Accordingly, we attempted to capture the quality factor by re-operationalizing the local balance for each of the 58 cases as values based upon the per capita military expenditures of each country in the deterrence episode. While not the only possible approach to capture differing military quality, this reestimation of Huth's specification—using the per capita based values—proved to have no greater explanatory power than his original approach.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> The percentage of cases predicted correctly using the per capita operationalization of the local military balances was 86%, about the same result from using Huth's operationalization. However, using the per capita approach resulted in a specification in which  $p < .15$  for the military strategy variable (for all other variables,  $p < .1$ ), whereas  $p < .05$  for all of the variables in Huth's specification.

A third concern regarding Huth's study is that the most recent case in the dataset is from 1983. Would his specification perform as well in predicting outcomes of more recent cases? Are new factors in play? Through a series of four new case studies, we examined this issue.

### **New Case Studies of Extended-Immediate Deterrence**

Testing Huth's approach against more recent cases was an important goal in this examination of new cases, but it was not the sole purpose. We also wanted to determine whether the *type* of force threatened/used by a defender in a deterrent episode mattered. For simplicity's sake, we categorized type-of-forces threatened/used by defenders as "strike," "ground," or "a ground/strike mix." We next selected four recent cases—two involving a ground/strike mix and two involving only strike power. The cases and their outcomes are listed in Table IV-2 and summarized below.

**Table IV-2. List of Case Studies**

Case	Force Type	Outcome
Operation Vigilant Warrior	Ground/strike	Deterrence success
Operation Vigilant Sentinel	Ground/strike	Deterrence success
Operation Determined Falcon	Strike only	Deterrence failure
Operation Determined Force	Strike only	Deterrence failure

**Operation Vigilant Warrior:** On or about October 4, 1994, Iraq advanced several Republican Guard as well as other divisions toward the Iraq-Kuwait border. The number of men and amount of armor being moved south by Iraq approximated that which the Iraqis moved prior to their invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The United States and Kuwait responded swiftly to the potential threat. Kuwait moved four divisions north near the border, and the United States increased its presence in the area with the rapid deployment of ground troops and additional strike assets from CONUS and Europe. The lead element of the US ground force landed in Kuwait on October 10, and the bulk of the additional strike power arrived on or about October 15. On October 10 the Iraqi forces began pulling back from the border and by the 15th nearly all Iraqi forces had returned to their normal stations. This is a case of successful deterrence.

**Operation Vigilant Sentinel:** Less than a year later, Saddam Hussein again deployed his forces close to Iraq's border with Kuwait. In August 1995, as part of an overall US response, Third Army/ARCENT provided command and control for a rapid deployment of a heavy brigade force. Iraq quickly withdrew its forces from the Kuwaiti border. This is a case of deterrence success.

**Operation Determined Falcon:** Serbian forces began a campaign of aggression against the Kosovars in June of 1998. As part of NATO, the United States demanded that Serbian forces withdraw from Kosovo and that the campaign cease. As a demonstration of the seriousness of the NATO threat, NATO commenced an air exercise involving approximately 60 allied strike aircraft. It is clear that Milosovic was aware of the exercise; thus, the message of serious intent was delivered successfully. However, the Serbs did not withdraw from Kosovo and the suppressive campaign against the Kosovars not only continued but escalated over the next few months. This is a case of failed deterrence.

**Operation Determined Force:** Determined Force was the precursor to Operation Allied Force. As the Serbian campaign against the Kosovars intensified in October 1998, the United States and NATO sought to increase their pressure on Milosovic to cease the campaign. In October the United States began deploying strike aircraft from both CONUS and northern European bases to air bases closer to Kosovo and Serbia, e.g., Aviano and Cervia. In addition to this nonverbal threat, the US and NATO agreed to issue an ACTWARN order. This order authorizes the planning of operations but does not authorize their execution. These efforts were designed to pressure Milosovic to sign an agreement stating that Serbian forces would withdraw from Kosovo. After continued intransigence from Milosovic, the US and NATO issued an ACTORD order. This allowed for the execution of any plans resulting from the ACTWARN order issued previously and was yet another effort to pressure Serbia to withdraw from Kosovo. On October 25, Milosovic finally signed such an agreement. However, in December reports of Serbian atrocities again came to the fore, making it clear that Milosovic had not pulled back his forces from Kosovo. As Serbian attacks increased in intensity in January and February, the US and NATO, while continuing to build up their strike power in the immediate region, again issued warnings to Milosovic. This situation came to a head in March 1999 when Serbian forces numbering approximately 40,000 moved to the northeast border of Kosovo. The US and NATO issued yet another ultimatum. The response from Serbia was an invasion of Kosovo. This is a case of deterrence failure.

### **The Performance of Huth's Specification in Recent Cases**

To assess Huth's specification, we calculated the overall and local military balances in each case, coded the diplomatic and military strategies employed, coded the past behavior between the defenders and challengers, and applied these values to the specification. In the first two cases, Vigilant Warrior and Vigilant Sentinel, Huth's approach predicted a Hi probability of deterrence success and these cases were indeed successes. In the latter two cases, Huth's approach also predicted Hi probabilities of success. These cases, however, were clear instances of deterrence failure. That is only a 50% successful prediction rate on cases since 1990, far worse than with the original

cases. Is there something inherently problematic with Huth's approach? Or is there something unusual about the latter two cases that predisposed US deterrence efforts in those cases to fail?

Since Huth's specification accounted for most of the outcomes in the 58 cases that constituted his dataset, it seems unlikely that there is a serious flaw in his basic approach. However, it may be instructive to look closely at the mispredictions in order to improve the initial approach. Along these lines, recall that the second goal of doing these new case studies was to determine whether the type of force threatened or used by a defender in a deterrence attempt mattered to its success. We believe that there may be such a relationship and that, in fact, it may be the driving factor behind the two failures in Huth's predictions among the four new cases. If so, analysis of these mispredictions will enable us to strengthen his basic approach, by incorporating an additional important variable *explicitly* into his otherwise powerful specification. The next section describes our reasoning in this regard.

### **The Defender's Response**

A consistent theme in the deterrence literature is that at least three factors inform a challenger's strategic choices: (1) assessments of a defender's resolve; (2) assessments of a defender's capability; and (3), assessments of its own ability to manage the risks of the crisis that it is considering initiating. While each of these assessments is an important component of the deterrence dynamic, we focus here on the third item. In this respect, far more often than not challengers prefer to be able to manage the risks of a crisis that they choose to initiate. Accordingly, we propose that the type of force a defender uses or threatens to use in a deterrence attempt has its greatest impact on a challenger's own assessment of its ability to manage the risks of the crisis. More specifically, we propose that a threat or use of ground forces by a defender during a crisis reduces the challenger's expectation of his ability to control the evolving crisis significantly more than does a defender's use or threatened use of only strike forces.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> These two propositions are grounded in analyses of cases developed in Hinkle et al., 1997.

A consideration of the assessments made by a challenger, in conjunction with the propositions put forth above, results in four hypotheses, as follows:

Hypothesis 1: If a challenger is initially *uncertain of a defender's resolve*, a credible threat or use by the defender of ground forces alone, strike forces alone, or a ground/strike force combination will deter that challenger.

Hypotheses 2-4: If a challenger *judgets a defender's resolve to be strong and unequivocal* but *questions a defender's capability to deter the challenge*:

- A credible threat or use of ground forces alone by a defender will deter.
- A credible threat or use of strike forces alone by a defender will *not* deter.
- A credible threat or use of ground and strike forces in combination by a defender will deter.

For perspective on these hypotheses, note that all challengers in hypotheses 2–4 are willing to press a challenge even while believing that the defender is highly committed to deterring the challenge; challengers in hypothesis 1 are not all willing to press ahead if they learn that the defender is actually highly resolved to deter the challenge. Less determined challengers will be easier to deter than others, other things equal. The conditions of hypothesis 1 include a larger fraction of weakly committed (e.g., opportunistic) challengers than the conditions of hypotheses 2 to 4.

### **Case Study Results**

In studying the four new cases, particular attention was paid to the coding of the challenger's assessments of the defender's resolve and capability, the substance of the defender's response, and to the challenger's ability to manage the crisis. Figure IV-6 displays those values, the outcome of each deterrent episode, and whether those outcomes provided support for our hypotheses.

	Defender's Response	Challenger's Assessments	Challenger Deterred?	Support for Hypothesis?
Vigilant Warrior (Iraq '94)	Threat and demonstration with mix of forces	D. Resolve: Hi D. Capability: Hi Risks: Hi	Yes	Yes
Vigilant Sentinel (Iraq '95)	Threat and demonstration with mix of forces	D. Resolve: Hi D. Capability: Hi Risks: Hi	Yes	Yes
Determined Falcon (Kosovo '98)	Threat and demonstration with strike forces	D. Resolve: Hi D. Capability: Lo Risks: Lo	No	Yes
Determined Force (Kosovo '98-99)	Threat and demonstration with strike forces	D. Resolve: Hi D. Capability: Lo Risks: Lo	No	Yes

**Figure IV-6. Case Study Results**

In every case the outcomes are consistent with our hypotheses. For decision-makers, however, these findings beg the question of how one can really know what assessments a challenger is actually making in a current crisis. Without that information, it may seem that these findings from our cases studies have little relevance for strategy and policy in actual future crises. However, according to our hypotheses and evidence, and regardless of the assessments made by the challenger, there appears to be a consistently powerful deterrent effect found in the threat to use ground troops, alone or in combination with strike power. Stated differently, these findings suggest that at no time during a crisis should policy makers publicly state or even privately suggest that they are not considering the use of ground troops to defend their interests. To do so appears to significantly reduce the probability of deterrence success.

## CONCLUSION

There has been substantial evolution in the scholarly literature on deterrence over the past 50 years. We reviewed this work with two goals in mind. First, we sought out research that focused on the relationship between presence and deterrence. Second, we aimed to develop a tool for decision-makers that would clarify the potential effects that alternative presence postures could have on the likelihood of US deterrence success. We found Huth's 1988 analyses to be both the most comprehensive, in terms of depth and breadth, and the most relevant to the research question at hand. His work is broad in that it investigates hypotheses regarding military balances, bargaining strategies, and

reputational factors. The work has depth because Huth's conclusions are based upon the analysis of 58 historical cases covering the period 1885–1983. His work is the most relevant to the study task because it includes variables that at least begin to approximate DoD's concepts of power projection (overall military balance) and of overseas military presence (local military balance). In addition, Huth's choice of logistic regression and the probit method of analysis presented us with a rigorous platform from which to start engaging in systematic real-world assessments of current and alternative US presence postures.

In an effort to test the forecasting capability of Huth's approach, we selected four recent cases of extended-immediate deterrence. While his approach accounted well for two of the four outcomes, it also failed dramatically in two other cases. A close analysis by IDA of the mispredictions, in conjunction with insights from the deterrence literature, yields what we think is an even more powerful set of policy recommendations based solidly on Huth's original findings.<sup>15</sup> We conclude this chapter with a review of those recommendations.

If a policy-maker has confidence in Huth's approach and our findings, he/she should adhere to the following guidelines both before and during future crises:

- (1) Maintain a decisive favorable military balance over potential adversaries—through some combination of US power projection capability and routinely present forces as well as those of our protégés.
- (2) Adopt a “best strategy” approach wherever possible (i.e., use a Firm-but-Flexible diplomatic strategy in combination with a Proportional Response military strategy).
- (3) Under no circumstances should the potential use of ground troops be taken off the table, publicly or privately, in devising the defender's military counterthreat to a challenger in an extended-immediate deterrence attempt. Indeed, a ground/strike mix may be best: it hedges against the possibility that

---

<sup>15</sup> In effect, we are proposing a new specification of Huth's model, adding a variable that distinguishes from all other possibilities those cases in which *both* the challenger's perception of the defender's resolve was high as well as in which strike alone was threatened/used by the defender. According to Hypothesis 3, above, such cases should be significantly less likely to succeed than others, holding other variables constant. This is what appears to have occurred in the two Kosovo cases. A practical problem with reestimating Huth's model in this way, however, is that virtually no cases among the original 58 appear to have involved the threat or use of strike alone by a defender. Thus there may be too little historical variation on this variable to get a robust set of estimates.

the challenger's assessment of the defender's resolve may be high, and it may also be hardest for the challenger to "design around."

Chapters II, III and IV have presented, respectively, a review of the extant literature on US overseas military presence, a promising technique for building simulation evidence of the potential effects of alternative presence postures upon potential combat outcomes, and a historically based approach for assessing the extent to which different presence postures affect our ability to deter state-level attacks upon our friends and allies. In chapters V and VI, we now offer the findings from our not-for-attribution discussions with nearly one hundred foreign and American senior national security professionals concerning the forms and levels of US overseas military presence that they see as desirable to address the current and emerging security environment.

This page intentionally left blank

## **Chapter V**

### **DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN EXPERTS**

In discussions with over 50 representatives of 22 countries<sup>1</sup> we found that US friends and allies were generally comfortable with current levels and forms of US military presence in their countries and regions.

In this chapter we summarize and assess—

- These representatives' attitudes regarding continuous US military presence levels in their countries and regions
- Relations between these representatives' views of security threats facing their countries and their attitudes regarding US military presence
- Relation between their views of the need to deter a conventional military threat to their countries and their perspectives on the value of US military presence
- The types of US military presence forces that they most valued, by country and region
- The purposes for which they valued US military presence
- US military presence (and related) activities that these representatives valued

The chapter concludes, with respect to potential changes in US military presence posture, that latitude can be found to substitute less personnel-intensive forms of presence for the current ones. However, to avoid undercutting the assurance objectives of US national security policy, it cautions that changes in US presence numbers need to involve consultations with our allies and very likely will require compensatory changes in activities, capabilities, and non-military diplomacy.

#### **METHODOLOGY**

Our methodology consisted mainly of not-for-attribution private (one-on-one, two-on-one, or two-on-two) discussions in English. The transcripts of these discussions

---

<sup>1</sup> A list of these contributors and their countries is provided in appendix B. Countries were selected in consultation with the sponsor.

were used to prepare brief summary statements with respect to each interlocutor's views on various matters related to US presence. These summaries were then analyzed, with frequent reference to the original transcripts, to assess these representatives' views on:

- The current and future security environment in their countries and regions
- The role of the United States in their national and regional security
- Levels, forms, and frequencies of US presence, current and potential
- Security-related activities carried on by the US

We supplemented the information from these private discussions with information from roundtable conversations, speeches by foreign experts and answers given during the question and answer periods that followed some speeches, their comments to the media, etc. However, the private meetings are far and away the most important source of our observations.

The prevailing views we have deduced from these discussions tend to cluster into the seven regional groups listed below. The numbers in parentheses indicate numbers of meetings; some involved two people making substantive contributions.

- Northeast Asia (NEA): Japan, Korea, Taiwan (11 meetings)
- Southeast Asia (SEA) &/Australia: Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia (8)
- South Asia: India, Pakistan (2)
- Southwest Asia (SWA): Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman (4)
- NATO Europe:
  - Three Western European NATO allies: UK, Germany, Italy (9)
  - Two Southeastern European NATO allies: Greece, Turkey (5)
  - Two other NATO allies: France, Poland (5)

We also collected views in China in about ten meetings and the same number of conversations in the course of longer meetings devoted primarily to other topics. These are treated separately. (See appendix I.)

While we did find differences of perspective within regional groups, the views we will discuss for the most part differ more across than within them. As we shall see, however, the notable exception here is Southwest Asia; there the differences among our interlocutors were very large.

All but 12 discussants were government officials; of these officials about half were diplomats and half military officers. We did not observe major differences among interlocutors from a specific country, whether the individual was a serving officer, a diplomat, or an academic. A list of our interlocutors is provided in appendix B to this report.


Four additional methodological points are worth mentioning at the outset. First, we overwhelmingly talked to representatives of countries the US was seeking to assure to some degree by US military presence and, further, to a subset of people who were probably predisposed to favor US military presence. Second, in some discussions we became uncertain that our interlocutors were using security-related terminology in the same sense that it is used in the US DoD; occasionally circumstances did not permit seeking clarification, leaving some ambiguity in these exchanges. Third, we recognize that most discussants, as official representatives of their governments, undoubtedly did not feel free to state opinions that were not generally consistent with the official position of their governments. Fourth, almost all of our private meetings were held after September 11, 2001, the majority while operations in Afghanistan were underway. We encountered frequent statements of support for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), but we did not specifically address OEF-related deployments to South and Central Asia. The fact that OEF was going on during the period we were collecting views undoubtedly had some influence on the views expressed; clearly these security professionals were at various stages in assimilating the idea of a long-term, wide ranging conflict with global terrorism.

## **OVERALL EVALUATIONS OF CONTINUOUS US MILITARY PRESENCE**

Figure V-1 displays the degree to which we inferred from our discussions that the political/military experts of various countries valued (or did not value) a continuous US military presence in or near their countries or in their regions.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Great importance should not be attached to the precise positioning of country names on the fields of the figures in this chapter. “Military” presence in this chapter includes “naval” presence unless specified otherwise.



**Figure V-1. Evaluations of Continuous US Military Presence**

Overall the discussants across all regions tended to value some kind of continuous local US military presence—whether in their country or elsewhere in the region. With a few exceptions, the representatives valued US military presence in their region more highly than they valued it in their countries. Representatives of the UK, however, valued the US military presence in the UK as highly as—or perhaps more highly than—that presence in Western Europe generally. Two other exceptions were Germany and Korea; representatives of these countries clearly valued US military presence in their countries more highly than the US presence elsewhere in their regions.<sup>3</sup> We will discuss these exceptions further below.

The UK, German, and Italian representatives with whom we spoke were foursquare behind the current US military presence in their countries and in the region generally. Based on the evidence, we found that British experts value US military presence in the UK and elsewhere in Western Europe more or less equally, that Italian experts value US military presence in the Mediterranean region somewhat more highly

<sup>3</sup> We judge that in both cases our interlocutors were so focused on showing the importance of maintaining current US military presence levels in-country that they consciously or unconsciously downplayed the value of military presence elsewhere in the region. As will appear later, in these two countries, “boots on the ground” were more highly valued than in any other country.

than they value the US presence in Italy, and that German experts view US presence in-country as more valuable than that in Europe generally. However, we do not see these differences as large enough to be regarded as significant for US presence policy.<sup>4</sup>

Turning to Northeast Asia, all the Korean and Japanese political and military experts with whom we met strongly supported the current US military presence in their countries, with one exception. Okinawa was seen as a special problem. Our Japanese interlocutors recognized it in every discussion and Koreans in most.<sup>5</sup> Also, the vast majority of the NEA experts were dismissive of those of their countrymen who did not agree with maintaining current US military presence levels. However, in addition to Okinawa, we see evidence of a growing body of opposition to US military presence in both Japan and Korea that should be taken into account in planning US military presence in NEA. This is based less on comments made by our interlocutors than on a range of press reports, public opinion polls, and the estimates of US experts on the region.<sup>6</sup>

Taiwan and Poland are depicted in Figure V-1 midway between the in-country and in-region categories, because their representatives said, in effect, that a US military presence would be highly valued in-country if geopolitical circumstances would permit it. They recognized, however, that current circumstances render such a presence impractical and, on balance, were content with the current situation—US forces nearby, primarily in Germany in Poland’s case and the US Seventh Fleet in Taiwan’s.

---

<sup>4</sup> Our Western European interlocutors, including the French, agreed that there was no significant opposition in the UK, Germany, and Italy to the current US military presence in those countries. We did not discuss the possibility of a continuous US military presence in France with any interlocutor and, therefore, display only French attitudes toward US military presence elsewhere in Europe and the Mediterranean.

<sup>5</sup> Some European interlocutors emphasized the broad European acceptance of US military presence with comments to the effect, “We don’t have an Okinawa problem in Europe.”

<sup>6</sup> The relevant polling data include the following two Department of State Office of Research reports. A September 13, 2001, *Opinion Analysis*, “Post-Reunification Security: South Koreans Say Keep Alliance, Trim US Forces Korea,” reported that opinion surveys in September 2000 and July 2001 showed 76% of respondents said US forces in Korea were important to Korea’s security, while 22% said not important, a significant shift from 83–86% and 14–16%, respectively, in 1999 opinion surveys. It also reported a consistent 62–64% support among Koreans for maintaining the alliance, versus 30–34% against, in surveys from September 1997 through July 2001. A September 20, 2001, *East Asia Opinion Alert*, “Stretching the Security Consensus in Japan,” reported that an opinion survey in August 2001 showed that 74% of respondents favored maintaining the US-Japan security alliance, but that 90% favored reductions in US bases in Japan. US experts on the region, including specifically Dr. Kongdan Oh and Mr. J. Delaney of the IDA team, have cautioned that the underlying trends—especially in the younger generations—need to be monitored carefully.


In Figure V-1, we describe Greece and Turkey as neutral (or indifferent) with respect to a continuous US military presence in-country. Of course, both now host some such presence. As will be discussed below, neither Greek nor Turk experts seemed to see a threat against which a US military presence is helpful. On the other hand, in the context of supporting OEF, both indicated willingness to host additional US military presence, if asked. Among Greeks we found an emphasis on whether the request was in a NATO context.

Looking at SEA/Australia, South Asia, and even some of SWA in Figure V-1, we are not saying that all countries in this great sweep would unequivocally oppose a continuous in-country US military presence of any kind. We do say that under the circumstances they foresee, almost all their governments would very much prefer not to receive a proposal from the US for a continuous visible military presence in their countries, and if one is received, the shorter the proposed duration, the better. Again, that does not mean opposition to all US military-related presence. For example, Australia clearly is willing to consider US use of its facilities, including training ranges and repair facilities; Singapore welcomes port visits and aircraft transits; and so on.

Looking at SWA, we found that US military presence somewhere in the region was generally valued. Although it is very much a judgment call, we would have to say that the evidence suggests that it was valued somewhat less than was the US military (regional) presence in NEA and Western Europe. Nonetheless, it is clearly valued. The evidence is too sparse to say more about the views of Southwest Asian policy and military experts toward US military presence in specific countries than that it is quite diverse, as indicated by the broad spread depicted on Figure V-1. Concerning South Asia, note that our information also is limited enough that the views depicted on Figure V-1 should be treated with some caution.

## **COMPARING VIEWS REGARDING THREATS AND PRESENCE**

On the basis of our discussions, we analyzed the US military presence location the experts of a country value *most* in relation to the types of security threats they see, as explained below and depicted in Figure V-2.



**Figure V-2. Views of Threats and on Presence**

We arranged the security threats mentioned by our interlocutors as most salient into three categories: regular military, irregular and/or internal, and none significant. By “regular military,” we mean a threat of attack by the organized land, air, sea or missile forces of another country. The Northeast Asian and most of the Southwest Asian countries we sampled saw a regular military threat as most salient. Based on overall evidence, we could not judge whether the South Asian countries of India and Pakistan placed regular military threats higher or lower than irregular threats.

By “irregular and/or internal” threats we mean terrorism, international crime, insurgencies, refugee flows, and generalized worry about coercion or aggression short of a conventional attack. Turkey provides a good example. It faces a Kurd insurgency that has employed terrorism. Refugees are flowing in from the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. It views Russia as destabilizing the Caucasus but not attacking Turkey directly. Turkey does not seem to worry about Iran, Syria, or Iraq. Turkey and Greece remain at loggerheads over issues in various places, including Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, but neither seems to fear a conventional attack by the other. Both countries worry about their ethnic brethren in Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, and Mid-Eastern locales rife with conflict. Greece also worries about crime, terrorism, and refugee flows, but much less

intensely than Turkey. While both countries were neutral with respect to US military presence in their countries, including US naval presence in the Aegean Sea, they valued it in the region broadly.


During the time of our meetings internal problems were clearly evident in the Philippines and Indonesia. Several interlocutors from SEA named piracy as a problem. Generally, however, our discussions with Southeast Asians and our Australian ally did not convey a sense that an immediate security threat was perceived. Similarly, our Northern and Western European NATO allies recognize terrorism and refugee flows as problems, so strictly speaking we could have positioned them to the left in Figure V-2. However, the overall sense of our discussions with these Europeans was that these were manageable and that they felt their countries to be quite secure.

South Asia was an outlier. Pakistan and India saw imminent regular military threats (each other) before the recent escalation of tension between them, but they did not see the US military presence in the region for OEF as particularly relevant to that. Neither did we find evidence that they saw US military presence as relevant to their concerns for irregular or internal threats, with one exception. The overall evidence suggests that the Indian navy values US naval presence as a help in combating piracy.

The anomaly in this particular assessment is Western Europe. No threat is seen, but US presence in-country is valued, even highly valued. We will return to this below.

## **COMPARING VIEWS ON PRESENCE AND ON DETERRING THREATS**

In the next step in our analysis, we set aside concerns about irregular or internal threats and focused on conventional military threats. We sorted countries into two categories (see Figure V-3). The first included those that saw no conventional military threat developing; we generally talked in terms of 5 to 10 years, but often what constituted the foreseeable future to our interlocutors was even less precise. This category encompassed Europe, SEA, and Australia and some countries in SWA. Among the representatives of these areas, the most valued location of US military presence ran the gamut from a strong desire to maintain current levels of US military presence in-country, through support for a more or less continuous US military presence in the region, to indifference as to whether or not the US was present militarily.



**Figure V-3. Views on Threats, Deterrence, and Presence**

In the second category, countries for which the majority of our interlocutors saw an imminent conventional military threat, all saw the US military presence in-country or in the region as deterring that threat. This category included NEA and some countries in SWA.

In no case did we encounter evidence that foreign experts were using a specific calculus of the numbers or capabilities needed to deter, let alone defend. This was not surprising among the representatives of countries that saw no conventional threat; for them deterrence and defense calculations would be purely hypothetical, and in any case they are thinking about US military presence primarily in other terms, as will be discussed in connection with Figure V-5. However, among countries seeing an imminent conventional threat, there was still no evidence of an explicit analysis of the capabilities or numbers that would deter or defend.<sup>7</sup> We conjecture that this absence of a deter/defend calculus may relate to two factors we observed during our discussions: resistance to changing the *status quo* and the value assigned to “boots on the ground.”

<sup>7</sup> One of our reviewers hypothesized that this might be a cultural matter; perhaps people from these countries tend not to think such calculations are meaningful.

First, if one truly has no idea of “how much is enough,” for whatever reason, the *status quo* attains greater significance as an equilibrium point—if it appears to be “working.” With the exceptions of Okinawa and SWA, wherever there is a significant visible US military presence in-country, we encountered resistance to any idea of reducing US military presence levels.

Second, if there is no capability assessment, US earnestness of mutual suffering and risk sharing may become salient for assurance of the foreign expert. The Korean affinity for boots on the ground clearly relates to this. The European preference for boots on the ground may be colored by the intra-NATO debates on peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.

In our discussions with representatives of countries in which US military presence is valued, we also encountered an unwillingness to consider increased military technical or reinforcement capabilities as substitutes for numbers of US military personnel present. This was rarely an explicit rejection of specific tradeoffs; rather, it was either an early statement to the effect that nothing could substitute for physical presence or a dismissive comment or gesture when the idea of a tradeoff was raised.


As discussed earlier in connection with Figure V-2, in this assessment South Asia is an outlier and Western Europe an anomaly.

## **WHERE US PRESENCE IS VALUED, THE TYPES MOST VALUED**

In Figure V-4 we compare how foreign experts see the various types of US forces in-country with how they view them elsewhere in their region. The dashed vertical line separates in-country and in-region evaluations. A rectangle around a country name in Figure V-4 means that the country values both types of presence more or less equally. It should be emphasized that in Europe and NEA, most interlocutors emphasized the need for “balanced” US forces in the presence posture; thus, these “top” priorities should not be interpreted as exclusionary. The Germans clearly value “boots on the ground” most, but they also value land-based air and even carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean.

For an example of the rectangles, consider the “UK” entries. In discussions with various British representatives the presence of US land-based air in Great Britain was valued by all and highly valued by some. At the same time, US forces on the Continent were also valued. For example, outside of Great Britain, the presence of US “boots on the ground” performing peacekeeping work in the Balkans was assigned special importance

by one British interlocutor. Another British observer said that the main reason Great Britain continues to maintain 17,000 (by his reckoning) troops in Germany was to be able to train there with the Americans.



**Figure V-4. Most Valued Force Types**

In the lower left-hand corner of Figure V-4, land-based forces were quite clearly seen as a special problem, and our interlocutors preferred to see naval forces in the region to US forces on the ground. Again, it bears emphasis that in the latter case we were discussing continuous visible land-based presence. To varying degrees the members of this group were quite willing to host US land-based forces temporarily.

Although both Turkish and Greek interlocutors recognized that the Aegean Sea was a problem area between them, neither group assigned significant value to US naval presence there as a factor in preserving peace between them.

## WHERE IT IS VALUED, WHY US MILITARY PRESENCE IS VALUED

In Figure V-5 we display the reasons given by our interlocutors (those who "valued" or "highly valued" it in-country, in their region, or both) for valuing the US military presence. The order of listing of countries has no significance here. There were two entirely different classes of reasons given. Those on the right are related to day-to-day affairs. Those on the left are of a politico-military nature; we turn to those first. A country

was listed twice among these politico-military categories within a dotted rectangle when it seemed that two purposes were nearly co-equal for interlocutors representing that country.

Political-Military Reasons:			Day-to-Day Significance:
1) Deter an attack on <u>itself</u>	2) Stabilize a region, deter or respond to crises involving <u>other countries</u>	3) Leadership, commitment, and/or dissuasion of intra-regional jockeying for position/stature	Militaries learning to work together for use <u>here or elsewhere</u>
Korea			Korea
Japan	Japan		
SWA	SWA		
	SEA/Australia		Greece
	Greece		
	Turkey		UK
	UK	UK	Germany
	Germany	Germany	<u>Local economies</u>
	Italy	Poland	Germany
	France		Italy

**Figure V-5. Why US Military Presence is Valued**

Conventionally, three of the main purposes ascribed to of US military presence are defeating an attack, deterring an attack, and responding to a crisis elsewhere than where the military is present. The leftmost column of Figure V-5 includes those countries that saw an imminent conventional military threat; for them *deterrence* of that threat was generally mentioned as the main value of US military presence.<sup>8</sup> And among those countries in this group currently hosting military forces in-country, little interest was shown in US reinforcement capabilities. Taiwanese interlocutors were sensitive to US reinforcement capabilities, that is, the time needed by carrier battle groups to reach the Formosa Straits.

In NEA only Japanese discussants assigned a positive value to the role of US forces present in and around their country in preventing or dealing with crises involving third countries in East Asia. Some Southwest Asian interlocutors (not the ones that saw a need to deter an imminent threat to their countries) assigned a positive value to US military presence for deterring crises involving others in their region. In SEA, Australia,

<sup>8</sup> Interestingly, None of these people talked about *defeating* an attack; we hypothesize that when talking about their own country, they were unwilling to articulate the possibility that deterrence might fail. We did not press them.

and Europe US military presence was valued mainly for its role in modifying behavior between third parties. The role was not defined precisely. Terms such as “regional stability,” “responding to crises in a region,” “detering local extremists in the Balkans,” and the like were used in overlapping and diffuse ways that seem to justify grouping them together as essentially one purpose. Again, the possibility that actual combat might take place was avoided during these discussions, even though combat was underway in Afghanistan as most of the discussions took place.

Continuing down the second column of Figure V-5, we recall that Greeks and Turks saw value in US military presence in their region, but they professed to be relaxed about US military presence in their countries. In contrast, our German, British, and Italian interlocutors valued, even highly valued, US military presence in-country and strongly resisted any proposal for reducing that US military presence. Further, our Western European allies—and this included French interlocutors—tended to advertise European bases as excellent for purposes of US responses to crises in the Mid-East, Caucasus, Central Asia, and even North Africa. While they may well be correct as to the advantages to the US, the question remains, “Why do *they* want US presence levels to remain the same or even increase?”

Also, most of our British and German (and some French) interlocutors saw the level of US military presence as necessary to preserve US claims to leadership positions in NATO, especially as subordinate commanders. Admittedly, such considerations might be relevant in American planning circles, but why are these matters important enough *to the Western Europeans* (excluding France) that they strongly resist any reduction of US forces, even in the absence of a perceived threat?

The third, rightmost, politico-military column in Figure V-5 is where we get to what we have called “the Western European anomaly.” This category is where we summarize our (admittedly) fragmentary evidence as to why our British, German, and Italian interlocutors wanted the US military presence to stay at current levels.

Some practical reasons were given. The leadership position issue has an interoperability component. One officer pointed out that subsidiary positions were important because the US policy of not placing American troops under foreign commanders would make it hard to form NATO units for employment anywhere if the NATO subordinate commands currently under Americans were to be reassigned to another nationality. Related reasons are given in the rightmost column; Germans and British (and probably others had we pressed the matter in our discussions) very much

value the enhanced ability to operate together that comes from daily interactions with counterpart US forces in Europe. Another reason is given in the lower right-hand corner of Figure V-5. In Germany and Italy some local economies have become habituated to the local US base; there is a BRAC problem in Europe as well as in the US. These practical reasons are understandable. However, the concerns expressed seem to go further.

The leadership issue as presented in our discussions often seemed to possess a transcendental quality. One German observed that any changes in subordinate leadership positions would be complicated and contentious because so many countries would lay claim to the positions. No European mentioned it, but some reviewers of this research have observed that the Europeans have had such great difficulty organizing actions in the Balkans that most of our Western European interlocutors might well have been saying indirectly that US leadership is necessary to get difficult security-related things done. In contrast, our French discussants clearly believed that Europe could organize its security affairs without a US military presence or leadership.

Separately, our British, German, and Italian interlocutors cited US military presence, especially “boots on the ground,” as an important earnest of US commitment to Europe. The concept of “commitment to what” seemed to vary a good deal from person to person. One had in mind that US troops in Europe were far easier, politically as well as logistically, to deploy to European trouble spots such as the Balkans; therefore, their presence meant that the US would be more ready to commit forces to a peacemaking or peacekeeping operation. Another European observed that, while most Europeans believe the US is committed to European security broadly, long-lived memories of abandonment by past security guarantors still influence Europeans so they seek the assurance of a presence that would be hard to extricate quickly. In the end, however, we have been unable to fully explain the strong attachment to “ground forces presence as commitment” among people who profess to see no threat of conventional war on the horizon.

There were hints in a few conversations and specific statements in three to the effect that the US military presence reminded any European who might be inclined to seek ascendancy that such an effort would be pointless. This is what we mean by “dissuasion of intra-regional jockeying for position/stature.” The least optimistic (British) interlocutor said, “If the US left Europe, we’d fall apart and you’d have to come back and pick up the pieces again.” Some discussants in France asserted there would never be another European war; such a thing was simply not a concern anymore. However, one

Frenchman went on to say that the risk of European war was all in the Germans' minds and self-doubts, and that Germany's small neighbors don't fear Germany any more than small countries always worry about their large neighbors.

We are not able to assess how all these reasons actually rank in Europe. Perhaps all of them are in play to varying degrees at various times and in various places.

## **EVALUATIONS OF US PRESENCE ACTIVITIES**

Three general types of presence activities were most often cited as valuable by foreign experts: 1) consultation, 2) relationship building, and 3) developing "institutional interoperability," that is confidence the US and their country can and will work together in employments that matter to them. We were unable to connect these evaluations of presence activities to the objectives of crisis response, deterrence, dissuasion, or even assurance in the classic sense of assuring allies that the US can and will defend them effectively if need be. The foreign experts' value assessments appeared to be based on much more diffuse criteria related to assurance.

Two aspects of consultation were valuable from the perspectives of our foreign experts, especially the government officials. First, they wanted to be involved in deciding things that matter to their country. Second, they wanted to be seen by others in their countries as being involved, presumably to maintain their stature domestically. Intelligence sharing was often mentioned as valuable and in ways that suggested it was seen as empowering consultation, rather than simply providing information on things of interest.

The great value assigned to high-level US visits appeared to be three-dimensional. The first two were the two consultative dimensions described above. First, such visits involve real participation in mutual decision-making; this dimension was valued generally around the world. Second, high-level visits show domestic supporters and political opponents that the local government is involved in important decision-making. This seemed to be especially significant in Korea and Japan. We speculate that this is related to the existence of political opposition to US military presence, an opposition that is intertwined with opposition to the governing elite. In any case, for a government leadership group—from which most of our interlocutors are drawn—to be seen as not consulted by the US adds insult to injury at minimum and may threaten its hold on power. The third dimension of the value assigned by foreign experts to high-level visits was that they involve person-to-person relationship building.

We have mentioned intelligence sharing and high-level visits as two activities that are valued by most of our friends and allies. In neither case can we assign the value definitively to *military* intelligence sharing and *military* high-level visits, although military is certainly among the subject areas of interest. It would seem that more general information sharing and high-level visits can be helpful, especially if mutual security is invoked as a partial rationale for a specific activity.

Our interlocutors valued relationships with Americans at all levels. Thus, in addition to high-level visits, presence activities of many kinds were valued in large measure for their role in relationship building. In particular, building personal relationships was seen by foreign experts as a co-equal goal for many activities that are seen from the US side as focused mainly on substantive training. One of our interlocutors characterized the goal of relationship building as developing a capability so that when problems arise one can move quickly with people who are already known quantities to solve the problems. Most interlocutors, however, were not precise, seeing relationship building in terms of a more diffuse comfort level. International military education and training (IMET), Partnership for Peace (PfP), and similar programs were seen as valuable as much for their relationship building aspects as for substantive learning. Exchange programs and combined exercises also were seen as important relationship building activities.

Being interoperable, beyond technical interfaces, in the broad sense of working seamlessly as combined teams in action was often cited as a goal of presence because of the unit activities that take place wherever US military forces are found. For example, as noted earlier, a British observer stated that the UK keeps 17,000 troops in Germany primarily to train with the Americans there. A Korean general offered that an important purpose of US military presence is “to improve comradeship, to share lessons, and to learn from each other.” A German officer suggested that there should be combined units, with subunits from the US, the host country, and another country to exploit the potential he saw for interoperability to produce units capable of enhanced coalition operations. Peacekeeping constabulary units, emphasized as needed by some of our European interlocutors, might be a test case.

Several Europeans—including some French—made suggestions that were variations on the theme that the US and its allies need to learn to work together better and more broadly. The underlying view holds that NATO HQ remains wedded to its past when the focus was on getting national commitments to deployment timetables. This

view implies that mutual examination of a range of scenarios would produce several classes of activities in which allies can help each other. One example was to work out how US strategic lift would move and support European peacemakers in the African Great Lakes region. The planning and practicing of such activities was seen as potentially very helpful for building individual and institutional relationships in general and especially helpful *if* at some time the parties decided to work together. However, it was seen as important to make the proposed planning and practicing distinct and separate from any political commitment by any government to act in a particular situation.

Overall, the kinds of activities described here were clearly highly valued by essentially all our friends and allies. However, among allies where US military forces are present, no one volunteered that there is a tradeoff between activities and numbers in US military presence. In nearly all cases our interlocutors were clearly opposed to any reductions and had no interest in discussing what might compensate for reduced numbers. It seems clear, however, that if numbers are to be reduced, in the vast majority of cases these findings on activities can point the way to a less painful process if they are taken into account. At a minimum, consultation should be a part of the process. In general, the US should consider significant tailored increases in the areas of relationship building and institutional interoperability to compensate, at least in part, for any reductions in numbers.

## CONCLUSIONS

In this section we shift from dissecting and categorizing what foreign experts told us to exploring whether our discussions with foreign experts indicate any latitude for reducing the numbers of US forces that have been more or less continuously stationed in various countries since the end of the Cold War and Desert Storm. We do not address deployments that have taken place as part of OEF and subsequent counterterror deployments.

With respect to NEA and Western Europe, we judge that the evidence we have accumulated suggests convincingly that reductions of 10% need not create problems. Further, although the evidence is not so clear, we sense that larger reductions could well be acceptable as long as the numbers remaining in-country are in the several thousands in the UK and Italy, and in the several tens of thousands in Germany, Korea, and Japan.

Indeed, the weight of the evidence suggests that the process—more than the magnitude—of change will evoke the most objections. Accordingly, if reductions in these regions are desired, we recommend giving considerable attention to the process of

change as it relates to our friends and allies. Fundamental is to consult with an ally as the reduction decision is being made and as it is being implemented, in order to educate foreign experts and allow them to take ownership of the change. The painful memory that remains in Korea (whether or not it is accurate) of the Carter administration's unilateral reduction is an example of why this is important. At the same time, consultations may provide the US valuable insights as to how to achieve policy goals. For example, one Korean advised, if the US wants to reduce US Forces Korea, the US and RoK should at least try to figure out how to obtain a reciprocal gesture from Kim Jong-Il.

While working with responsible officials of host countries is important, the education of foreign experts goes further. Based on the lack of an independent calculus of capabilities needed for crisis response and deterrence among the experts with whom we have met, there is ample room for US activities that will educate and shape their perceptions of how much is enough. As the US and foreign leadership converge on a final understanding of a new US presence posture, the US should be prepared to persuade a broader audience that the new posture is appropriate before actually making major changes.

To minimize the reduction in the assurance value of the final US presence posture, before reductions in overall force levels in a country take place, compensating—but much smaller—increases in military presence should be investigated. Recalling the value placed on various activities by our interlocutors, two types of continuous military presence seem to have disproportionate assurance value for the US people-years involved. One type is a combined headquarters to plan and organize the practicing of out-of-area contingency operations proposed by some of our interlocutors. A related alternative is to maintain a US operational headquarters organization in-country for the US units that might be deployed to the country in a crisis to plan and practice with local authorities. The UK headquarters on Cyprus was suggested as a possible model. In either case, the Americans in such headquarters would be specially selected and tasked to develop long-term personal professional relationships with host country military and civilian officials.

A second type is a combined unit of the sort mentioned earlier—the subunits are US, host country, and perhaps others. To avoid having US troops under foreign command, perhaps the subunits would be merely affiliated with each other rather than combined. A number of specifics would need to be examined before proposing this, but peacekeeping constabulary units are a possible application for such combined or affiliated units.

Finally, we return to the issue of the special importance of the status quo, whatever that may be, as an equilibrium point. If the US government is even considering reducing the forces continuously present in a country, it makes sense to begin to blur the equilibrium point by word and deed. Consultations and public diplomacy can contribute. Consideration should be given to actually freeing US force levels from the relevant equilibrium point by dint of temporary deployments, on base exercises that keep the local streets empty for a few nights, etc. The Kitty Hawk deployment to OEF was a case in point. Although our interlocutors declined to identify a tradeoff with numbers present, activities were clearly valued. This suggests that substituting activities for numbers should be investigated when change is contemplated. Parenthetically, we saw no indications that the level of major exercises in the recent past has been too low or that there is a need for more of these high-cost activities. Activities involving many individually small interactions such as IMET, high-level visits, small unit work, and US specialist teaching teams appear likely to be most significant in maintaining the level of assurance in allied and friendly countries while overall US force levels decrease. Those that facilitate long-term personal relationships may be especially effective, and could be couched in terms of maintaining the ability to reinforce rapidly, work together out-of-area, and so on.

Institutionalized combined/coalition/multinational planning and training mechanisms may have reassurance value disproportionate to the people and funds required. Examples that came up included a coalition center for planning and coordinating non-combatant activities in SWA located perhaps in Bahrain, and a “Sea Lanes Institute” for SEA/South Asia located perhaps in Singapore.

Bilateral and regional conferences on developing shared visions with respect to various issues or areas were cited as valuable relationship-building mechanisms. On the one hand, there was no indication that the current level of such activity is less than satisfactory. On the other hand, there was no evidence of orchestration of the many conferences being sponsored directly and indirectly by the US government. Significant coordination of these activities would appear desirable to ensure that they support long-term relationship building and/or facilitate US policy goals. Among the latter goals very likely should be persuading foreigners to converge on a view of presence that takes into account military capabilities rather than just numbers.

The potential benefits of these institutions and activities are more assurance of foreign experts per deployed person, encouraging alliance and coalition partners to take greater responsibility, drawing regional players into multinational activities, and providing venues for building long-term relationships.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Returning to a point made at the beginning of this chapter, one of the lessons learned in these discussions is that we were holding talks with representatives of countries currently being assured, in a general and not always obvious sense, by US military presence. While these representatives have views on deterrence, regional stability, and the like, their *collective* views are primarily useful as indicators of the *assurance* value of a particular posture. This implies that the calculation of what posture (combination of numbers, capabilities, and activities in various places) is appropriate for crisis response, deterrence, and dissuasion of potential peer competitors is largely up to the United States.

However, there certainly are various postures that may be more or less equally appropriate for crisis response, deterrence, and dissuasion. These alternative postures need to be articulated so that US initial planning leaves room to adjust end states and to take different paths to them in order to maintain assurance at acceptable levels. Then, in working toward the final posture, multilevel and multivenue consultations and negotiations will need to be carried out by a US interagency team, one empowered to make midcourse corrections to plans as negotiations progress. This may be beyond the capability of the current interagency coordination processes. If so, new effects-based planning and negotiation support tools will be needed to address the substitution of activities, capabilities, and consultations for numbers.

## **Chapter VI**

### **DISCUSSIONS WITH US EXPERTS**

#### **BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY**

The routine overseas presence of a quarter million American military personnel and their equipment at many locations around the world ensures that most senior US military and foreign policy professionals have had detailed exposure to the subject of this study at some point in their career. Some of these experts have had direct responsibility for deciding on levels and types of US military presence. Many have been responsible for overseeing or directly managing the activities of these forces, or reporting on their effectiveness. The result is that a relatively large number of current and recently retired officials have acquired valuable experience and insights on this topic, and constitute an obvious source of ideas that could well be of value to the DoD in developing and evaluating future US presence options.

#### **THE INTERLOCUTORS**

IDA has undertaken a series of discussions with selected US officials as one of the major methods of obtaining information and perspectives relevant to the goals of the study. A letter of introduction was prepared that identified the goals of the study. It asked US and foreign officials who were being approached on this topic to cooperate with the IDA study team. A copy of this letter is provided at Appendix C.

The study team sought to identify candidate interlocutors that were known to have had relevant experience in this area. An initial list of candidates was developed informally by the study team. This initial list was then supplemented by reference to current organizational charts. Because US military presence is generally organized by region, we sought to identify those officials that have, or have had, considerable responsibility for the regional aspects of US national security planning and assessment. This naturally resulted in a list dominated by military officers with experience as (or on combatant commanders under the DoD Unified Command Plan, and by ambassadors and other regionally oriented foreign policy officials.

In addition, we identified other potential interlocutors who had similar familiarity with this topic. These included former Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, and Directors of Central Intelligence. Some of the interlocutors had previously formally discussed this topic for earlier studies.

In scheduling discussions we were constrained both by time and available funds. Fortunately, many of the highest priority candidate interlocutors were in the Washington D.C. area often enough to permit the resulting conversations to be held locally. Only two of the scheduled talks were conducted outside the local area.

As expected, the most available candidates were those who were no longer in active government service. It also turned out that these candidates were the most expansive on this topic and more willing to suggest major changes than were serving officials. Although all interlocutors were assured that their remarks were “not for attribution,” a few serving officials were reluctant to move very far from current “official positions.”

Very few candidates refused to be involved outright, but conflicting schedules made it impossible to meet with everyone on the initial list. Additionally, each of the interlocutors was asked to recommend additional candidates, which resulted in some changes in the list as the study progressed. As a general matter, retired officials ended up being interlocutors early in the process, and the study team held talks with most of the serving officials later in the process.

The list of the 39 officials with whom discussions were actually held is at Appendix A. Most discussions lasted 1-1 ½ hours, although a few ran longer and a few had to be cut somewhat shorter than one hour. All interlocutors, having committed their time to this project, were very cooperative, even enthusiastic, participants. The “not for attribution” caveat clearly stimulated considerable candor, particularly among most serving officials.

## THE DISCUSSION QUESTIONS AND FORMAT

The goal of the discussion process was to get evidence, insight, and ideas on several topics:

- The proven utility of military presence in promoting the key US security objectives of:
  - Assurance of friends and allies
  - Dissuasion of potential hostile entities from taking up arms
  - Deterrence of hostile armed entities from actually attacking US interests
  - Defeating such attacks, should they occur
- The utility of different types of presence in the future
- The utility of military presence vis-a-vis other displays of military power; e.g.,
  - Rapid reinforcement capability
  - Exercises
  - Relationship building
- Perceived latitude for the US to adopt less personnel intensive forms of presence without compromising security objectives, e.g., substituting some “firepower for manpower”
- Specific options for reducing US overseas military manpower that could be pursued in the near term
- Ways to improve the process by which the US plans and decides its routine overseas military presence posture.

In pursuit of the foregoing goals, an informal discussion guide was constructed. However, when discussing the topic of US overseas military presence with experienced senior personnel, we found it most productive to let the conversation flow naturally rather than follow a formal questionnaire. In particular, most interlocutors had definite points they wanted to make sure were conveyed, regardless of the order in which those topics might have been set out in the discussion guide.

The resulting discussion process then entailed first soliciting the opinions, observations, and suggestions that the interlocutor wanted to volunteer “up front.” The study team then used those comments that related to one of the guideline topics as a basis

for more detailed discussion. Those guideline issues that were not addressed by the interlocutor on his own initiative were then systematically covered in the later stage of the talk, as time permitted.

Some topics that had initially been thought to be useful proved not to be and were not used after the first few discussions in order to preserve the available time for productive discussions. For example, because of the consistent view in the early discussions that the nearby routine presence of US military forces has little or no influence on the incidence and course of strictly internal conflicts, however vicious, unless the US has indicated intent to intervene on one side or the other, this topic was not pursued in most of the later discussions.

A snapshot of the guideline topics used in the discussion process is provided at Appendix F. However, it is important to understand that the specific topics evolved from discussion to discussion and were frequently tailored to the time available and the particular expertise of the interlocutor.

The notes from each of the discussions were subsequently transcribed in a fashion intended to reflect the general flow of the discussion, while highlighting the specific topics of greatest importance to achieving the goals of this research project. These notes are on file at IDA. Because discussions were not for attribution, the notes are not available for wider dissemination.

## **ANALYSIS OF DISCUSSIONS**

The notes from the discussions with the US experts were systematically reviewed to identify observations that were generally common across the sample; observations on which there was sharp divergence of opinion; and areas where opinions were particularly diffuse. This section presents the results of this analysis.

Note that late in the research process the study team was tasked to identify some notional options for preserving the effectiveness of the US military presence posture at lower levels of military personnel. Those “strawman” options are detailed in chapters VIII through X and were constructed to be as consistent as possible with the predominant views of the US expert interlocutors. The continued viability of these options was tested and reconfirmed in May 2002 in a series of informal conversations with some of the earlier interlocutors and with other knowledgeable officials who had not been available for the earlier scheduled discussions.

## **Consensus Observations**

The following points were either initially identified, or subsequently agreed to, by most of the interlocutors, as being of greatest importance to decisions on the routine US military overseas presence posture. It was emphasized in all discussions that the study was not addressing the *temporary* overseas deployments incident to Operation Enduring Freedom (the current crisis operations in the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and elsewhere incident to the war on terrorism).

### **Important Underpinning**

Civilian and military interlocutors alike were unanimous in citing the importance of US overseas military presence posture in the pursuit of US foreign policy and national security goals both during and since the Cold War. There was widespread acknowledgement that the role of the theater Combatant Commanders in pursuing US policy goals had increased in recent years. The reasons cited were the reduced funding of the State Department consular and USAID activities, and the fact that the end of the Cold War has caused the combatants commanders to broaden their focus well beyond just responding to a potential Soviet threat.

Several interlocutors described the US as “The New Rome”—an unchallengeable superpower with substantial military forces routinely stationed far from home to pursue and protect national interests. Others noted that US military presence in and near countries governed or dominated by military structures frequently helps provide access for US diplomatic personnel—access that could not be so readily obtained without the influence of local US military officials.

Among almost all of the interlocutors there was a sense of declining formal requirements for current levels of US overseas military presence. This was expressed by one key official:

All trends argue against the need for permanent US military presence: the threat is too diffuse; our equipment is vastly superior to any threat; and the politics of presence are shifting against us.

As a general matter, the interlocutors did not broadly distinguish the values of US overseas presence for assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeating an enemy. The general response was, in effect, “the value of our presence depends on the context of the

local situation.” However, several mentioned increased sharing of intelligence and “situation awareness” surveillance information as having extremely high payoff for “assurance.”

Additionally, very few interlocutors thought that the US should consider significant increases in its routine overseas military presence. In this regard, some interlocutors were familiar with the inference in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) guidance that the future US overseas posture should be adequate to defeat the enemy with only modest reinforcement. However, most interlocutors placed a high value on the demonstrated ability of the US to rapidly deploy and reinforce its forces from considerable distances and didn’t think significant increases in routine manpower levels were warranted. They did, however, support increases in the military capability of our deployed forces through modernization of their weapons and C4ISR systems.

Finally, although most interlocutors acknowledged that modest reductions in the numbers of US military personnel routinely located overseas could likely be justified, there was little enthusiasm for such reductions. There was a general sense that “perstempo” problems could be better addressed by improved personnel management practices, thereby avoiding the need to “sell” the rationale for reduction to friends and enemies alike.

### **Building Long-Term Relationships**

There was broad agreement that one of the highest payoffs of past US military presence activities has been the establishment of favorable long-term *relationships* with key foreign officials. In many cases these relationships were initially established years before the foreign officials rose to high positions. The value of such relationships has repeatedly been proven when the US has needed to quickly establish military and diplomatic coalitions and to gain access to operating bases and sources of supply. The web of such relationships was also cited as an effective vehicle for assuring friends and allies of continuing US interest in their security situations. As one official said, “We need US Army generals to visit countries that are being run by generals.”

While all forms of US military presence offer opportunities to foster desirable long-term relationships, some forms were assessed as much more efficient than others. The form that was cited almost uniformly as being by far the most cost-effective way to establish such relationships was the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Under this program the US sponsors relatively long-term residential

education of foreign officers in military education programs in the United States. Support for IMET and similar programs was so strong that several military interlocutors volunteered that the DoD should be willing to transfer some funding to the State Department budget, where IMET is funded, in order to greatly expand—even double—the number of foreign officers under instruction. It was widely understood that such an increase would require the expansion of the capacity of the US military schools, with its attendant costs.

In discussing IMET and similar programs that provide in-depth exposure to life in the United States and the civil/military nature of the US national security system, it was emphasized repeatedly that there were many examples of the value of the resulting relationships, as well as examples of the problems created by the absence of such relationships. In the latter category, the dearth of Pakistani military officers that had received schooling in the US in recent years because of congressional restrictions resulting from the Pakistani nuclear program was repeatedly cited as an impediment to the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. By the same token, the fact that President Musharraf had attended US military schools and had a relationship with some senior US military officers was cited as very important to the ability of the US to get Pakistani cooperation as quickly as we did.

In this regard, it was repeatedly recommended that the Executive Branch more strongly support IMET and similar programs in its dealings with Congress, by documenting the proven value of having officers sympathetic to the US in senior positions in many foreign countries, and by providing evidence of the “relatively small” number of human right abuses that have been associated with such officers. It was also recommended that greater effort be made to explain to Congress the damage done to important US goals when IMET funds are “inappropriately restricted” in an attempt to “punish” a country for transgressions in other areas.

Other forms of presence that were cited as contributing strongly to the building of relationships were frequent high-level visits by senior US military officials as well as joint exercises (both “command post” exercises involving primarily senior staffs, and field exercises involving combat units).

As noted earlier, the building of strong relations was assessed by most interlocutors as contributing strongly to both the assurance of friends and allies, and to the

defeat of any attack—the latter due to quicker base access and better coalition prospects. There was little indication that such relationships were thought to directly dissuade or deter potential enemies.

### **Demonstrated Rapid Deployment and Reinforcement Capability**

Almost all interlocutors highly valued the US ability to deploy substantial combat capability to important locations on relatively short notice. In this regard, preexisting arrangements for base access and militarily significant stockpiles of unit equipment, fuel, and ammunition pre-positioned in key locations were cited as important indicators of such capability. Nevertheless, there was a strong consensus that both the willingness and ability of the US to deploy forces to key locations must be demonstrated from time to time for this type of presence to be an important contributor to assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence, and that such demonstrations are now too few and far between.

It was also generally agreed that the foreseeable threat warning times, including the time to assemble needed coalitions, are such that the US is highly likely to have time to deploy needed forces to crisis locations from the US, *provided that base access has been prearranged and suitable supplies prepositioned in the general area*. Only on the Korean Peninsula was the situation judged as requiring the ability to respond with only a few days warning, and even there it was noted that combat aircraft could be counted on to deploy to suitably prepared bases within the expected warning time.

Most interlocutors supported the observation that the speed and distance over which the US executed Operation Enduring Freedom has served to greatly strengthen the worldwide understanding of this important US military power projection capability. In this regard, several interlocutors volunteered the opinion that this recent US demonstration of rapid military deployability provides a “window of opportunity” to reduce the manpower intensity of our routine steady state overseas military posture, while preserving the necessary level of deterrence, dissuasion, and assurance through periodic redeployment demonstrations. One key official suggested that we say to North Korea: “If you were impressed with what we did in Kabul, wait till you see what we will do in Pyongyang if you step out of line.”

Although all interlocutors expressed considerable confidence in the ability of the US to rapidly deploy forces from the US, many observed that such capabilities, however efficient, cannot fully substitute for at least some US presence in each area of interest, even if such presence is only sporadic. In particular, the military interlocutors generally

made the point that each region has enough local peculiarities of geography, weather, local custom, and politics that detailed familiarity by key personnel is essential for proper military planning and smooth execution. It was also clearly and widely noted that only a command subset of the likely deploying force is likely to really need such familiarity, and that these key personnel can be provided special opportunities to gain such familiarity without needing to deploy entire major units.

### **The Need for Better Planning and Assessment of US Military Presence**

All respondents agreed that the US government should have a systematic process for periodically reviewing, assessing, and updating its global plans for its routine overseas military posture in support of the administration's foreign policy and national security strategy. The Secretary of Defense does not currently conduct such periodic reviews, and the Intelligence Community is not routinely tasked to assess the impact of our military presence overseas.

To the extent that such planning processes now exist, they are currently within the nearly exclusive purview of the theater combatant commanders. In this regard it is to be expected that responsible military officers will seek to minimize risk in their areas of responsibility by continually seeking that more US military forces be put under their control. The lack of a countervailing or integrating process in Washington was frequently cited as a major contributor to what was said by some to be the excessive operational tempo imposed on many units.<sup>1</sup> Most interlocutors supported a DoD-led presence planning process, perhaps as part of the Secretary's Contingency Planning Guidance, with significant involvement of the State Department and NSC staff.

In summary, there is wide support both for a more systematic national-level process for setting and managing our overseas military presence posture, and for tasking the intelligence community to periodically assess the impact of that posture.

---

<sup>1</sup> Although obviously not a "consensus" observation, it is important to note that the military services' support for more central planning of peacetime presence operations is conditioned by their belief that their ability to manage the orderly rotation and career progression of their service personal has been unduly weakened by the authority given to the theater commanders to plan and conduct peacetime presence operations.

## **Peacekeeping Forces**

There was widespread agreement on the need to better support a system that would permit US combat personnel that had responded to a crisis to be more quickly replaced by more suitable security personnel once the major dangers had been reduced. There was a general willingness to divert some DoD funding to this end. There was also general agreement that any attempt to create a deployable civil constabulary force in one of the US agencies outside the Department of Defense was a “non starter.” Other options, such as transforming elements of the US National Guard that are currently focused on armored warfare into military police and civil affairs units, and funding a “standby” international police force under UN control, each had their supporters, but nothing approached unanimity of opinion.

## **Opportunities for Reductions**

The “not for attribution” approach freed most interlocutors from necessarily supporting the positions of their institutions. This led to a surprising degree of agreement on the existence of several opportunities for the US to reduce overseas military personnel without damage to our security interests.

In addition to the following specific geographical observations, it was widely agreed that some overseas presence locations are more conducive than others to the assignment of personnel for 2- to 3-year tours accompanied by their families. Those locations not suitable for families were generally thought best manned by tours of 6 months or less, to limit family separation time. However, some interlocutors were concerned that long accompanied overseas tours are likely to increasingly interfere with the careers of working spouses and may need to be reconsidered. The alternative would be to move toward more scheduled unaccompanied rotational deployments, such as long used by the Navy and increasingly by the Air Force AEF concept.

### **Europe**

The area on which there was the most agreement was northern Europe—particularly Germany. While it was generally acknowledged that significant reductions had already taken place, the absence of a nearby threat made Northern Europe a natural “target” when interlocutors were asked to identify logical candidates for reduction. It was observed that allies that are not threatened shouldn’t need US military

presence for assurance, and that our presence in Northern Europe was unlikely to help dissuade or deter threats to other regions.

It was also acknowledged that there is a very real need for the US to keep enough forces routinely located in NATO Europe to retain our leadership position, or at least “a seat at the European table.” Most also felt that the utility of European bases as a “jumping off point” for US forces deploying to crises in the Middle East and to Southwest and Central Asia should be preserved. No firm formula was put forward for computing what such a minimum level might be, but there was general agreement that a reduction of 10,000 to 20,000 was unlikely to compromise our effectiveness.

### **Okinawa**

The frequent publicity given to local Okinawan complaints about the noise and other imposition of the heavy US military presence on that Japanese island ensured that most interlocutors would have something to say on this topic. Surprisingly, there was broad support for seriously considering making some reductions. Most of the US military manpower on Okinawa consists of the Marines in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force, including its support structure. This military force is approximately four times the size of the force that can be readily transported by the naval amphibious ships that are routinely stationed in Japan, and even that force deploys to crisis spots relatively slowly. Given this general understanding, there was considerable support for reducing the Marines on Okinawa to more closely match the lift that is likely to be available when needed.

There was also general acknowledgement that the security situation in Northeast Asia was such that at least some elements of the USAF fighter wing, and elements of the airborne ISR and tanker units now on Okinawa, could be moved back to Guam or the US with the expectation that they could be returned to the theater in a timely fashion if needed.

Several respondents suggested Guam as a suitable repositioning location for units potentially coming out of Japan, while noting that the cost to provide a suitable infrastructure for PCS personnel would need to be examined in some detail.

### **Naval Forces**

There was surprisingly little discussion of naval presence forces by the interlocutors until they were specifically asked about it. In that regard it was generally agreed that it would be both feasible and in some cases desirable to reduce the rigidity of

the Navy's peacetime deployment schedules and move toward a more flexible pattern of deployments of both battle groups and amphibious ready groups. Not often mentioned in this regard was the difficulty that such flexibility may impose on Navy personnel assignments and rotation schedules. But in general, it was thought that there was now less need for continuous naval presence in many areas, and that more flexible, intermittent deployments should be implemented. By the same token, several interlocutors noted that the Navy could continue to maintain a substantial forward presence posture at lower levels of personnel turbulence if it would homeport more ships oversea, with Guam being mentioned most frequently as a potential location.

There was widespread agreement that the Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), with their embarked Marines, helicopters, and landing craft, have proven to be very valuable presence forces in several theaters for many years but are undervalued publicly. It was noted, however, that the Navy's big deck carriers remain the "gold standard" of naval presence forces in large part because their fixed-wing aircraft are widely recognized as having the ability to conduct sustained strike operations over long distances. In this regard, it was observed that the number and type of embarked aircraft is not thought to be significant because of the US ability to reinforce such strike forces quickly.

### **Options Without Consensus**

No attempt was made to systematically discuss every region in which the US has forces routinely deployed. Interlocutors were usually asked only to identify areas where they saw an issue or potential opportunity for adjusting US presence. There was general agreement on the above regions. There was disagreement—some of it sharp—on the following regions.

#### **Saudi Arabia**

The discussions were all conducted in the post-September 11 environment amid much publicity and controversy about what role US military forces in Saudi Arabia may have played in motivating some of the terrorists. While many interlocutors recommended that we move our combat forces in the Gulf to more hospitable states, some argued that such a move would appear to many as a terrorist victory. Others emphasized the importance of Saudi bases to the efficient prosecution of a campaign against Iraq, which some saw as imminent. One recommended the immediate deployment of at least two

brigades of a second US Army division to the region to add to the two brigades already there, or prepositioned there, with the goal of better deterring another Iraqi attack.

More generally, it is difficult to accurately distinguish those US military forces that are in the Gulf region for routine peacetime presence from those that are there for crisis response purposes—either following up on the last war with Iraq (Southern Watch aircraft patrols)—or getting ready for the next one. For this reason the study team believes that the interlocutors’ observations on this region at this time are of relatively limited value in addressing the broader issues of future US worldwide military presence posture.

### **Korea**

The sharpest difference of opinion among the interlocutors concerned the appropriate US military posture in South Korea. Shadowing all discussions of Korea is the memory of the problems created in the 1970s when President Carter announced a major peremptory reduction in US forces, allegedly with little or no advance consultations with the South Koreans.

There is general agreement that the major military contribution the US would likely make to repelling an attack from the north would come from our tactical aircraft (including helicopters), battlefield missiles, and C4ISR.

Some interlocutors noted the huge size of the South Korean infantry compared with the two brigades of the US Army 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division and conclude on the basis of balance of force arguments that the US units could be removed with little or no adverse impact on the likely outcome of an attack from the North. Others would tie any reductions in US military manpower to explicit improvements in residual US firepower or other elements important to combat effectiveness such that informed observers would conclude that the actual resulting capability was no less, and perhaps greater, than before the reductions. And still others appear to doubt the full effectiveness of the South Korean forces, and see the US infantry as providing a contribution that could well be decisive.

Several interlocutors were highly dismissive of the relevance of balance of force and similar quantitative analytic methods of estimating the likely outcome of a battle to the political assessments of the value of US military presence on the Korean peninsula. These interlocutors generally see the existing number of US troops as having great value in assuring the general public in South Korea of the continued commitment of the US. They doubt that “firepower for manpower” arguments would be persuasive to that

audience. The “general public” audience is thought to be important because of the recurring issues of land use by the US military, and the need for ROK political experts to be able to justify this usage in simple terms.

Other interlocutors expressed similar concerns with regard to the message that any change would send to North Korea. In essence, they see the North as being deterred in large part by the prospect of drawing the wrath of the US if they kill a significant number of US infantrymen should they attack the ROK. And if those troops were to be reduced or removed, they predict the North might misinterpret such a move as a weakening of US resolve.

Still another school of thought advocates retaining substantially the current number of US troops in South Korea as a way to ensure the US will have a major role in the dissolution of the North—however it may unfold—whether it is a military march to the Yalu after a misguided attack from the North is defeated, or the requirement to deal with the chaos that might accompany a collapse of the regime in the North, or any one of a number of other ways events could unfold. Most US reinforcements for any counteroffensive are now slated to be deployed to Korea from other locations (mainly from the US) and don’t have to be present routinely. A few interlocutors suggested that the ROK might prefer to undertake reunification operations with as few US troops as possible. In this context, current US force levels were valued particularly for their prospective value in influencing the course of reunification under chaotic conditions, should the ROK choose to delay US reinforcements as “not needed.”

### **The Sinai**

Some believe this long-standing presence mission has outlived its usefulness, given the lack of hostility between Egypt and Israel for many years. Others believe that this is exactly the wrong time to consider changing this commitment, given the continuing violence in the Middle East and the relatively small demand this operation places on the US Army. Some cite the success of the Army’s unit rotation practices for this commitment as a model that could be productively copied in Korea.

### **Presence Recommendation Highlights by Expert Group Category**

The following summary of the results of informal, not-for-attribution discussions with 38 US security experts includes only actions that would directly change the current US overseas military presence posture by moving military personnel. Other important

observations and recommendations concerning the need for much better planning and management of the US military presence posture are presented elsewhere. A majority of those within each category actively supported the potential changes presented below. (Note that not all interlocutors voiced opinions on all options).

Following the summary, Table VI-1 provides a tabular view of the results, with the column headings keyed to the letters of the specific summary entries.

**Serving Senior Civilian/Military Officials (Sample: 16)**

- A. Reduce troops in Europe (but keep “seat at table”). Reduce US troops in Germany in particular. A 10,000-troop reduction was mentioned as a useful next step
- B. Reduce Marines on Okinawa; some said match to available lift; some say by 100%; some say by about 1/4 or more
- C. Substitute “some” firepower for manpower in US Forces Korea but consult with ally first
- D. Increase reliance on prepo and crisis surge capability, particularly carriers and AF Tacair; must exercise capability
- E. Move toward more variable carrier deployment schedules and increase visibility of ARGs
- F. Increase IMET school capacity and throughput significantly
- G. Support additional senior mil-mil relationship-building over large deployments

**Retired Senior Military Officers (Sample: 9)**

- A. Reduce Marines on Okinawa (some said to match lift); move to Guam or US
- B. Support “some” additional US reductions in Europe/Germany
- C. Some limited firepower for manpower changes in ROK would be useful, including tacair
- D. Can reduce presence in general
- E. Should increase reliance on prepo and crisis surge capability, particularly for tacair
- G. Increase IMET school capacity and throughput significantly
- H. Support increased high-level, mil-mil relationship building

### Retired Senior Civilian Officials (Sample: 13)

- A. Reduce USMC on Okinawa to match lift (some say to zero)
- B. Would cut more troops in Europe; some said to 25K
- C. Would support some “firepower for manpower” changes in Korea, if well coordinated
- D. Can reduce presence in general
- E. Should increase reliance on prepo and crisis surge capability
- G. Increase IMET school capacity and throughput significantly
- F. Would support shift to less regular carrier deployments; increase reliance on ARGs
- H. Support increased high-level, mil-mil relationship building

**Table VI-1. Majorities in Various US Security Expert Categories Actively Supporting Selected Proposals for Changes in US Presence Posture  
(Total number of individuals equals 38)**

US Security Expert Category	A Reduce in Okinawa	B Reduce in Europe	C Reduce in RoK	D Reduce Presence Generally	E Increase Prepo/ Surge	F More Var. CVBG/ More ARG	G More IMET	H More Sr. Mil-to-Mil
Serving Senior Military and Civilian Officials (N=16)	*	*	*		*	*	*	*
Ret'd Sr. Mil (N=9)	*	*	*	*	*		*	*
Ret'd Sr. Civ (N=13)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Groups=3	3(100%)	3(100%)	3(100%)	2(50%)	3(100%)	2(50%)	3(100%)	3(100%)
Of 38, min. no. of indiv's supporting	24(63%)	21(55%)	20(53%)	12(32%)	21(55%)	16(42%)	24(63%)	16(42%)

Note: Support levels shown here are minimums; actual levels may be higher: not all interlocutors voiced an opinion on each subject.

Overall, among these experts, some proposals for change enjoyed more and broader support than others. Majorities in all three groups actively supported reducing US Marine presence in Okinawa, and troops in Europe and Korea, the latter two without much enthusiasm. Majorities in all groups support significant increases in IMET and greater reliance upon prepo and surge as part of US military presence planning. By

contrast, more or less across the board US presence reductions were explicitly supported by majorities in only two (the two “retired”) categories.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Note, though, that the first groups may also support at least some degree of overall net presence reductions. Indirect evidence on this point is that majorities in this group did not explicitly favor assigning elsewhere overseas the forces that they said could safely be drawn down from Okinawa, Europe and/or Korea.

This page intentionally left blank

## **Chapter VII**

### **AN EFFECTS-BASED PRESENCE PLANNING AND EVALUATION PROCESS**

In QDR 2001, the Secretary of Defense declared that the department's presence posture was inappropriate to the new security environment and to DoD's strategy. He called for a number of posture changes as well as for the Services to prepare more options for him to consider [Department of Defense, 2001b: p. 27]. What process should the Secretary use to evaluate these options as well as to develop others? Based upon its review and analyses, IDA recommends that the Secretary consider building and regularly employing an effects-based presence planning and evaluation process for such issues and decisions. While he will most likely need to make a number of near-term choices related to presence before such a process can be fully up and running, many are recurrent decision-problems. Accordingly, the sooner a well-structured process is available to address them, the better the Secretary's decisions are likely to be.

The presence planning approach in place in the DoD today is really not an output or effects-based process. It still focuses far too much on such inputs as achieving certain numbers of ship days-on-station per year, ensuring that the US can be somewhere within certain timelines (hours or days), and maintaining certain US troop counts in one region or another.

A DoD-wide, effects-oriented approach would ask what outputs, or results, we want to produce vis-à-vis key objectives in a region. It would develop various options that DoD and the US government generally could use to promote them. It would explicitly compare these options with current practice (and each other) in terms of performance metrics such as effectiveness, resource costs, stress on personnel, and implications for preparedness in other regions.

The process envisioned here would be deliberately structured to take full advantage of the capabilities of *all* the services, taking increasing advantage of what are considerable but today *unrealized joint* capabilities. It would also seek to integrate the resources of all relevant US government departments and agencies as well as of friends and allies in order to promote mutual security interests.

## FOUNDATION FOR JOINT PRESENCE PLANNING

An effects-based approach could serve as a working-level, operational foundation for the joint presence planning concept that is outlined in the QDR [DoD, 2001b]. That policy is intended to strengthen the Secretary of Defense's management of the allocation of joint deterrent and warfighting assets from all the Military Departments; to establish steady-state levels of air, land, and naval presence in critical regions around the world, to "synchronize deployments of US forces and to facilitate cross-service trades for presence and deterrence." [p. 35]

DoD's new planning construct calls for maintaining *regionally tailored* forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral and the Middle East/Southwest Asia to *assure allies and friends, counter coercion, and deter aggression* against the United States, its forces, allies, and friends. [p. 20]

### A SIX-STEP PROCESS

IDA recommends a six-step planning and evaluation process. For each region the basic steps might be as follows:

Step 1. Establish demands for *desired* effects, outcomes, capabilities by region/country/period(s); develop demands using more and less ambitious standards.

- a. Crisis-responsiveness, crisis/combat outcomes (outcomes of MTWs, NEOs, etc.)
- b. Deterrence (adversary behavior; statements; likelihood goals)
- c. Assurance (key foreign attitudes toward US commitments, capabilities)
- d. Dissuasion (evidence re others' WMD programs; other hostile programs, alliances)
- e. Stability/prevention (reduce the killing, other crime, strengthen basic security/stability)

Step 2. Identify plausible packages/plans to produce desired effects, capabilities.

- a. US military (presence, power projection, intelligence, strategy, policy, agreements, facilities)
- b. Non-US military (forces, coalition support, infrastructure, SOFAs, etc.)

- c. US non-military (diplomatic/political strategy and policy, assistance, trade options, intelligence, visits, summits, exchanges, sanctions, political support, quid pro quos)
- d. Non-US non-military

Step 3. Identify “full up” packages to promote desired effects/capabilities (combining elements from each part of step 2)

Step 4. Evaluate packages for effectiveness, resource costs, risk, QoL

Step 5. Implement most promising packages in consultation with allies/friends

Step 6. Review/strengthen process and approaches

### **A SIMPLIFIED LOGIC**

To illustrate the basic logic of this process, Table VII-1 offers a simplified construct that focuses on the major *military* dimensions of the planning and evaluation problem. For a given region, the table lists the (hypothetical) *results* of what are likely to have been an extensive set of assessments of the estimated minimum number of the most cost-effective capability elements (X1, Y1, Z1) needed to meet the performance standards established by the US for each of the objectives cited in the rows of the table (crisis/combat; deterrence; assurance; dissuasion; and stability). (In this illustration, some cells are shown as empty because no agreement had been reached by participants in the process on those issues.)

The bottom set of rows in this table represents the result of one plausible decision rule for judging what overall US presence (continuous and intermittent) should be in that region in the next planning period, assuming that the resources are available and that other potentially important objectives, such as minimum Quality of Life (QoL) standards for servicemembers and their families, are also met. The logic of the procedure in this most basic version of the effects-based process is that the US presence levels for X1, Y1, and Z1 that would be selected (and that would appear in the bottom right of the table) would be based upon the maximum values of those three capability elements that appear for US presence in the rows in the upper sections of the table.

**Table VII-1. Minimum Needed of Most Cost-Effective Military Capabilities  
to Meet Desired Standards**

Capability Elements for Objectives	Overall	Overall Allies	Overall US	Power Proj. US	Overall Presence	Allied Presence	US Presence
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
<b>Crisis/Combat</b>							
X1	10	4	6	4	6	4	2
Y1	6	3	3	2	4	3	1
Z1	4	1	3	1	3	1	2
<b>Deterrence</b>							
X1	6	4	2	1	5	4	1
Y1	7	3	4	1	6	3	3
Z1	4	1	3	1	3	1	2
<b>Assurance</b>							
X1	10						
Y1	6						
Z1	4						
<b>Dissuasion</b>							
X1	4						
Y1	3						
Z1	4						
<b>Stability</b>							
X1	2						
Y1	1						
Z1	2						
<b>Overall</b>							
X1	10	4	6	4	6	4	2
Y1	7	3	4	2	6	3	3
Z1	4	1	3	1	3	1	2

If sufficient US military resources are not available, or if other important objectives (such as QoL) are not satisfied, then various alternatives could be considered. Possibilities include (a) accepting different performance standards vis-à-vis the various objectives; (b) getting allies to do more militarily; (c) determining the availability and effectiveness of invoking other resources, e.g., non-military resources such as diplomatic

and economic strategies, in the development of cost-effective packages that could meet the minimum standards invoked in Table VII-1.<sup>1</sup>

## MOVING FORWARD

Building the sort of evidence base that is postulated in Table VII-1 calls for an ongoing, extensive set of cost-effectiveness assessments, a willingness to establish explicit standards of performance, and the adoption of a decision rule for aggregating across objectives. In such a process, a significant number of decisions would need to be made regarding what military and other resources are available for particular regions, along with a considerable number of judgments/policies concerning such issues as when to involve various US and foreign participants in the process.

IDA believes that tangible progress can be made in developing such a process. Moving from an input-oriented approach toward one that is output or effects based will take initiative, extensive consultation, and leadership. A process of this kind could help bring analytic rigor and systematic assessments together in an integrated decision-mechanism for transforming US military presence from what is now a manpower-intensive, mass force, input-based approach into a high capabilities/strong relationships,

---

<sup>1</sup> As the overall process is developed, non-military options would be considered systematically in the initial development of the most cost-effective elements (the X1s, Y1s, and Z1s) for use in Table VII-1. Consider, for example, that the US presence posture in a given region is probably not the only determinant of allied and friendly assurance of US commitment and ability to respond. The way the US has handled previous incidents and crises, whether in the region or elsewhere, seems very likely to affect how assured allies and friends feel or would react to potential presence adjustments. Thus clear, frequent demonstrations of US ability to deploy US forces rapidly from elsewhere, as well as to stand up for other friends and allies in their time of need, seem more likely to have positive assurance “demonstration effects,” whereas ambiguous, inconsistent, or weak responses to challenges to our interests and those of allies and friends are more likely to breed insecurity and anxiety. Close, continuous defense consultations, even if at significant physical distance (by telephone, teleconference, or secure electronic forms), quite plausibly have strong assurance effects compared to weak, erratic consultations. Similar positive assurance effects seem likely with high-quality (versus mediocre or haphazard) ambassadorial consultations, with close attention to (versus neglect of) alliance agreements, and with robust (versus very limited) technology and arms sales and transfers. Strong positive assurance effects could accrue as well to close intelligence sharing (versus very limited sharing). High-level visits by US political officials are more likely to assure allies and friends of our commitments than infrequent, low-level visits and exchanges. Military student exchange programs, such as IMET, are likely to have an assurance effect, even though they are not US military presence activities. Inclusive US economic policies, such as those that encourage US investments in the countries and regions, are more likely than not to assure others of our commitments to mutual interests. Economic development assistance may also assure friends and allies of our commitment to long-term mutual security.

effects-based approach, one that would deliberately develop regional and global partnerships of networked capabilities to promote key US and shared security objectives.

Transforming presence in this way appears to be highly consistent with the Secretary's goals, as expressed in the QDR [DoD, 2001]: "A key objective of US transformation efforts over time will be to increase the *capability* of its forward forces...."[p. 20] "The defense strategy is premised on *efforts to strengthen America's alliances and partnerships* and to develop new forms of security cooperation" [p. 14]

Discussions with a wide range of US security experts in this study convince us that there would be significant support among them for a more effects-based presence planning and evaluation process.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, our not-for-attribution talks with more than 50 diplomatic and security experts from 23 countries persuade us that these friends and allies would very much like to be involved in thinking through and consulting with the US about possible adjustments to American military presence in their countries and regions.<sup>3</sup>

Evaluation methods and tools will need to be developed further in order to make such a process a reality for the Department. And options will need to be regularly developed and evaluated using those methods and tools. IDA's methodological work to date has only scratched the surface of possibilities for a more analytically rigorous, effects-based approach to transforming presence planning, evaluation, and postures. However, the initial results do suggest that there is significant potential in DoD's conducting an ongoing array of such assessments—to use as evidence in both developing and evaluating presence options—for the near and the longer term.<sup>4</sup>

Delays in building an effects-based process will risk poorer DoD and indeed US government performance in promoting key security objectives, due to delays in emplacing superior capabilities and building militarily relevant relationships and networks. Delays

---

<sup>2</sup> See chapter VI. Talks with US experts suggest a number of things: they see several areas where the US has latitude to move from a manpower-intensive presence toward a high-capabilities approach; they would like to see a more systematic development and evaluation process; and they see great value in proactive efforts to build strong, militarily relevant relationships.

<sup>3</sup> See chapter V. Overall, they generally value current forms and levels of US presence and believe that DoD ought to work very closely with its friends and allies in any process of transforming presence toward a high capabilities-strong relationships approach.

<sup>4</sup> See chapter III for a discussion of tools for assessing combat implications of alternative presence postures. See chapter IV for a discussion of tools for assessing the deterrence implications of alternative US military presence postures.

are also likely to cost the DoD and the US taxpayer (due to the perpetuation of inefficiencies) and are likely to continue to place undue burdens on service members and their families.

## **STRUCTURING STRONG CAPABILITIES**

The 2001 QDR cited eight critical types of capabilities that DoD believes should be focused upon in building substantial “margins of advantage” across “key functional areas of military competition” (e.g., power projection, space, information): 1) information operations; 2) ensuring US access to distant theaters; 3) defending against threats to US and allied territory; 4) protecting assets in space; exploiting US advantages in the following three areas: 5) superior technological innovation; 6) space and intelligence capabilities; 7) military training; and 8) ability to integrate highly distributed military forces in synergistic combinations for highly complex joint military operations.

Options built from components such as these would deliberately and aggressively focus on creating and maintaining regional and global partnerships of networked capabilities with our friends and allies.

## **OPTION EVALUATION CRITERIA**

In this effects-based process, newly developed options ideally would aim to—

- Transform US presence postures from today’s routine, manpower-intensive, mass-force approach toward a high capabilities-strong relationships approach
- Strengthen joint/combined capabilities in key regions
- Promote key security objectives as well as or better than today’s postures
- Minimize QoL hardships on service members and their families, especially in peacetime
- Fall within plausible bounds of affordability and resource availability
- Increase efficiency

## **ORGANIZATION OF THE PROCESS**

For this proposed process, it makes sense to build as fully as possible on current best practices—and best evidence—from throughout the Department. For example, the Department of the Navy (DoN) has developed an interesting process that could be built upon [US Navy, 1999–2000]. A fundamental strength of the Navy’s concept is the idea

that it starts by identifying objectives to be accomplished in a region; specifies tasks that should be achievable in order to promote those objectives; identifies forces and activities able to accomplish the tasks; and then determines how many of various forces and activities are appropriate to the tasks. The results postulated in Table VII-1, above, could be constructed from a process of this sort, especially if it were expanded in several ways:

1. Include the resources of all the Services, not just the DoN
2. Focus on more than US military presence assets and activities as means of achieving objectives (thus, for example, US power projection assets and activities should be explicitly considered in the planning process too)
3. Evaluate alternative means of providing high levels of deterrence and highly favorable combat outcomes
4. Consider the relative resource implications as well as effectiveness of various alternatives
5. Evaluate the implications for the quality of life and stress levels on servicemembers and their families
6. Integrate the perspectives and potentially useful resources of other US government departments and agencies, as well as those of friends and allies
7. Focus beyond the near term, to develop forward-looking options

Overall, we propose an OSD-led, effects-based presence planning and evaluation process, with the following major features: it would have strong Joint Staff, CINC, and Service roles, and there would be strong supporting/contributing roles for DoS and for other key US government agencies. The National Security Council would monitor the process. It would have a 2-year option development and evaluation cycle in sync with the PBBS and QDR processes. There would be well-structured consultations with, and inputs from, friends/allies in each cycle. There would be a strong analytic component to develop and assess options. Overall, the process would develop and assess the effectiveness and resource implications of alternatives, over several different planning periods.

The process envisioned here would draw, in any given cycle, upon the best available evidence as to what works to promote key objectives, and upon the best analytic tools for gauging the resource and other implications of the various packages. The scheme would clearly focus upon the establishment of US military presence options. But these options would not be developed in isolation; rather, they would be structured, insofar as possible, as explicit parts of integrated, overall packages of US policies,

activities, and assets for promoting the security objectives of interest as fully as possible within resource and other constraints.

In order to illustrate how such a process might actually work to develop and evaluate integrated packages, the next three chapters offer notional, partial options. In each case, we seek to briefly apply the evaluative tools that IDA has assembled thus far, and to suggest where additional evaluative methods and data should be assembled in order to further the establishment of the process.

This page intentionally left blank

## **Chapter VIII**

### **AN ILLUSTRATIVE OPTION FOR US MILITARY PRESENCE IN NATO EUROPE**

#### **BACKGROUND**

The US European Command (EUCOM) includes about 116,000 personnel (June 2001) of the following Service forces, most of which are in Germany:

- US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE): About 33,000 persons
- US Army, Europe (USAREUR): 62,000 members
- US Navy, Europe (NAVEUR): About 12,000 members
- US Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR): About 3,000 marines
- US Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR): About 5,000

The center of gravity for EUCOM's force structure is the Army, and its center of gravity is V Corps with 42,000 soldiers, the vast majority stationed in Germany.

This chapter presents a candidate alternative for the employment of these EUCOM forces, with some variations, based on concepts presented by representatives of European NATO experts in the course of discussions with IDA. We found five main points in our discussions, listed below in decreasing order of frequency:

1. US commitment to and leadership in European security will continue to be central.
2. Basing US forces in Europe is desirable because they are closer to potential trouble spots in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
3. There is a need for more peacekeeping forces and crisis prevention activities involving Americans as well as Europeans.
4. The European NATO allies are willing to support the alliance prior to, during, and after crises, and while their technical capability is relatively limited compared with those of the US (especially C<sup>4</sup> and strategic airlift), they are not limited in terms of regional knowledge, intelligence, providing access, and willingness to arrange beneficial relationships.

5. NATO HQ must shift—

- From single scenario planning focused on specific forces meeting deployment schedules and the related testing.
- To capabilities planning focused on using NATO members' assets in various combinations over a wide range of contingencies and testing these plans, without prior commitments by governments to participate in particular contingencies, should they arise.

## **PRESENCE OPTION RECOMMENDATIONS**

Examining these five major findings from our discussions with European experts in light of the four purposes of US military presence—crisis response, deterrence, dissuasion, and assurance—suggests two thrusts:

1. An initiative to improve NATO allies' ability to operate effectively out of area in nontraditional (for NATO) roles, notably peacemaking and peacekeeping. Our interlocutors made clear that such an initiative would have to include American boots on the ground, but it appears that the primary US role would be in C4ISR, logistics, transportation, and of course leadership for the initiative.
2. A realignment of NATO to support crisis response, deterrence, dissuasion, and assurance in the Middle East, Southwest Asia (SWA), Caucasus, and Central Asia. The most obvious available improvement would be to shift significant heavy ground forces and supporting tactical air to the southeast; these would be US forces primarily. Of secondary, but still great, importance would be to enhance the transportation network from Western Europe to southeastern Turkey to support decisive military operations from the southeastern nodes of that network. This latter work would be primarily the responsibility of our NATO allies, using a variety of national, regional, and international nonmilitary agencies, since substantial economic benefits would accrue to them as well.

Overarching both thrusts would be the need for—

- Significant changes to EUCOM, and probably eventually NATO alliance, headquarters structures and modes of operation.

- Long-term coordinated interagency US government efforts to consult with, learn from, and eventually bring along our allies.

The following paragraphs describe specific changes which, taken together, would implement the two major thrusts. These specific changes are illustrative; alternatives are certainly possible to achieve essentially the same ends. For example, the basic option includes a reduction of about 17,000 in US military personnel permanently stationed in Europe; this is based on certain assumptions about how the US will want to posture its residual heavy land forces expertise, equipment, and facilities as the Army transforms itself. Variations on these assumptions could well leave those personnel in Europe.

After presenting the specific changes and discussing the likely impacts of the changes with respect to crisis response, deterrence, dissuasion, and assurance, the chapter closes with a discussion of the possible cost implications of the option.

Specific changes would be to:<sup>1</sup>

1. Shift the EUCOM ground forces power projection base by moving as far southeast in Turkey as mutually agreeable with the Turks the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division (1AD) and approximately half of the battalion-level units of V Corps' eight independent brigades, i.e., the 12<sup>th</sup> Aviation Brigade, 130<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade, 69<sup>th</sup> Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 22<sup>nd</sup> Signal Brigade, 18<sup>th</sup> Military Police Brigade, 205<sup>th</sup> Military Intelligence Brigade, and 30<sup>th</sup> Medical Brigade. Stationing essentially all of the troops associated with these units in CONUS would reduce ground force personnel permanently stationed in Europe by about 17,000. At selected locations in Turkey:
  - a. An armored division set of equipment, and related corps combat and combat support equipment would be pre-positioned. This would include fuel, ammunition, other consumables, and transport equipment to allow deploying and supporting the division and its supporting units long distances overland south and east from Turkey. An unusually large amount of pre-positioned material would be needed in the early years, before the transportation system improvements discussed in section 8, would have taken effect.
  - b. Base maintenance and pre-positioned equipment maintenance and repair would be conducted by contractors.

---

<sup>1</sup> This option does not address naval forces. Likely, one would want to maintain naval bases in Italy, consider bases on Crete, and, in particular, look for basing in the Indian Ocean. However, this is beyond the scope of this option.

- c. Security would be provided by the Turkish army and gendarmerie directed through liaison arrangements with the standing joint task force headquarters support element (see 3b, below).
- 2. Shift the EUCOM tactical air power projection base southeast by repositioning the USAFE 48<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing from Lakenheath, UK, to Crete or alternatively to Turkey, operating in the rotational mode proved by the 39<sup>th</sup> Wing at Incirlik, Turkey. The 39<sup>th</sup> is assumed to continue operating at Incirlik.
  - a. The Incirlik model includes having primary force protection and base security carried out by Greek (or Turkish) military and police forces.
  - b. The Lakenheath air base would be maintained as a rotation base subordinated to the 48<sup>th</sup> Wing.
  - c. Other USAFE assets would be shifted as necessary to support the wing in its new posture<sup>2</sup> so there would be no impact on USAF personnel PCS in Europe.
- 3. Establish in Turkey—not necessarily collocated with Army assets—a lean standing joint HQ (based on model of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) and lessons learned in the UK Cyprus HQ) capable of commanding units that would come regularly to train and test pre-positioned equipment and, with augmentees from V Corps HQ, those that would be assigned to it in time of crisis. The HQ would plan and test its ability to project forces to trouble spots in the Mid-East, SWA, Caucasus, and Central Asia.
  - a. The HQ staff personnel would be PCS and number about 300. Billets would be reallocated from existing Service HQs in Europe to this staff.
  - b. In support of the standing joint HQ, a small number of military police, signal specialists, Army aviation, engineers, and necessary combat service support, a total of roughly 500 troops PCS to support the HQ. This small number of specialists would be augmented by the specialists coming to Turkey as part of the unit rotations discussed in 4a, below.
- 4. Assign the vast majority of the personnel in the units described in items 1, 2, and 3 to bases in CONUS, and a smaller number to bases in Western Europe; rotate these personnel as units, e.g., battalion combat teams (BCTs) to Turkey and squadrons to Greece.
  - a. Army BCTs would deploy—typically as units at the ends of staggered 2-year readiness cycles—for 3 months, to fall in on pre-positioned

---

<sup>2</sup> Another option could involve shifting the 52<sup>nd</sup> Fighter Wing from Spangdahelm, Germany, to Turkey and the 48<sup>th</sup> to Crete.

equipment and exercise intensively with Turkish and other allied forces. Approximately one armor or mechanized infantry battalion—with a variable mix of supporting Army aviation, air defense, and other combat and combat support—will be in Turkey at any given time. There will be a few days overlap between rotating units. The philosophical underpinning of this idea is that the assignment in Turkey would not be garrison duty; rather it would be a “graduation” field exercise for fully ready units simulating intensive offensive operations in the environment that lies to the east and south of the Turkish training area.

- b. One squadron of the 48<sup>th</sup> Wing would be in Crete (or Turkey) and one squadron of the 39<sup>th</sup> Wing would be at Incirlik at any given time, with appropriate overlap between arriving and departing squadrons.
  - c. A basic guideline for the changes in items 1 through 4 is to minimize the average number of US military personnel present in Turkey and Greece consistent with the presence posture. Of those present on a rotational basis, an emphasis on intense field training will reduce their visibility to the general populace.
5. Maintain EUCOM base structures in the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain to be available to support very large surge deployments rapidly, provide rear-area combat service support (hospitals, supply depots and the like), and support forces shifted southeast day-to-day.
- a. Shift some of the 21<sup>st</sup> Theater Support Command’s bases and functions southeast to support the redeployed power projection base. For example, leaving the 29<sup>th</sup> Support Group indefinitely at Taszair Air Base, Hungary could be evaluated as part of this shift. If admitted to NATO, Bulgaria and Romania could be candidates; for example, establishing the equivalent of the 29<sup>th</sup> Support Group in southern Bulgaria in support of forces in Turkey and Greece is a possibility. Consultations with—among others, the Russian government—would emphasize that these are not combatant units and, therefore, relocation to former Warsaw Pact countries is in the spirit of earlier agreements.
  - b. USAREUR’s Area Support Groups (ASGs) shift their focus southeast (see 5a) while maintaining capability to support surge requirements in Western Europe.
  - c. First Infantry Division remains in Germany and provides an organizational home for the Army’s planned European Interim Brigade Combat Team.
  - d. Reorient V Corps HQ to (1) provide support to US forces in Southeastern NATO and the Balkans, (2) conduct training and exercises

in northern Europe with NATO allies and friends (with 7<sup>th</sup> Army Training Command), and (3) perhaps other tasks delegated from USAREUR HQ if the latter is downsized or disestablished.

6. Establish a peacemaking/keeping brigade, consisting of three multinational battalion-size units, the US units of which would be subordinated to SOCEUR, at bases released from US use. Each battalion-size unit would consist of one company of US personnel (for initial planning, organized on the basis of military police TOE with augmented firepower and an air control squad), one company of Germans, and one company from elsewhere (e.g., Italy, Spain, Turkey, Eastern Europe, Russia), plus necessary support, which would be mostly civilian contracted through a dedicated base support battalion from a US ASG.<sup>3</sup> Other nations' peacemakers/keepers could come periodically to train with these units, and Italian Carabinieri, Spanish Guardia Civil, and UK Northern Ireland veterans could provide specialized training. Total US peacemaker/keeper and support personnel for all three units would be about 1,000<sup>4</sup> (an additive amount).
7. Reallocate billets from existing Service HQs in Europe to create a joint HQ under USCINCEUR, with liaison elements in the UK, Germany, Italy, France, and the other NATO countries that have or later do establish similar joint HQs, to plan for a broad range of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping contingencies, and to carry out tests of parts of the plans. For example, a French interlocutor suggested an intervention in the African Great Lakes region by UK, Belgian and French peacemakers and peacekeepers using US military airlift, C4ISR, PSYOP, and logistics support.
8. Establish a high priority dual-use transportation system improvement program to enhance the transportation network from Western Europe to southeastern Turkey to support decisive military operations from the southeastern nodes of that network. Its primary initial goal would be to create a highway and rail system in Turkey from the Bosphorus and Black Sea, and also from the Mediterranean Sea adequate to support an allied military campaign launched from the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers into Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Iran. The program's secondary goal would be bringing the land transportation systems of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkish Thrace up to satisfactory standards to complete a modern land link between the Bosphorus and Western Europe.

---

<sup>3</sup> The 104<sup>th</sup> ASG, which now supports IAD, is a candidate to form such a base support battalion.

<sup>4</sup> Other NATO allies might well oversubscribe the quota of non-US/German companies, in which case US and German companies could be fewer. However, at least one American company would be needed to satisfy the "boots on the ground" criterion, and there would be significant numbers of Americans involved in headquarters and technical support.

Large economic benefits would accrue to Turkey, Greece, other southeastern European countries, Austria, and Germany, among others. Therefore, the day-to-day work would be primarily the responsibility of our NATO allies, and would involve coordinating projects sponsored by the nonmilitary organs of European governments, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). However, vigorous US involvement with the NATO political structure, European Union, and international financial institutions (IFIs)—all at multiple levels—would be required, hence the need for a long-term interagency effort within the US government.

The eight recommendations above, net, would remove from Europe about 17,000 military (ground forces) personnel.<sup>5</sup> Of course, a significant number of the personnel “removed” by shifting combat units to Turkey will be present there at any given time on short-term rotational deployments.

## **DEALING WITH CHANGE, BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR ALLIES**

Our Western European allies can be expected to applaud the formation of multinational peacemaking/keeping units and a joint HQ to plan for contingencies. But while Western European interlocutors advertised proximity to trouble spots as a benefit of their neighborhood, we should not assume that they will endorse moving US capabilities even closer to the Middle East, SWA, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Clearly the then ongoing political debates over how to deal with one or more of those areas will dominate reactions on any given day.

However, our Western European interlocutors, among others, emphasized that they were quite capable of participating in serious consultations and accepting, for the greater common good, outcomes that were inconvenient. Therefore, they can be expected to understand reasoning along the lines of assumptions made for US Army transformation, encapsulated here for illustrative purposes:

The Army will move toward lighter more agile forces under a capabilities-based approach to cope with future enemies who cannot be precisely foreseen. At the same time, some specific regions very likely will remain threatening for many years. They

---

<sup>5</sup> These estimates are approximate based on military personnel in the units named. If further reductions in military personnel permanently stationed in Europe are desired they might be found by using every practicable opportunity to transfer functions and personnel to CONUS and to outsource/private functions that must be carried out in NATO Europe in support of the redeployed combat capability.

include at least two where armor forces will remain highly relevant: Korea and the Middle East/SWA, the latter being tank country whether approached from Turkey or the Persian Gulf. This would justify pre-positioning at least one armor division set of equipment in Korea, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf littoral, as well as afloat or at a port. Further, it would be sensible to have two to three armor divisions working with their training equipment in locations from which the soldiers can fly away to marry up with one or another pre-positioned equipment set. Given the uncertainties necessarily attending where crises will erupt, CONUS is probably the optimum location for the soldiers.

It would not be unreasonable to expect that Western European military officers and security policy professionals could understand and accept reasoning along these lines. Of course, if the assumption were incorrect, another basis for consultations would need to be found.

In spite of earning acceptance at an intellectual level, redeployments still create practical difficulties for our allies. For example, it is clear that in Germany, base closures will cause the government difficulties, whatever the proximate cause; it would seem likely that the proposed repositioning would be such a cause. Reportedly the Army has initiated an "Efficient Basing-East" program, which will involve base closures on a smaller scale.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that all that can be done has been

---

<sup>6</sup> [Anderson, 2002] The Army is finalizing plans to shut 12 military installations in the Giessen area north of Frankfurt and relocate about 8,500 1st Armored Division soldiers and family members to Grafenwöhr in southeast Germany. According to Army planning documents, the closures are expected to save the service \$12 million annually. Meanwhile, Army officials in Europe have been quietly briefing national and local German officials on the pending relocation while drawing up plans for some \$650 million in new facilities to handle the influx of personnel at Grafenwöhr over the next 5 years. US Army Europe spokesman Col. Carl Kropf said plans call for moving six battalion-sized units of a brigade combat team from other locations in Germany to Grafenwöhr in a phased, incremental approach, beginning in 2005. The move will involve approximately 3,400 soldiers and some 5,000 family members... "While currently the artillery, engineer and forward support battalions of a combat brigade may be at different locations with families living in other areas, the concentration of assets planned at Grafenwöhr will mean the brigade commander can exercise more effective and timely command and control of all his major combat resources..." The Army has already spent \$25 million just drawing up plans for the relocation. According to USAREUR spokeswoman Millie Waters, approximately \$561.5 million has been earmarked for new family housing, barracks, maintenance and unit operations facilities, as well as renovation and expansion of support facilities such as child care. New schools, an exchange and commissary, as well as improved medical facilities, will also be built. Construction is expected to begin at the end of this year, with \$70 million programmed for fiscal 2003. "Current plans call for the first unit move in fiscal 2005," Waters said. All construction is slated to be completed by 2008.

done to address issues of demilitarization, environmental restoration, and working with local authorities to apply lessons learned in US base closures to create positive results from the changes.

Also some Western European interlocutors linked the number of NATO subordinate commands designated for Americans with the US continuous presence there. A part of examining this option would be to identify subordinate commands, perhaps in NATO's northern sector, that would be used for trading material in negotiating the changes involved.

A significant issue is the confidence that US planners can have that the Turks and Greeks, having agreed to hosting these capabilities, would then allow their use. In reporting our discussions with NATO allies, the IDA team evaluated both the Greeks and Turks as "neutral" with respect to US military presence. That is, neither Greeks nor Turks saw it as necessary to their security situation, but they were willing to have a US military presence if asked properly. The IDA team judged that a request would be better received in Greece if it came with a NATO imprimatur and focused on Crete rather than the mainland.

A concern that needs to be addressed when considering an armored division and/or a standing joint task force headquarters in southeast Turkey is that this is the main area of Turkey's long-running Kurdish insurgency. Turkey appears to have made progress toward solving this problem, but maintenance of day-to-day security will be a major factor in establishing a US military presence in the region.

The enhancement of the Turkish land transportation system and of its connections to Western Europe would appear to be a powerful incentive to Turkey to participate in the entire illustrative strategic repositioning. A less valuable, but nonetheless valuable, quid pro quo would be a strong commitment to a multiyear coordinated program of military assistance, civil nation building technical assistance, and subsidized business investment, primarily in the Caucasus and secondarily in the westernmost Central Asian "-stans." This could involve coordinated US government, NATO, European Union, and World Bank sponsored projects. EU admission is a third area of great importance to Turkey; some in the EU have resisted and will continue to resist Turkey's admission strenuously, barring effective US intervention. However, since strong US support for Turkish EU membership was reportedly tendered to persuade Turkey to assume leadership of the 2002 Afghanistan peacekeeping force, it is unclear that a US promise to do even more would be credible.

## **STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CHANGES**

The likely net impact of the recommended changes on crisis response, deterrence, dissuasion, and assurance are discussed below in general terms.

### **Crisis Response**

The US would be far better postured to carry out military operations against Syria, Iraq, and Iran; this posture would be further enhanced to the degree that long legs for ground combat and support units are also pre-positioned. An armored division in southeastern Turkey, with the support of US strike and allied ground forces, would open the possibility of a two-pronged attack on these potential adversaries. Baghdad is about the same distance from either Kuwait or southeastern Turkey across generally open country. Tehran is also about equidistant from southeastern Turkey or the nearest point on the Arabian Gulf coast; however, mountains intervene in both cases. Damascus is much closer to Israel than to the Turkish border, but much of Syria is open to occupation from Turkey.

If the armored division equipment set were located near sufficiently large air bases, it also would be better postured than sea- or port-based pre-positioned armor sets to respond to crises in Central Asia.

### **Deterrence**

Turkey's willingness to allow offensive action and the specific length of the "long legs" of the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division would remain worrisome in DoD contingency planning circles. However, the worries in Tehran, Baghdad, and Damascus would err on the side of believing that the Americans can strike their capitals at will. The proximity of the 48<sup>th</sup> (and perhaps 52<sup>nd</sup>) Fighter Wing would support the deterrent value of US pre-positioned armor. IDA studies of deterrence demonstrate clearly that the combination of strike and ground forces provides a synergistic deterrent value.<sup>7</sup>

The deterrence of various ethnic, religious, and otherwise opportunistic peace breakers in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Northern Africa has not been assessed because of the multitude of possible combinations and permutations. It is safe to say, however, that US forces positioned in Turkey and Crete offer more deterrence value than

---

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter IV of this report for details.

the same forces in Western Europe. Further the existence of a multinational peacemaking/keeping brigade in Western Europe will have some deterrent effect on the same classes of peace breakers.

### **Assurance**

IDA's discussions with representatives of 23 countries supported the notion that pre-positioning does not provide anywhere near the assurance provided by "boots on the ground." Having said that, IDA's research suggests strongly that, with the possible exception of some residual worries in some former Warsaw Pact countries, Europeans do not need assurance that the US will come to their defense if they are attacked frontally. Further, the quarterly rotation of highly ready BCTs to Turkey and their participation with the forces of Turkey and other NATO allies will provide a regular opportunity to remind everyone of US reinforcement capability. Therefore, the strategic repositioning proposed in this option is unlikely to have a significant negative impact on assurance, at least not with respect to conventional military threats.

The proposed peacemaking/keeping brigade and the joint HQ for coalition contingency operations planning and testing—properly presented, created, and operated—will substitute for the reduction in US conventional military forces and staffs in assuring Europe that the United States remains committed to its well-being. These particular modalities are proposed in part because they would involve much more intense interactions with European experts than equivalent numbers of personnel in conventional units and administrative staffs. IDA's discussions with foreign experts suggest strongly that such interactions are an important element of assurance.

### **Dissuasion**

There is no doubt that IDA's German, British, and, to a lesser degree, Italian interlocutors strongly resisted ideas of reducing US military presence levels in Western Europe and in their individual countries. Indications are that their populations welcome American military forces. Setting aside reasons they gave for why the US should want to stay in Europe, the reasons they gave for why they wanted the US military presence to remain had to do with alliance leadership and demonstrated US commitment. Moreover, a number of interlocutors said directly, or implied, that the US military presence dissuades intra-regional jockeying for position. The rationale appears to be that the US

presence is so dominant that any European would view trying to match it as pointless, and a number two position is not worth the effort.

This interpretation is speculative. Still, the actual mix of Western European assessments of US military presence remains unclear. It is highly unlikely that the proposed shifts, all of which are within NATO, should undermine peace or unravel NATO. Indeed some of them—the peacekeeping units and contingency planning headquarters, to name two—are designed specifically to respond positively to European concerns so as to counterbalance the shift of major combat capability. Still, further probing is in order to understand how to best execute the strategic repositioning.

## **PRESENCE OPTION COSTS**

The costs of carrying out the option described here depend in large part on decisions as to how it is implemented. The IDA study team used the capabilities of the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) and analogies to other redeployments to gain insight into the most significant of the costs.<sup>8</sup> We only addressed costs that were in addition to those incurred today.

### **Establishing Bases in Turkey and on Crete and Support in Southeastern Europe**

Our review suggested that the main questions here involve the availability of adequate airstrips and the degree of permanency of the structures. In both countries, we have assumed that no airstrip would need to be built. Also we have assumed that expedient structures would be built with the view of conveying the political message that these are not permanent US bases. It does not include the cost of building family housing. With these assumptions, the set-up costs would be:

1. Turkey: \$35 million. This includes the cost of moving equipment from Germany to Turkey, building facilities for the standing joint task force headquarters and for rotating Army units, moving the 800-person force and dependents to the base, and one month of base operation, not including a rotating BCT. For costing purposes we used Konya, Turkey, where a NATO range operates. Strategically, it would be far better to position the 1AD in Southeastern Anatolia, near the headwaters of the

---

<sup>8</sup> Costs will be expressed to the nearest million dollars for costs under \$10 million, to the nearest \$5 million for costs in the \$10–70 million range, and to the nearest \$10 million for larger costs.

Tigris River. Diyarbakir is the largest city in the region and is the location of the Princirlik Air Station and other allied activities during the Gulf War. Costs of establishing the forward base in this region would be several percent more than locating it at Konya.

2. Crete: \$25 million. This includes the cost of moving base support and operations equipment from Western Europe, building facilities for a squadron headquarters, base support and operations, and rotating Air Force units, moving the 1300-person force and dependents to the base, and one month of base operation. For costing purposes we used Souda Bay, where an airfield has been used often over the last three decades and a US Navy facility currently exists. Strategically, it would be better to open the base at the eastern end of Crete, for example at Sitia, where a commercial airfield is in operation. Again, costs of establishing the forward base in this region might be somewhat more than those involved in locating it at Souda Bay.
3. Hungary/Bulgaria: Leaving the 29<sup>th</sup> Support Group indefinitely at Taszair Air Base, Hungary would involve only continuing current costs. If the group would be disestablished after operations in the former Yugoslavia cease, this continued operation would represent an opportunity cost. The cost of establishing the equivalent of the 29<sup>th</sup> Support Group in southern Bulgaria in support of forces in Turkey and Greece has not been estimated. It would be on the order of \$10 million. It would be staffed with billets freed up by the redeployment of 1AD: therefore, net recurring cost differences would not be noticeable at the level of aggregation employed here.

### **Rotating Units to Turkey and Crete over the Years**

IDA's review assumed that after an initial surge, the annual recurring costs of the headquarters and base operations would not be significantly different from the costs incurred by the same people based in Western Europe. The obvious details of transport and communications that would be more costly in these more forward bases are not material at the overview level presented here. With this caveat the additive cost for maintaining this forward-leaning posture would be:

1. Turkey: \$170 million per year. This is primarily the rotation of BCTs to Turkey with intensive 90-day exercises while there. It includes the cost of

contractor maintenance of pre-positioned equipment but not direct costs for Turkish force protection and base security.

2. Crete: \$140 million per year. This is overwhelmingly the cost of the quarterly rotation of squadrons and their more intensive operations while flying from Crete. It does not include direct costs for Greek force protection and base security.

### **Relocating Military Personnel and Dependents from Germany to CONUS**

These costs depend largely on the means of execution. Our review suggested four main questions in this regard:

1. Are units and associated dependents moved as units from Germany to CONUS? The costs can vary by approximately \$100 million. If units in Germany were drawn down, consolidated, and deactivated as people departed, and units in CONUS were reactivated and filled out in the normal course of PCS rotation, the incremental cost of this move would be very low. However, 2 years—more or less—would pass in which substantial numbers of combat units would be in this process on both sides of the Atlantic. If, on the other hand, units were rotated the costs could be close to \$110 million, but the time that specific units would be in transition would be reduced to weeks. Intrinsic to the ground force option is that each BCT would be formed in less than 3 months, stabilized and trained to higher and higher levels of proficiency for 18<sup>+</sup> months, and then deployed to Turkey for a 3-month graduation exercise. The Germany-to-CONUS relocation would be used as a means to set up that rotation. Therefore, the incremental costs of the shift could be managed to keep them in the low tens of millions of dollars, but not eliminated entirely.
2. What are the costs of preparing CONUS home bases to receive service members and dependents? If all the units, service members, and dependents being relocated from Germany were to be assigned to a CONUS base lacking adequate facilities and quarters, a large cost could be

incurred. For general planning purposes, \$140 million gives a sense of what the costs might be, but it surely is not the upper limit.<sup>9</sup>

3. What demilitarization and environmental remediation costs will be incurred in Germany? There is no information immediately available to judge the magnitude of these costs. COST includes a placeholder—10% of the original cost to build troop housing and facilities—for the final demilitarization of a site. However, this does not appear to address costs for sites that have been long occupied. Therefore, there are possibly several tens of millions of dollars of one-time costs here.
4. What training equipment will the units use in CONUS? Earlier a global strategic assumption about Army transformation was described; it may not be correct. For costing purposes the IDA study team made a less ambitious assumption. We assumed, as the Army active component transforms to a lighter, more agile force and as the National Guard focuses more on homeland security, that an armored division set of equipment will be freed up for use in CONUS for the redeploying troops. This seems quite reasonable for the tank and mechanized infantry battalions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigades of 1 AD. It is by no means clear for the redeploying elements of the 4<sup>th</sup> (Aviation) Brigade of 1 AD and the eight independent brigades; there may be several tens of millions of dollars of one-time costs here.

### **Nonmilitary Costs of Operating Bases in Turkey and on Crete**

In Turkey highway (or rail) construction to create better transportation arteries would improve the military effectiveness of units postured in southeastern Turkey; improvements in the networks connecting Turkey to Western Europe would further enhance the effectiveness of these units. Very roughly, the cost of constructing a two-lane highway in a mixed plain/mountainous region is in the neighborhood of \$1 billion per 100 miles. The distances from the headwaters of the Tigris to the nearest Black Sea ports and to the Turkish Mediterranean ports on the Gulf of Iskenderun, are 250 to 300 miles

---

<sup>9</sup> In reactivated sections of CONUS bases, if buildings and sidewalks must be handicapped accessible, and all building interiors subjected to asbestos and lead paint remediation, to name a few possibilities, costs could go considerably higher. The cost attributed to the Army plan for moving 3,400 military personnel and their dependents within Germany discussed earlier in footnote 5 suggests higher costs. However, it also suggests that these costs may have to be incurred in any event, whether the military personnel stay in Europe or move to CONUS.

by air, but 300 to 400 miles by land on roads ranging from very poor to mostly substandard at best. With only back-of-the-envelope analysis, it appears that a highway construction program of about a billion dollars per year over a decade is not beyond reason from both military and civil viewpoints. Typically such a project would be financed by the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and other international financial institutions. How to create workable financial structures, apply the appropriate persuasion, and present US government guarantees so as to achieve an adequate construction program will have to be the matter of careful interagency consideration.<sup>10</sup>

It is clear that Turkey would be looking for some concrete and significant quid pro quo for hosting the proposed US presence. The proposed transportation network improvement program may well suffice in itself. The arteries built partially for military purposes also would spark economic development in southeastern Anatolia, which is already a priority infrastructure investment region for the Turkish government. Improving connections to Western Europe also would be very attractive. If further incentives are needed, adding US, NATO, and European Union actions to effectively defuse what Turks see to be Russian destabilization in the Caucasus and Central Asia might be a part of a package that would be very attractive to the Turks. The cost of such actions—spread over several USG, European, international donor institutions, and IFI accounts—might well be on the order of \$100 million per year over several years in DoD accounts. Earlier we mentioned EU admission as an important Turkish goal and speculated that a US commitment to support this admission more strongly might be hard to make credibly. Therefore, no cost estimate is associated with this third possibility; in any case the cost almost surely would not involve the DoD budget.

### **Other Costs of Altering the Posture**

Costs for establishing the multinational peacemaking/keeping brigade would depend largely on the amount of new equipment that must be purchased. The bases would be in place in Germany. Whether the three US companies within these battalions would

---

<sup>10</sup> A current template for addressing such matters is available in the program of the British Petroleum (BP) led consortium of nine oil companies, which announced on August 2, 2002 the commencement of the 1730 kilometer Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline to be completed by late 2004 at an estimated cost of \$2.9 billion. The pipeline will enter northeastern Turkey on its border with Georgia, traverse Turkey (1076 kilometers), and terminate at a storage and port facility in Ceyhan on the Gulf of Iskenderun, near Incirlik.

be manned by US Army personnel, a mix of volunteers from all Services, or another alternative such as contractors is an open question. In any case, they and the US personnel in support roles represent an additive long-term cost to the US government because it is reasonable to assume that the US Army will win the argument that these personnel should not be counted against Army totals. The support battalion for the three peacemaking/keeping battalions would be drawn from existing US Army assets in Germany, mostly German civilians, freed up by the 1AD redeployment; therefore, it represents no cost or an opportunity cost, depending on whether one thinks the people would be let go otherwise. All in all, it seems reasonable to assume that the initial cost of this initiative will be in the neighborhood of \$20 million and that the recurring cost increment will be in the neighborhood of \$100 million per year.

The postulated DoD costs of supporting military assistance initiatives in the Caucasus and Central Asia are highly speculative, if they are required at all in support of the presence realignment. Nonetheless it is not unreasonable to assume that DoD outlays would total about \$100 million per year for several years.

In sum, the option could involve first-year costs ranging from something under \$200 million to something close to half a billion dollars, depending on decisions made about implementation. Thereafter, approximately \$510 million per year would be expended supporting the military component of this posture. If the Army units were left in Germany, the one-time costs of moving units to CONUS would be avoided, but other consolidation or quality-of-life costs might well be incurred in Germany that would be comparable in magnitude. In any case, a different cost would be incurred to pre-position an armored division set in Turkey. The cost would be larger if the equipment were collected in CONUS and shipped to Turkey, smaller if equipment pre-positioned in Western Europe were transferred to Turkey. The recurring costs of supporting the posture in Turkey would be somewhat less, but the PCS costs would be more.

The costs of building transportation infrastructure are outside the figures above. They also are highly speculative. The sources and uses of these funds are too complex to judge their direct impact, if any, on DoD. It is certain, however, that considerable political capital would be expended to get European governments, international donors, and IFIs to provide funds for transportation improvements.

## CONCLUSIONS

The option described here has many variants, only a few of which were noted explicitly. The main point of laying it out was to illustrate with a concrete case that changing the US strategic posture in Europe or anywhere else is not a one-dimensional matter, whether that one dimension is force-on-force calculations, cost, or command structures. It is all of these and much more, including politics and perceptions.

A creative, interagency process would be needed from the outset and our allies would have to be involved, informally early on and more formally as plans gel. Creativity is in order because something not anticipated at all here might turn out to be key. For example, assume that the shift of ground forces to southeastern Turkey is deemed to be desirable from the US perspective. To make this acceptable to both Turkey and Germany it might turn out to be critical to invite the 5<sup>th</sup> Panzer Division (which is the third division of V Corps, along with the US 1<sup>st</sup> Armored and 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Divisions) to pre-position a battalion set of equipment alongside the American equipment and to periodically train together, under agreements carefully formulated to not imply any prior political commitments by any of the three countries to act in future situations. The US government needs to be able to deal with such a possibility in an evolving process.

Interagency work is needed because this option or creating a better option will involve political and economic issues as well as military ones. Two examples follow. Transportation network improvement is the first. While various economic sanctions against Iran, Iraq, and Syria in the 1990s impacted American international business interests only modestly, they devastated significant parts of the Turkish economy. In the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Turkish economy was described as a shambles by some observers. This cannot be ignored in thinking about posturing US military power in Turkey. The transportation network program will address these very serious economic problems as well as enhancing the military posture. Another example bears on improving the option. While a USAF “Incirlik-like” base on Crete is an improvement over the current posture, a base on eastern Cyprus would be even more important strategically. It is unattainable, however, unless an ethnic feud is put to rest, which is a political challenge. No US government mechanism to balance the potential strategic gain against the political cost is in evidence.

## **Chapter IX**

### **AN ILLUSTRATIVE OPTION FOR US MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA**

#### **BACKGROUND**

The United States routinely maintains about 47,000 military personnel in Japan. These forces are nominally there in support of both the US/Japan mutual defense treaty and the long-standing commitment of the US to maintaining stability in East Asia. They are also planned to be used to help defend South Korea if that country is attacked. While some US military units are located on the main Japanese islands, the majority are on Okinawa, an island about 1,000 miles southwest of Tokyo. Potentially useful adjustments to the US units on Okinawa are the topic of this chapter.

The following major US military units are routinely stationed or rotationally deployed on Okinawa:

- The USAF 18<sup>th</sup> Wing, including two F-15 C/D fighter squadrons, a KC-135 in-flight refueling squadron, an AWACS squadron, an HH-60 rescue squadron, and associated support. Under separate command is the AF 353<sup>rd</sup> Special Operations Group, with one squadron each of Combat Talon and Combat Shadow MC-130 aircraft, and MH-53J Pave Low helicopters. (Total USAF Okinawa: About 10,000 AF military personnel + family members + retirees + contractors.)
- The Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), including the HQ and four infantry battalions of the 3rd Marine Division, the 1st Marine Air Wing (H-53 and H-46 helicopters, KC-130s), associated support units and command elements. (Total: About 17,000 Marines + families etc.)
- The majority of the US military facilities and personnel are in southern Okinawa. The US bases there are in a heavily urbanized area that provides little opportunity for the training that is essential to maintaining combat readiness. This scarcity in turn requires that US combat units stationed on Okinawa routinely deploy elsewhere in the Far East for such training. The US military presence in congested southern Okinawa has also provoked considerable local opposition. The US agreed in 1996 to vacate the USMC's Futenma Air base by the end of 2003, and Japan agreed to build a replacement

air base in a more remote northern Okinawan location. The press recently reported that that project is being held in abeyance pending US/Japanese agreement on the duration of assured US use, and that new international environmental objections are currently being raised on behalf of the endangered local dugong (a large marine mammal) population. Construction of the now stalled new air base, which the US has specified be sized at 4,200 feet to accommodate future tilt-rotor V-22 and other carrier aircraft, is the pacing item for vacating the Futenma location. The 1996 agreement reflected a plan for the Marines to move their KC-130 force to the Iwakuni air base on the Japanese “mainland.”

### **Personnel Tempo Considerations**

The US military forces on Okinawa consist of a mix of personnel stationed there for 2 to 3 years and accompanied by their families, and personnel there on 3- to 6-month unaccompanied tours. Personnel in the latter category generally rotate on set schedules as coherent military units, rather than the independent rotation of the individuals that are there on longer assignments. Most of the US families on accompanied tours live in government housing subsidized by the Japanese government, but there is no surplus of such housing that could accommodate a major shift from rotational deployments to more accompanied tours. In fact, US military personnel assigned to Okinawa and authorized to bring their families must often wait for over a year after arriving before government housing becomes available. In the interim they either remain separated from their families, or their families live “on the economy,” usually in substandard conditions.

The peacetime rotational deployments of US military units to Japan for 3 to 6 months contribute directly to the “personnel tempo” that the Services must carefully manage if they are to remain within the goals that have been established by DoD. Although such rotational unit deployments contribute most directly to family separations, the 2- to 3-year nominally “accompanied” tours can also contribute to family separations and other problems. Such problems arise particularly when a working spouse must choose between a career in a US-based business and keeping the family together during an overseas assignment, and when adequate family housing will not become available until many months after the military member has deployed.

Although the Marines and the Air Force have had some success in managing these “perstempo” problems, it would clearly reduce the overall strain on military families if US security goals could continue to be met, but with fewer personnel deployed to Okinawa from the US on a day-to-day basis, and without the need to build a

new remote base on northern Okinawa to which married personnel would be required to commute from the family housing areas in the south.

### **Meeting US Security Goals**

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the direct military threat to Japan has been sharply reduced at a time when Japanese self-defense capabilities have been increasing. Consequently, US military forces in Japan now focus primarily on reinforcing South Korea in the event of an attack by North Korea. In addition, they continue to demonstrate the broad commitment of the US to the security of South and East Asia by their very presence in the theater, and by engaging in small contingency operations and various training exercises with other nations in the theater.

The 47,000 US military personnel in Japan clearly help demonstrate the US commitment both to the direct defense of Japan, and to the broader goal of regional security. Nevertheless, it is widely agreed that the current number need not be rigidly adhered to as long as the US continues to provide the requisite military capability and other forms of assurance.

### **The Korean Contingency**

The largest US combat forces in Japan—the Marine and Air Force units—are on Okinawa, which is about 800 miles from Seoul. Because of the potential need to respond to an incipient attack by North Korea with only a few days' notice, it is widely recognized that the Marine ground combat units and their equipment on Okinawa could not be expected to be brought to bear in Korea until after such an attack had been stopped. Even at that point, the routine presence in the theater of only enough amphibious lift for one of the four Marine infantry battalions on Okinawa would limit the full use of all the Marine ground combat forces stationed in Japan until much later in such a conflict. If more Marines needed to be employed by ship in order to establish a credible threat of a large-scale amphibious assault, the additional amphibious ships deploying from the US west coast could as easily bring Marines from California or Hawaii as from Okinawa.

Because tactical aviation units are much more inherently mobile than are ground combat forces, the Air Force and Marine fighter squadrons stationed in Japan could probably be repositioned to advanced bases in South Korea (or, in the case of Marine aircraft, to Navy carriers) within the warning time likely to be available. Indeed, this inherent mobility of such units suggests that the even greater distance from the base in

Guam (1800 miles vs. 800 miles) should not preclude its consideration as an alternative to Okinawa from which to stage tactical aviation units forward to Korea in an emergency. Additionally, the relatively underutilized air base at Guam is a logical alternative for basing the long-range AF tanker and ISR aircraft now operating out of Okinawa.

### **Other Contingencies**

The US military forces in Japan not only serve to reinforce South Korea if needed, but also constitute a “tool kit” for the Pacific theater commander to use throughout his large theater. In addition to the training exercises that are routinely conducted with many countries in pursuit of our “assurance” “dissuasion” and “deterrence” goals, US forces in the Western Pacific are available to support such unexpected needs as were created by the violence on East Timor, the campaign in Afghanistan, and the potential need for evacuation of non-combatants (NEOs) in such trouble spots as Indonesia and the Philippines.

The Marines on Okinawa are usually the first to be called upon when such lesser crises arise and ground forces might be needed. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) embarked in Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) have proven to be particularly adept at NEOs over the past several years in many areas of the world. They are expected to retain their value for such contingences well into the future, recognizing that these battalion-sized units are not expected to operate alone in high threat areas, or conduct opposed amphibious assaults.

While on Okinawa, the components of III MEF maintain their high level of readiness primarily through training exercises on other Japanese islands and elsewhere in the theater, because training facilities on Okinawa are very restricted. Although all elements of III MEF are nominally available for employment by CINCPAC to respond to crises, or for peacetime engagement purposes, there are no major lift assets dedicated to the rapid movement of major III MEF units other than the single three-ship Navy Amphibious Ready Group homeported in Sasebo. Response to contingencies by this mode depends in turn on the actual location and availability of these ships at the time of the crisis. In general these ships follow the same peacetime operational tempo rules as do ships based in the US. They are usually scheduled to deploy for exercises with other countries elsewhere within the theater with a Marine MEU embarked from Okinawa (designated the 31<sup>st</sup> MEU, regardless of the numbered battalion currently assigned) for several weeks at a time, about twice per year.

An alternative (or complementary) mode of employment for potential combat situations is to fly Marines from Okinawa or elsewhere to the location of interest where they would marry up with equipment that is routinely stored aboard the three or so Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships that are typically located in the Marianas. Most of the combat equipment and 30 days of sustaining support for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (roughly 2+ MEUs) is stored aboard these MPF ships. Again, the responsiveness of this option is highly dependent on the availability and location of the MPF ships and the availability of an airfield near the destination port that can handle the Marines KC 130 intratheater transport aircraft or chartered passenger aircraft.

An additional lift option has recently become available as the Military Sealift Command (MSC) leased a large oceangoing, high-speed ferry as a way to lower the cost of routinely moving Marine units to training ranges while they are deployed to Okinawa. This ship (and a second one whose lease is being discussed) is currently configured and contracted strictly for commercial-type administrative transport. However, ships of this type have considerable potential for employment as operational lift vessels in low to medium threat environments, with minimum modifications. The Army and the Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) have recently joined forces under the auspices of the Joint Forces Command and leased a similar high-speed ferry for experiments on the US East Coast involving the potential configuration and use of ships of this type for various military missions.

Air Force units on Okinawa are of course also available for employment in lesser contingencies throughout the Pacific theater, in addition to helping in the defense of South Korea. To this end, the Special Operations Group MC-130 and Pave Low aircraft, and the long-range tanker and ISR aircraft are arguably more likely to be needed for lesser contingencies than are the F-15 C/D fighters. To the extent that the family housing situation and other “quality of life” pressures suggest that some Air Force units be considered for relocation, the long-range tankers and ISR aircraft could be rebased at Guam without undue impact on small-scale military operations throughout the theater, or on a Korean contingency.

## **THE OPTION**

### **Summary**

1. Transform the USMC posture on Okinawa by increasing the capability to redeploy ground combat units by adding additional new high-speed ships,

while also reducing the size of the USMC force on Okinawa to more closely match the total resulting available lift, thereby also reducing overall USMC perstempo.

2. Maintain the support and prepositioning structure for the current USAF fighter units at Kadena but reduce perstempo. Make room at Kadena for the remaining USMC rotary wing aviation units vacating Futenma and take advantage of the AF's increasingly rapid deployment capability by moving 1 of the 2 fighter squadrons of the 18<sup>th</sup> fighter wing to CONUS to be maintained at a high state of readiness for redeployment when needed, and by moving the tanker and ISR units to Guam.


Both actions would lower personnel deployment tempo, impose less family separation, and avoid the need to build a new air base.

### **Specifics**

1. Build on the recent SecNav approval of the lease of commercial high-speed oceangoing catamaran ferries (designated "HSVs") in the Western Pacific by acquiring enough (probably 2 to 3) HSVs to handle the "embarkable" elements of a second Okinawan MEU. (Figures IX-1 and IX-2 illustrate the HSV.) When added to the 1 MEU lift capacity of the three-ship Navy Amphibious Ready Group now homeported in Sasebo, this would effectively double the ability of the Pacific theater US combatant commander to rapidly employ highly ready Marine ground combat units from Okinawa throughout the Pacific theater by sea. The MEU lifted by HSVs would be restricted to more benign landing sites than the MEU in the ARG because of the greater vulnerability of the HSVs to hostile fire, and would likely not initially include either the heaviest Marine helicopters or main battle tanks.
2. The HSV recently leased by the Marines was acquired primarily as a cost-effective alternative to continuing to pay high rates for transporting Marines and some of their equipment by US military airlift to peacetime training ranges several hundred miles away. This option envisions the additional use of such HSVs for operational missions, such as NEOs, humanitarian operations, joint exercises, etc., of the type being tested by the Army and Navy East Coast experiments with a leased and modified high-speed commercial ferry.



**Figure IX-1. Images of Successful 6- Month Test of “Theater Support Vessel”**



**Note:** Military features are described by the contractor as follows:

The craft has been upgraded and fitted with military enhancements such as a helicopter deck, stern quarter ramp, RIB deployment gantry crane, troop facilities for 363 persons, crew accommodation, storage facilities, medical facilities, long range fuel tanks and C4ISR room.

After enhancements the craft has a loaded draft of 3.67 metres (12 feet) and a total operating deadweight of 740 tonnes (815 short tons), exceeding the uplift requirements of its military charter by over 25% and almost doubling the required deployment capability with an all-up range of over 4500 nautical miles.

With all improvements added, the vessel is able to transport a specified cargo load of at least 422 short tons over a range of 1110 nautical miles at an average speed of 35 knots in sea state 3. Alternatively, a specified cargo load of 545 short tons over a range of 600 nautical miles in sea state 3 is available.

**Figure IX-2. “Joint Venture” HSV-X1 with Military Features  
Concept for Future 112M Joint HSV**

The Department of the Navy would conduct a 6-month study to ascertain the potential value of acquiring HSVs that have been modified to include such militarily useful features as a helo pad and fueling station (for reconnaissance, utility, and light attack helos and possibly for FireScout UAVs); improved habitability for longer transits and possible use for short periods as an offshore base; lighterage for offloading “in the stream”; and a modest self-defense suite. Following this assessment, the DON would arrange to buy and station at Okinawa enough of the most cost-effectively configured HSVs to accommodate a second MEU.<sup>1</sup>

3. This option would also reduce the overall manning of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force/Third Marine Division/Third Marine Air Wing on Okinawa to a level commensurate with the ability to quickly embark two combat ready MEUs for transport to an area of emerging crisis. Given that units routinely rotationally deployed to Okinawa from CONUS and Hawaii are already highly trained, the deployed and stationed force on Okinawa could be reduced to the two battalion landing teams, and associated aviation and support units that comprise the embarkable MEUs. The core of the substantial III MEF headquarters would remain in Okinawa as the main element of a PACOM JTF headquarters, and would continue to be available to the theater commander for high-level peacetime training with allies. The two infantry battalions and medium helicopter squadrons not needed for MEU operations would be retained at their current permanent stations in the US. The resulting US Marine force on Okinawa would be little more than half the size of the current force.
4. Retain the ability to support two squadrons of USAF F-15 C/D fighters at Kadena, but maintain only one squadron there routinely in peacetime; rotating each of the other squadrons in the 18th Fighter Wing to Kadena from the US every 90 days as part of the AEF rotation concept. Relocate the USAF ISR and tanker aircraft now routinely deployed on Okinawa to Guam. These reductions in the USAF equipment and personnel at the Kadena AB would free up space to which USMC aircraft retained on Okinawa could be relocated.

---

<sup>1</sup> Under current US government procedures, purchasing such long-term equipment is generally more economical than leasing. Purchasing a long-term warranty with the ships can preserve the benefits of commercial support. Near-term purchase may require the administration to waive some “buy American” provisions, due to lack of US capability to build these types of commercial ships of appropriate size. The Navy could operate such ships with civilians under the same terms as other naval auxiliary ships, such as the T-AOs, that also are expected to occasionally go in “harm’s way.”

## **EFFECTS OF ADOPTING THE OPTION**

The changes envisioned in this option could preserve—or even enhance—the US military capability throughout the East and South Asian “arc of instability” primarily through the increased availability of USMC crisis response forces. The significant reduction in manpower on Okinawa envisioned in this initiative could facilitate a less demanding overseas rotation rate for both Air Force and Marine Corps personnel, with attendant benefits in family life and retention rates.

Reducing the USMC and USAF manpower routinely on Okinawa by more than 1/4 should also permit the remaining USMC aviation units that are now slated to move from MCAS Futenma to a new more remote base promised by Japan to instead move to the Kadena air base. This could quickly abate the noise and urban congestion problem at Futenma without waiting for completion of the new facility and the attendant environmental difficulties. It also provides additional opportunities for consolidating the many Service-specific support activities on Okinawa into a more efficient unified support configuration.

If some of the USMC units being removed from Okinawa were no longer needed in the active force in CONUS to support the objective peacetime rotational deployments, they could be cadred into the highly effective USMC Reserves and some of their equipment pre-positioned in South Korea.

### **Assurance**

There is a widespread habit of equating the degree of US commitment to the security of any overseas region to the number of military personnel the US maintains in that theater in peacetime. The US has worked in recent years to convince the parties concerned that a better measure is the United States’ demonstrated willingness and capabilities to conduct the type of military operations important to success in each theater, while keeping enough force and support in theater to demonstrate such willingness and to facilitate the capability.

The retention of nearly 10,000 Marines, a ready squadron of USAF fighters, and a robust Special Operations Group on Okinawa, when coupled with enhanced Marine employability and frequently demonstrated reinforcement exercises, should continue to be a persuasive US presence posture in the eyes of all reasonable friendly nations in the Pacific theater. The reduction in tensions associated with the current large US military

“footprint” should also be helpful, as should the timely return of the Futenma base to Japan, as previously agreed. Of course, a suitable consultation program should precede any decisions on an option of this type.

### **Dissuasion/Deterrence/Combat Capability**

The modest reduction in the day-to-day number of USAF aircraft in Japan, when viewed in the context of the Air Force’s frequently demonstrated capability to rapidly deploy from CONUS to such well-prepared bases as Kadena (or, more importantly, to prepared bases in the ROK), should not reduce the perception by potential adversaries of US capability for the early employment of large numbers of tactical aircraft in response to any crisis in the western Pacific. History<sup>2</sup> and discussions with key foreign officials both indicate the effectiveness of rapid reinforcement as a major contributor to deterrence. And analysis and experience both demonstrate that the US is quite able to deploy its combat aircraft to effective locations when needed to confront emerging threats.

With regard to the re-posturing of the Marines, because the units now on Okinawa would need to be transported by sea to any emerging crisis over a substantial period of time, the enhancement of such deployment capabilities with the addition of the HSV lift needed to carry most of the elements of a second MEU into low-to-moderate threat areas would be a significant increase in capability. This would be additive to the existing ARG/MEU and the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) equipment set embarked in the Pacific Maritime Pre-positioning Force ships and should increase the deterrence factor by expanding the ability of the US to bring Marine units into areas of potential combat.

The methodology developed in chapter IV demonstrated the importance of a defender’s perceived ability to quickly reinforce his forces to the establishment of an effective deterrent posture. In the case of Korea, it is the demonstrated ability of the US to respond quickly to any threatened attack from the North by deploying reinforcements that contributes to deterrence. Whether the timely reinforcements, particularly of aviation units, come from Japan or CONUS or elsewhere should be immaterial in the calculus of deterrence.

With regard to likely outcomes of actual combat in Korea, the analysis outlined in chapter III (and appendix D) suggests that the course of the important early stages of

---

<sup>2</sup> Research by Huth [1988] strongly supports this contention.

a war on the Korean peninsula may be quite insensitive to the arrival dates of the follow-on ground forces, such as Marines deploying from Japan. On the other hand, the increased potential for early amphibious operations inherent in the expanded sealift provided by this option should contribute both to increased deterrence and expanded counterattack options for the combatant commander.

## **Resources**

If the US is to commit to a long-term posture such as envisioned in this option, it should buy the two or more properly configured HSVs that are needed, rather than lease them as currently planned. This would have the added advantage of allowing them to be better configured for the specifics of a MEU's footprint—perhaps including strengthened vehicle decks and helo pads. Such ships would cost about \$70–100 million each, vice \$30 million for a 3-year lease.

There is some question as to the extent to which the existing US Marine Corps base structure in the United States could accommodate the two returning battalions and their associated aviation and support units without the need for additional housing. However, given the housing shortage that already exists on Okinawa, if more housing is needed it would probably be preferable to add housing in the US under the DoD privatization program. In the interim, newly increased housing allowances should make living off base in the US more attractive, on average, for many active-duty personnel than it is on Okinawa.

Similar considerations apply to any movement of Air Force tanker and ISR units to Anderson Field on Guam. The need for new family housing on that island would be ameliorated to the extent that the Air Force could maintain these deployments on a 3-month rotation basis at adequate perstempo rates. However, given the general demand for the services of these units in the many minor contingencies that arise over the course of a year, it may well be that the crews should be stationed on Guam for full 3-year tours accompanied by families. Such a move would therefore add to the cost of improving and expanding the support facilities on Guam that are already in train for the planned increase in Navy presence on that island.

The manpower resources associated with this option depend on the impact, if any, on AF and MC end strength. In principle, however, this option is intended to decrease the strain of overseas deployments for both the USMC and USAF and thereby reduce the demand for increased end strength to support such deployments.

In addition to incurring the one-time cost of relocating the units out of Japan, the US would forgo the substantial subsidy that the Japanese government now pays annually to support these units in Japan.

## **Chapter X**

# **AN ILLUSTRATIVE OPTION FOR US MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA**

### **BACKGROUND**

For the past 50 years the United States has maintained a major military presence on and around the Korean Peninsula. Together, US and South Korean servicemembers have helped build the peace. South Korea has become a thriving, modern democracy with an enormously successful economy and a highly capable military [CIA, 2000]. Sadly, North Korea is a highly militarized, isolated, impoverished totalitarian state where millions have died of starvation in recent years, due far more to the incompetence of the regime than to natural disaster [Oh and Hassig, 2000].

Approximately 37,000 US servicemembers are stationed on the Peninsula today. The two principal US military units serving there are the Eighth US Army (28,600 members) and the 7<sup>th</sup> US Air Force (8,500 members). The current US military presence posture on the Korean Peninsula is strong, and US and Korean military commanders speak proudly and forcefully of the alliance as well as of the friendships that have developed and continue to grow between Americans and Koreans. Unfortunately, however, there are also significant problems with the current US posture. This chapter first describes several of them. Then, based on preliminary data and estimates, a strawman option to mitigate some of these difficulties is outlined and partially evaluated. Several variants are also suggested.

### **Selected Problems**

#### **Quality of Life Issues**

For many US military servicemembers, duty in Korea is onerous. While 24,000 of the 37,000 men and women of the US military now in Korea are married, they are still required—just as are almost all members stationed there—to serve year-long, unaccompanied tours there, away from home, away from spouse and children, in what may not be peacetime but certainly is not a shooting war. While for single

servicemembers this may not be especially burdensome, and while in an actual war unaccompanied tours of this length would not be surprising for anyone, single or married, in peacetime good reasons for such a policy, especially for married members, are hard to find. Although US officials readily acknowledge that a problem exists, it is not clear that the core problem has been well identified. For example, US officials point to a serious lack of available US government housing for families in Korea, imply that this shortage is the difficulty and, further, assert that DoD has a plan to fix the problem. Yet even if a shortage of appropriate housing is the principal problem—and that is far from clear—current DoD housing plans will not even come close to fixing it.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the construction of US military family housing units on valuable land is an ongoing source of friction with at least some vocal elements of the ROK population. With increasing numbers of military spouses seeking independent careers, is more family housing in Korea the best solution? Perhaps it is shorter, unaccompanied tours, such as 6-month deployments, which, while hardly perfect, would at least be more in line with other US stationing and deployment standards.

### **Perverse Readiness Priorities?**

Second, many American men and women serve in Korea today at what may well be *unnecessary* risk. While service in the US military necessarily involves risk, the issue here is that the average US Army battalion in Korea, for instance, is significantly less ready, today, to operate *as a battalion* than are many other US units stationed in *lower* threat locations, such as in Germany and the United States.<sup>2</sup> This is a surprising allocation of risk and results in large part from the “churning” incident to the continuous rotation of personnel in and out of combat units throughout the year. Additionally, the presence of the families of US service personnel in a threatened area is thought by some to indirectly reduce unit actual readiness by distracting attention from incipient combat duties.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Fisher, 2001: “In providing for new housing construction, a new plan addresses what has long been a major concern for married military personnel in South Korea, many of whom are unable to bring their families with them for lack of available government housing. Of the 37,000 personnel on the peninsula, about two-thirds are married, but there’s only enough military housing for about one-tenth of that married population.” Fisher goes on to quote the assistant deputy chief of staff for the Combined Forces Command, Col. Robert E. Durbin: “So our plan would call for improving that figure from 10 percent to 25 percent during the 10-year life of the plan.”

<sup>2</sup> Under the current system in Korea, tank crews comprising a tank battalion do not get to train to maximum proficiency above the platoon level. Indeed, many are said not to complete Table 12 (platoon-level) tests. This contrasts sharply and unfavorably with the proficiency levels of Army units in many other, lower risk areas of the world [US Army, 1999: p. 5].

## **Inefficiencies in the Status Quo Posture**

Third, the US military presence posture in Korea appears to be founded on a more military manpower-intensive work model than is likely to be efficient.<sup>3</sup> What exactly is the rationale for stationing a high fraction of manpower-intensive units in RoK rather than relatively more firepower-intensive units? Is there any historical evidence or analytic methodology that would indicate that the former add more to the deterrence equation than the latter? On the basis of several preliminary assessments, today's US military presence posture in Korea may not be taking good advantage of a number of high leverage ways to build additional military capability into the US-RoK presence posture [Thomason and Atwell, 2002].

## **ALTERNATIVES TO THE STATUS QUO**

Are there alternatives to the status quo that could mitigate or eliminate these problems, while also maintaining US capabilities to resolve a conflict in Korea at least as favorably as those in place today, ensuring a strong ability to deter such a conflict from occurring in the first place, and allowing the US to sustain or enhance our militarily relevant relationships with our Korean allies? Several options may be able to satisfy these criteria. Option A, described below, is one such possibility.

### **Option A**

#### **Expand Capabilities**

In Option A, the US first of all would strengthen its firepower capabilities in RoK in one or more broad ways. Improving munitions inventories—such as of laser HELLFIRE missiles—to enable the US to operate select tactical aircraft at closer to full-time sortie rates in the opening days of a potential conflict is one capability multiplier.<sup>4</sup> Converting one or more US (and/or RoK) maneuver battalions to an MLRS

---

<sup>3</sup> For example, John Tillson et al. [1996] argue that a number of US combat service support jobs in Korea could be more efficiently performed on a day-to-day basis by Korean nationals under contract to the United States government. In addition, Thomason and Atwell [2002] discuss several tests of the relative combat performance of more and less manpower-intensive US force packages, and of selected firepower-manpower trade-offs. These tests indicate that the current posture may be needlessly manpower intensive.

<sup>4</sup> See chapter III and appendix D.

configuration is another. Strengthening joint and combined C4ISR is a third approach.<sup>5</sup> These are complementary, not mutually exclusive, initiatives.

### **More Frequently Demonstrate US Capability and Commitment to Deploy Ready Forces to Korea**

In this option, while approximately 80 percent of the number of U.S. personnel now in Korea would continue to be located there on a full-time basis, 20 percent of the personnel would shift to a “pre-position and regular exercise” concept. In this particular scheme, four of the six 2<sup>nd</sup> ID maneuver battalions now in Korea would leave their equipment there and relocate to a suitable base or bases in the United States. Comparable unit equipment would be assembled for these units to train on in the US. Several times each year, battalion personnel would deploy to the RoK from the US for short periods—on the order of 3 weeks to a month—vividly demonstrating a strong US ability and commitment to rapidly fall in on and exercise 2<sup>nd</sup> ID equipment in Korea.

### **Implement a 6-month Unaccompanied Tour Maximum**

As mentioned, about 80 percent of US personnel slots now in Korea would continue to be manned on a full-time basis there in this option. Of that 80 percent (or 30,000), the vast majority of billets (about 26,000) would be staffed by highly ready, pretrained, and stabilized units that rotate into Korea from the US on unaccompanied deployments of no more than 6 months. (The remaining 10 percent of US Forces Korea (about 3,700) would be assigned there as headquarters staff on 2- or 3-year, accompanied, PCS tours.)

### **Strengthen Relationships**

In Option A, US IMET funding for Korean officers would be expanded; joint participation in exercises with Koreans would be enhanced; US and RoK forces would participate together in a broader range of collaborative activities than they now do, both in Korea and elsewhere; US and RoK forces would experiment with building combined units more fully than they now do; and they would work more extensively on maintaining each other’s equipment, on reunification scenario planning together, and on an aggressive program for transforming combined defense forces in the years ahead. US service

---

<sup>5</sup> See suggestive tests by Walsh et al. [2001], and recommendations by IDA’s Transformation Panel [Thomason et al., 2001].

members would be given incentive pay to learn basic Korean during their 18-month workup periods as well as during their 6-month deployments. All of these new initiatives would be worked out in a consultative, collaborative way with RoK government officials and military commanders (see chapter IV).

### **Assessment of Option A**

What are the implications of such a change in posture regarding its ability to promote key US security objectives? What of its impact on personnel QoL? What are the implications of such a posture with respect to readiness, and the risk of putting unready US units needlessly in harm's way? What are the resource implications of such changes?

### **Combat Outcomes**

Initial assessments of option A, using an official combat model and data base, suggest that DoD could pursue this option seriously in the months and years ahead without compromising any key combat objectives. Performance on the battlefield could actually be significantly enhanced, according to these simulations, compared with an official Base Case [Thomason and Atwell, 2002].

### **Deterrence and Dissuasion**

Many observers have argued that current US military personnel are *all* needed to ensure deterrence on the Peninsula. Some new evidence suggests otherwise. Analyses by Paul Huth (1988), updated and applied by Fischerkeller (as described in Chapter IV of this report), indicate that the US has significant latitude to adopt a less manpower-intensive presence posture in Korea (see chapter IV). This evidence implies, in turn, that as long as the US maintains a robust power projection capability and is also prepared—with South Korea—to employ firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategies and proportional response military strategies in any incipient challenge by North Korea, the US will have an extremely strong chance of deterring any such challenge even if the US were to reduce our full time military manpower levels in Korea by 50 percent or more. Moreover, while not necessarily likely, it is possible that Kim Jong Il would interpret a phased reduction in continuous US military manpower as a symbolic gesture of US interest in defusing tensions, potentially encouraging him to reciprocate with similar reductions in threatening personnel and/or weapons.

Regarding the relative “dissuasion potential” of the Status Quo and Option A, we have found no evidence to indicate that Option A would be less dissuasive of future potential adversaries than the current posture.

### **Assurance**

A critically important part of the US forces being in Korea is to make it crystal clear to Koreans, both in the North and in the South, that the US will be there militarily for our friends and allies as long as they need us. Option A would arguably be at least as strong militarily as today’s posture. US firepower during critical early stages of any conflict would be stronger than in the status quo. Overall combat performance would likewise be stronger. In peacetime, there would be more highly visible demonstrations of US deployment capability, and the option would involve Koreans with the US units in more rapid deployment exercises. It would also feature closer involvement of Korean military officers in US military institutions as well as more intelligence sharing. Conceivably most important, modifications in the US posture would be worked through collaboratively with our allies, not unilaterally.

The importance of a collaborative process with a strong component of education of a wide range of Korean experts is underscored by the fact that evidence from our not-for-attribution interviews with Korean experts reveals a strong preference for no more than minimal reductions in the US troop presence in Korea, especially ground force presence, at least in the near term. This sensitivity and caution was mirrored by the US experts that were most familiar with Korean sensibilities on this topic.

Thus, while many South Korean experts may well be amenable to most dimensions of Option A, the shift to a more intermittent presence for some US ground forces may be unsettling if a careful education and coordination campaign is not undertaken. Any such shifts should therefore be very carefully and collaboratively arranged. The responsibility to educate is emphasized by the fact that South Korean views on this matter may have been influenced by our own public policy. For many years, the United States policy has been to use troop counts as an explicit symbol of our commitment. The US policy of keeping 100,000 troops in Asia as a measure and symbol of our commitment to the security of the area is indicative. While this policy is unlikely to have been favorably received by South Koreans in the first place if the symbolism hadn't "rung true" at a fundamental level, US presence decision-makers may still want to think

especially hard about cultivating/reinforcing a language of commitment that ties the nation to a presence posture that may become increasingly inefficient as time goes by.<sup>6</sup>

### **Effects on Personnel QoL**

Option A would decisively reduce the family separation problem associated with the status quo in RoK today. Members would be separated from their families for no longer than 6 months in this option, as opposed to the year-long separations prevalent today. Through this approach, the problem would be mitigated for essentially all of the 21,600 personnel now likely to be quietly enduring these long *peacetime* separations from their spouses and children.<sup>7</sup>

### **Readiness and Risk**

Option A assumes that about 80 percent of the units in Korea be on 6-month rotations from the US. For the first 18 months of a 2-year cycle, a unit and its members would train in the US. For the last 6 months in the cycle, the unit would deploy to RoK. In this approach, members would stay with their unit for at least 2 years, as opposed to the 1-year assignment cycle that almost all US servicemembers in RoK now serve on. Readiness of units serving in Korea would thereby be strengthened—probably especially in the Army units—because of the longer average time in unit that servicemembers would have together and thus the greater amount of time the unit’s members have to participate in unit-level training with each other. Some provision would need to be made for “handing off” responsibility from outgoing to incoming units to preclude a readiness “dip.” This might require a few days of overlapping presence, depending on how realistically the unit assignments had been simulated during the workup period.

### **Resource Implications**

Option A would require more US resources than the current presence posture does. Estimating how much more in any detail is beyond the scope of this specific study. It is clear, however, that a number of resource categories should be explicitly considered.

---

<sup>6</sup> One of the strongest recommendations of the South Korean experts IDA interviewed for this project was that changes in US military posture in Korea should be worked through on a collaborative basis. See chapter V.

<sup>7</sup> Assuming that 10 percent of the 24,000 married servicemembers in Korea today have families living with them in Korea, the balance, or about 21,600 married servicemembers in RoK, are separated from their families for a year. See Fisher, 2001.

These should include such elements as military manpower requirements; equipment requirements; basing requirements; lift requirements; and other, miscellaneous requirements, such as for relationship building efforts like IMET, language incentive programs.

The overall presence planning and evaluation process that IDA proposes elsewhere in this report would, as it is institutionalized, permit DoD to conduct a wide variety of such assessments, including resource implication assessments, rapidly and accurately.

Regarding military manpower requirements, however, the 6-month unit rotation concept embedded in Option A will most assuredly call for more servicemembers to support it than the current posture does—probably on the order of four times as many.<sup>8</sup> This need not imply an equivalent increase in Army end strength, but rather a reallocation of existing personnel and units. Is this too high a price for DoD to pay to achieve proper levels of readiness for members who are there? Is it too high a price to pay to ensure a decent quality of life for members and their families? If so, perhaps DoD should consider maintaining a smaller full-time military manning profile in South Korea. Additionally, there should be a measurable increase in reenlistments as a result of the more family-friendly rotation practices.

## **OTHER OPTIONS**

As mentioned, a number of options can be conceived that would also address many of the problems outlined earlier. Option A features specific efforts to build up firepower and capabilities; to shift to a more pre-positioned and intermittent presence concept for some US combat forces; to move decisively toward a 6-month rotation concept for continuously manning about 70 percent of US forces now in Korea; to provide for continuous manning of about 3,000 to 4,000 headquarters billets—using 2- to 3-year, accompanied, PCS assignments; and to undertake a set of a half dozen

---

<sup>8</sup> If the individuals serving 6-month deployments in Korea are otherwise training as units in the US for the balance of a 2-year cycle and assignment to their unit, then each billet being filled in Korea would require a rotation base of approximately three additional billets back in the US. For the Army, the multiple may be closer to five, depending upon a number of assumptions. (based on a report by Gen. John Keane (V. CoS of the US Army) to the IDA team, February 14, 2002).

relationship-building initiatives, described above. Other alternatives could be developed by varying the extent and implementation pace of the particular elements in Option A.<sup>9</sup>

## **IMPROVING UPON THE STATUS QUO IN KOREA**

There are many capability- and relationship-enhancing possibilities for the US to consider together with the Koreans in order to strengthen our security relationship in the years ahead. But several things seem clear even at the outset. First, at least for US military families, there has got to be a better way. To put it plainly, the current situation is an affront to family values. Second, under current policy, many units in Korea today are not being given enough time to train together *as units*. As a result, they may be left *needlessly* vulnerable in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Third, even on initial inspection for this study, there appear to be a number of ways in which the United States can improve, at relatively low cost, upon the anticipated combat outcomes of a conflict with North Korea. Fourth, a variety of relationship-building initiatives could be undertaken by the US, in full consultation and collaboration with its Korean alliance partner. These would all be aimed at solidifying and transforming our security partnership for the years ahead.

---

<sup>9</sup> More firepower could be substituted for more full-time military personnel; a larger fraction of the US units could have their equipment pre-positioned; US Reserve component personnel could participate in the 3-week exercise cycles posited here; part of the US force that is operating on a rotation scheme (in Option A) could be rotated on an intermittent, not a continuous basis. A number of such alternatives are explicitly outlined in Thomason et al., 2002.

This page intentionally left blank

## **Chapter XI**

### **TRANSFORMING US OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE**

This study has sought to identify credible evidence as to the effects of alternative US military presence postures upon key US security objectives and other important criteria; to determine whether there is latitude for DoD to adopt less manpower-intensive presence postures in any regions; and to elicit useful suggestions as to how DoD could structure a presence planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation process.

#### **SEEKING EVIDENCE OF EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE POSTURES ON SECURITY OBJECTIVES**

Identifying the likely effects of presence alternatives on US security objectives is difficult, but it is not out of the question. For example, through a review of the literature (described in chapter II of this report), IDA has found and developed several analytic techniques for estimating the potential effects of alternative presence postures upon the ability of the United States to deter and, if appropriate, to defeat adversaries (combat outcomes). These techniques, and several illustrative applications, have been described in chapters III and IV.

#### **IDENTIFYING LESS MANPOWER-INTENSIVE PRESENCE OPTIONS**

Based upon discussions with a considerable range of foreign and US security experts (described in chapters V and VI, respectively), and other analyses for this study, the IDA study team believes that DoD has a number of opportunities to achieve its key security objectives in several regions at least as well as it does today while also adopting presence posture options that involve fewer military servicemembers routinely forward. IDA has developed and partially evaluated several strawman options (chapters VIII through X) in order to illustrate how such postures might be achievable in two major regions (Europe and East Asia).

As was indicated in chapter VI, a sizable majority of US security experts we have spoken to believe that there is latitude for the US to scale back its full-time routine troop posture in Western Europe and in Okinawa. In addition, with regard to Korea, there is a

generally widespread conviction among these same US experts that by enhancing US firepower and other capabilities, there may be some latitude to reduce the full-time US military manpower presence on that peninsula. Some firepower-for-manpower substitution possibilities of this kind have been examined in the course of this study. Several of these tradeoffs are described in unclassified terms in chapter III; they are described in more detail at a classified level in appendix D of this report. These substitution results are promising and supportive of the US security experts' consensus in this regard. IDA's historically based deterrence analyses, as reported in chapter IV, also provide support for these conclusions. IDA's not-for-attribution talks with foreign security experts, which are documented in chapter V, showed that our interlocutors were not performing any quantitative calculus of what is required to deter or defeat aggression in their thinking about US military presence. Therefore, these foreign experts were generally uninterested in tradeoffs between numbers, firepower, reinforcement capabilities, etc., although several interlocutors recognized that in principle they should be. They did, however, speak of the great importance to our friends and allies of working through any changes in US military posture in a collaborative, not a unilateral, manner. While the resource implications of potential presence adjustments such as those described in chapters VIII through X have not been assessed in any detail in this study, they should be examined. Several analytic techniques for assessing resource implications of alternative presence postures, such as the IDA COST model, have been identified and tested in a preliminary way with respect to one of our strawman presence alternatives, the European option as described in chapter VIII.

Overall, IDA recommends that the assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and combat performance implications of a number of possible options with respect to Europe, Okinawa, and Korea be examined more closely. The resource and quality-of-life implications of each of these alternatives should be carefully examined as well. To do so, performance standards for each of these criteria will need to be considered, established, tested, refined, and implemented.

While some elements of a presence evaluation process appear to be in place within DoD to enable these kinds of in-depth assessments today, they are not organized for ready access or for integrated decision-option development and assessment for the Secretary's use. Many different offices within OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the combatant commands have specialized expertise in various parts of this kind of overall planning and evaluation challenge. Unfortunately, however, there is no integrating

function with any significant continuity. Consequently, there are few consistent standards for relative cost-effectiveness assessments, and the analytic tools that do exist often do not mesh together in an integrated process to prepare decision-options.

## **ESTABLISHING A PRESENCE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EVALUATION PROCESS**

IDA recommends that DoD develop a plan, or a set of options, to draw together a set of analytic tools, data bases, and data collection approaches in order to create an organized, regular process for presence option planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation in the years ahead. One possible process is the six-step presence planning and evaluation process that is outlined in chapter VII of this study. One option that should be given careful study is the establishment of an office within OSD that would be given the authority, and the funding, to build and implement such a process for DoD as a whole.

Such an office, which might be called the Office of Presence Planning and Evaluation, would be charged with the responsibility for developing and evaluating near-, mid-, and long-term presence posture alternatives for consideration by the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This office, which might be in OSD (Policy) or might be in the newly reorganized Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, would have the authority to establish data collection and analysis processes throughout DoD in order to conduct appropriate assessments. The office would operate on the Department's planning, programming, and budgeting cycle. It would work closely with the Joint Staff, with OSD (P&R), OSD AT&L, and the Comptroller in order to draw together key analytic approaches and data. It would work equally closely with the combatant commands to develop and evaluate alternatives to today's postures.

As described in chapters II through IV, IDA has identified several analytic techniques that could, if developed further, form the nucleus of a tool set for conducting the kinds of alternatives assessments for which such an office would be responsible. IDA recommends that these various analytic techniques be strengthened as quickly as possible and then integrated with a variety of important data sets and data collection procedures.

A prudent next step for DoD in this development process would be to commission one or several studies to further structure the tools, data, and data collection techniques that are needed in order to do more full-scale evaluation of the types of strawman options that have been described in chapters VIII through X of this study. In addition, a range of other options could be developed and then evaluated for other high-priority regions of the

globe, drawing upon the best evaluation concepts, techniques, and evidence available to the DoD over the next 6 months to a year. Gaps and shortcomings in this evaluation package should be identified and assessed, and further tool-kit and evidence development should be commissioned for the next cycle.

## **ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES WITH ONLY MODEST REINFORCEMENTS**

DoD has expressed, in QDR 2001, significant interest in devising presence postures that would enable the US to achieve its defense combat objectives in key regions with only “modest reinforcements” from CONUS or other regions. In order to develop such options, DoD could begin by establishing operational benchmarks for building, by certain target dates in the future, high capability packages (consisting of both presence and power projection elements) that rely on fewer reinforcements in order to achieve desired objectives, such as specific combat outcomes. With respect to East Asia, for example, DoD could first determine what is needed currently or in the near term in the way of presence capabilities (both US and friendly) as well as in terms of US reinforcements in order to achieve the combat outcomes it wants (should deterrence fail). Next, the Department could establish benchmarks for future progress with respect to reinforcement assets. “Modest reinforcement” could be defined, for instance, as involving the deployment of no more than half, or no more than a third, of those units deemed needed (e.g., in a TPFDL) today. Several complementary approaches to achieving modest reinforcement targets are conceivable. One approach would center on designing reinforcement units that are each twice as capable as today’s, or that, when operating together, could create such synergy as a system of systems, for instance, that only half today’s reinforcements would be needed. Another approach would be to beef up today’s presence forces in the given area such that only half of today’s planned reinforcements are required. A third approach would build viable combinations of the first two.<sup>1</sup>

Many elements of such capability enhancement packages (whether to forces present or to those playing a reinforcement role) may become available to DoD in the years ahead. The Department is currently assessing the potential of a number of promising systems and concepts, including Excalibur artillery systems, JDAM, Small Diameter Bombs, UAVs and UCAVs, advanced MLRS systems, SSGNs, SJTFHQs, and

---

<sup>1</sup> OSD may now be starting to conduct a range of such trade-off assessments along these lines. If so, these could be a very useful evidence base for the kind of ongoing planning and evaluation process envisioned here.

others as well.<sup>2</sup> Additional possibilities include a well-protected Joint Sea-based Bastion (see appendix J), combined counterterrorism teams, interagency coalition liaison teams, very high speed transport ships, and a good many others. Many of these individual elements appear to offer significant possibilities for achieving region-specific combat goals using presence postures that not only involve fewer US military personnel in a continuous presence mode but also may require only modest reinforcements compared to today's postures. The technical feasibility, the political viability, and the deterrence, dissuasion, assurance, QoL, and resource implications of efforts to implement such postures ought to be evaluated systematically to provide the Secretary of Defense with the clearest possible perspective on the merits and limitations of each. A wide variety of combinations of such possibilities ought to be looked at carefully and regularly for their potential in future presence and reinforcement planning. The six-step process that IDA recommends is one mechanism for developing a significant menu of options for consideration by the Secretary and the Chairman.

## **DEVELOPING PRESENCE OPTIONS FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM**

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has clearly been involved in an increasingly worldwide war on terrorism, both at home and abroad—at unprecedented levels of intensity. Every day, this war on terrorism is highlighting the reality that there are circumstances in which a deterrence or containment strategy is not likely to be good enough, and a more aggressive approach will be needed. For these tasks, presence assets and activities have a potentially very important role to play. Creating and strengthening the regional and global networks of US and friendly counterterrorist capabilities, including the strong human connections and relationships that so many of our US and foreign interlocutors have said increase the chance of crisis-prevention and timely response, clearly involve some kind of a military presence component in numerous forward areas. Structuring those presence components as a coherent part of an overall, integrated counterterrorist strategy and posture will be a significant, ongoing challenge in the months and years ahead. Developing and evaluating ongoing presence options for this counterterrorism mission is thus likely to be a very high-priority task in the process that IDA recommends.

---

<sup>2</sup> A number of these concepts are outlined in Thomason et al., 2001. Others are outlined in Leonard et al., 2000.

## **CONSTRUCTING PRESENCE POSTURES AS PART OF AN INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRATEGY**

In general, the more prepared the United States is to move into an area rapidly with highly effective military capability, the more secure our interests are likely to be. Similarly, the more the United States already has a high level of military capability in place to protect its interests, the more secure those interests are likely to be. During the last year, Operation Enduring Freedom has demonstrated vividly—to friend and foe alike—the ability of the United States to bring an enormous amount of capability to bear upon an adversary quickly across very significant distances. For such operations, routine presence activities can serve a very useful preparatory function, building the relationships, the contingency contracts and the situation awareness that enable rapid power projection and more effective combined operations. Better integrating the combined capabilities of presence assets and power projection assets for purposes of promoting US security objectives may be one of the most important challenges in the six-step process that IDA recommends.

## **ADDRESSING NEAR- AND LONGER-TERM RISKS**

Today, the basic security conditions for much of the world's population remain precarious. Such weaknesses are not easily or quickly fixed. Yet where security conditions are weak, local populations are more desperate and are easier prey for evildoers. The United States, with its military capabilities, economic strength, and core political value of respect for people with different cultures and traditions, may be in a historically unique position to make an important difference in improving the security conditions for much of the world's population. Doing so most effectively requires employing a variety of different tools of policy and strategy. Overseas military presence is certainly an important element of this tool kit. To get the most out of military presence efforts in this and other respects, it therefore seems best to coordinate them with other tools and instruments, such as diplomatic and foreign assistance programs of the Department of State as well as security activities of the FBI, CIA, and the Department of the Treasury. The process we recommend in chapter VII is aimed at promoting a more integrated, multiyear perspective in this regard.

## CONCLUSION

Assessing the effects of presence upon key security objectives, and assessing the relative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of presence alternatives, is a complex, time-consuming process. In the view of the IDA study team, the paucity of strong evidence today regarding the relative cost-effectiveness of one or another presence posture is due more to the limited number of serious, methodologically sound studies than to the lack of such effects. A major reason why there is so little credible evidence of the effects of alternatives is that DoD, and the US government in general, does not have a well-developed, sustained process in place for evaluating the relative cost-effectiveness of presence alternatives (or, more broadly, the relative cost-effectiveness of presence options along with other vital instruments of national power, policy, and strategy) in the promotion of key security objectives such as assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and “defeat.” As was documented in chapter VI, many of the US security professionals we have spoken to in the course of this study urge the DoD to create and utilize such a process. Drawing upon these suggestions, we have developed (in chapter VII) several recommendations for such an approach. The sooner a regular planning and evaluation process can be put in place, the more effective and efficient US presence activities are likely to be in promoting key US security objectives.

The Secretary of Defense seeks to transform DoD for 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges. Transforming presence would seem to be a key part of that process. Among those we have spoken to, there is little doubt that some “boots on the ground” and solid human relationships are the foundation of effective presence. There is an equally strong conviction that the US can and should move to transform its 20<sup>th</sup> century “standing mass force” approach to forward presence into a far more flexible, networked, global approach, one that relies more heavily upon small, more agile teams of highly capable military and civilian professionals, networked with supporting combat capabilities that can be brought to bear increasingly quickly and effectively both from an immediate presence posture and from over the horizon.

This page intentionally left blank

**Appendix A**  
**LIST OF US NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONALS**  
**WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE IDA “EFFECTS-BASED”**  
**PRESENCE DISCUSSIONS**



**Appendix A**  
**LIST OF US NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONALS WHO**  
**PARTICIPATED IN THE IDA “EFFECTS-BASED”**  
**PRESENCE DISCUSSIONS**

Per sponsor direction this appendix can be requested from IDA and provided as Volume III on an “Official Use Only” basis.

This page is intentionally left blank

**Appendix B**  
**LIST OF FOREIGN SECURITY PROFESSIONALS WHO**  
**PARTICIPATED IN THE IDA “EFFECTS-BASED”**  
**PRESENCE DISCUSSIONS**



**Appendix B**  
**LIST OF FOREIGN SECURITY PROFESSIONALS WHO**  
**PARTICIPATED IN THE IDA “EFFECTS-BASED”**  
**PRESENCE DISCUSSIONS**

Per sponsor direction this appendix can be requested from IDA and provided as Volume III on an “Official Use Only” basis.

This page is intentionally left blank

**Appendix C**  
**LETTER OF INTRODUCTION**



## **Appendix C**

### **LETTER OF INTRODUCTION**

In the wake of the tragic events of September 11, the US Department of Defense has called for a comprehensive, world-wide assessment of US security relationships and ways that the US can work with friends and allies to strengthen our collective ability to deal with the full range of existing and emergent threats. A key part of this effort is to develop sensible, forward-looking options for the positioning of US forces and other vital security capabilities. Of the highest importance will be options that provide effective deterrence of potential adversaries, clear assurance to friends and allies of the US commitment to their security and well-being, and credible, timely military capabilities should deterrence fail. The DoD is especially interested in ensuring that such options be constructed to take full, collaborative advantage of the capabilities of friends and allies in each region, as well as to provide consideration of the needs and sensitivities of our security partners.

The Institute for Defense Analyses, an independent research firm chartered by the Department of Defense with more than 50 years of experience conducting high priority studies for the US Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been commissioned to conduct a part of this overall assessment. Specifically, IDA has been tasked by the Secretary to identify, on a not-for-attribution basis, the perspectives and ideas of a number of senior political and military security elites, both US and foreign, concerning the security arrangements and forward US military postures that make the most sense for each priority region in the months and years ahead.

You have been selected as a key participant in this effort. Toward this end, the DoD would very much appreciate your cooperation with and assistance to the IDA research team, headed by Dr. James Thomason. The IDA team is cleared to discuss a range of classified and sensitive information. If you should have any questions regarding the credentials of Dr. Thomason or any member of his study team, do not hesitate to contact Mrs. J. Fites of the Office of the USD (Personnel and Readiness), at 703-614-3970.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this important effort.

This page intentionally left blank

**Appendix D**  
**ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE**  
**POSTURES ON COMBAT OUTCOMES**

**(Classified—Issued Separately as Volume II)**



**Appendix E**  
**TRENDS IN US MILITARY FORCES SERVING**  
**OVERSEAS, 1986–2000**




## Appendix E

### TRENDS IN US MILITARY FORCES SERVING OVERSEAS, 1986–2000

This appendix provides unclassified data from the Department of Defense regarding the numbers of US military personnel serving in various foreign areas on a year-by-year basis over the period from late 1986 through late 2000. The original data, from the Washington Headquarters Data Service, has been compiled for all countries (and afloat, by major area) for this period. It is now available in excel format upon request from IDA.


The following charts reveal a number of broad temporal trends in the stationing and deployment of US military personnel over this period.

Figure E-1 shows that, since 1986, overall US active duty military personnel strength, as well as the numbers of US servicemembers on active duty in areas outside the United States, have declined significantly, with most of these reductions occurring by 1995.




**Figure E-1. US Active Duty Personnel, Home and Abroad (1986–2000)**

Figure E-2 depicts changes over this period in the fraction of US servicemembers on active duty deployed or stationed overseas. From 1986 through 1995, with the exception of the deployments for Operation Desert Storm, the fraction declined relatively steadily and then stayed pretty steady for several more years. In 1998, the fraction abroad increased by several percentage points and remained at about 18 percent for the final years of the Clinton administration.




**Figure E-2. US Active Duty Personnel, Fraction Abroad (1986–2000)**

Figure E-3 indicates that a significant part of the increase in the fraction abroad during the last several years of the Clinton Administration was due to the increases in servicemembers serving abroad at sea during this period. Figure E-4 provides some specifics as to which regions experienced the largest increases in US military personnel serving afloat the most recent years: the Near East/South Asia region and the East Asia/Pacific region.




**Figure E-3. US Active Duty Personnel, Fraction Afloat or Abroad (1986–2000)**




**Figure E-4. US Active Duty Personnel, Afloat, by Key Region (1986–2000)**

Figure E-5 provides detail regarding trends in the stationing/deployment of active duty US servicemembers in the 10 foreign countries with the largest overall numbers of our military over this period. The chart vividly demonstrates that the biggest single pattern has been the reduction in US forces in Germany. Figure E-6 offers some finer level detail for the other nine key hosts, information which was obscured in Figure E-5 due to the very dominant position of US forces in Germany until the mid-1990s.



**Figure E-5. US Active Duty Personnel, Abroad, By Top 10 Key Hosts (1986–2000)**



**Figure E-6. US Active Duty Personnel, Abroad, By Key Hosts Other than Germany (1986–2000)**

**Appendix F**  
**PRESENCE DISCUSSION TOPICS FOR US SECURITY**  
**PROFESSIONALS**



## **Appendix F**

### **PRESENCE DISCUSSION TOPICS FOR US SECURITY PROFESSIONALS**

#### **OVERVIEW**

The following series of topics was used by IDA to guide the discussions with a select group of US experts and officials (current and past) on a not-for-attribution basis. A comparable guideline was used in our interviews with foreign leaders. Our goal really was to develop and explore alternatives, and we welcomed discussion of these topics in whatever format the discussant found most comfortable—the topics were merely a framework for such discussions.

#### **TOPICS**

*Topic 1.* We have your formal bio but need some additional background on this specific topic. Please characterize your general experience with policy-making/requirements determination procedures for the routine employment of US military forces in “presence” missions, which we are generally taking to mean the routine, preplanned stationing or rotational deployment of US military forces to overseas locations—not deployments that respond to emerging crises.

*Topic 2.* Please characterize your experience with the process by which specific decisions were made to deploy, station, increase, reduce, etc., specific US “presence” forces during your professional career.

*Topic 3.* In your experience and opinion, to what extent is it in the US interest to embed the US military presence posture in multilateral security arrangements, such as NATO Standing Naval Forces, Rapid Reaction Forces, and UN command structures; NATO operations in the Balkans (which are now considered “presence” operations under the new QDR); and NORAD, versus retaining the greater freedom of action thought to be inherent in more unilateral or bilateral deployments?

*Topic 4.* Some believe that the time it would take potential adversaries to assemble and field significant military forces in preparation for a cross-border attack would usually provide the US enough time to deploy combat forces from CONUS. For lesser threats, there could

obviously be less visible warning. For the area(s) with which you are most familiar, please characterize what you see as the most likely warning time in advance of actual US combat operations, recognizing that there may be different warning times for different types of indigenous threats. What are your general views on this issue of maintaining a clear capability to deploy on warning?

*Topic 5.* Please characterize your impression of the value of pre-positioned US combat equipment stocks, ashore and/or afloat, when supplemented by routine training/demonstrations of our ability to employ this concept, as demonstrating US commitment to a specific area, as seen both by friendly governments and potential hostile forces in the area(s) with which you are most familiar? How does this compare in perceived value/effectiveness with the pre-positioning of fully manned combat units? How often must the US exercise such capabilities to employ pre-positioned combat equipment to ensure credibility?

*Topic 6.* How important is interoperability with allied (or potentially allied) forces? If better interoperability could be achieved and demonstrated, could it lessen the need for forward deployed US forces?

*Topic 7.* In your area of expertise, to what extent is a pre-planned “division of labor” practical, e.g., allies provide all fuel and “force protection,” US provides firepower?

*Topic 8.* Please compare and contrast the value of frequent high-level face-to-face meetings of senior US officials—combatant commanders; Deputy Secretary of State; Deputy Secretary of Defense, etc., vis-à-vis stationed/rotated military combat units, for each of the four “Presence” goals [assuring friends dissuading, deterring, and defeating adversaries]. Compare, for example, the relative value of a CINCs visit to the temporary visit of a carrier or fighter wing.

*Topic 9.* Please comment on the relative presence value of small in-country IMET/FAS/SOF/USCG LET teams vis-à-vis “full up” combat units.

*Topic 10.* One of the chronic problems in planning US military presence is the perception that changes in the routine level of presence are much more important than the actual level of presence itself. This problem is exacerbated by the tendency of many to measure US presence by counting military personnel rather than estimating US combat capability. As we discussed earlier, this administration would like to develop options that would increase deployed combat capability at lower manpower levels. Do you have some ideas on how this might be undertaken without sending the wrong signal in your area of expertise?

*Topic 11.* The new QDR sets a clear goal of being able to stop attacks by adversaries with the forces we have routinely deployed forward, with minimal reinforcements but obviously with the help of indigenous and other forward deployed allied forces). In your area of expertise, what changes in the US presence posture will be needed to meet this goal?

*Topic 12.* One of the benefits of US forward military presence is to enhance the stability needed for economic activity to flourish. In your area of expertise, to what extent is this benefit understood and accepted by potential host countries as a valid reason for cooperating with US military presence planning?

*Topic 13.* US Naval carriers traditionally deploy to presence stations with a full complement of naval combat and support aircraft. However, in the Haiti operation, and most recently with the Kitty Hawk deployment in the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, US carriers have demonstrated the ability to employ US Army combat helicopter units. To what extent would the deployment of Navy carriers with contingents of Army and/or Air Force attack/utility/scout/SOF helicopters substituting for some naval attack and fighter aircraft be seen as enhancing or degrading the presence value of US carriers? More generally, please comment on any shifts you perceive in the relative value of land-based vs. sea-based US military presence.

*Topic 14.* The US Navy's large deck carriers are generally considered second only to stationed Army and Air Force units in terms of visible commitment to specific regions. Yet the Navy's medium deck carriers—the amphibious assault ships that routinely deploy with a broad spectrum of USMC combat capability, including VTOL fighters, attack helos, assault craft, armoured vehicles, artillery, combat infantry, and SOF—provide a broad spectrum of military capability that will be enhanced only with the arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter aboard such ships. In your experience, what military value do indigenous countries see in these “amphibious ready groups,” and are there steps the US should take to improve these perceptions?

*Topic 15.* What do you see as the relationship between long-standing US military-to-military and diplomatic exchange programs; US schooling; Marshall Center programs, etc., and the ability of the US to establish an efficient military presence posture in the region you are most familiar with? Are any changes needed?

*Topic 16.* US land- and sea-based presence forces are increasingly seen as magnets for terrorist attacks (Khobar Towers, USS Cole), thereby increasing the (sometimes costly)

requirement for force protection measures. Do you have any suggestions as to how the US can better provide protection for our forward deployed forces without compromising their effectiveness?

*Topic 17.* More generally, do you have any suggestions as to how the US can maintain or increase its forward deployed combat capability at lower levels of routinely deployed military personnel?

*Topic 18.* The Secretary of Defense recently directed that the Joint management of US military presence be improved, with an immediate focus on harmonizing and coordinating the practices of the several military services. Do you have any recommendations for either improving the overall process of planning the US military presence posture, or perhaps improving its efficiency by substituting capability from one service for that from another?

*Topic 19.* Finally, there is a perception that at least some of the overseas activities to which US military forces become committed could be better performed by other agencies of the US government, if they were to be properly organized, trained, and equipped. Do you have any specific recommendations for alternatives that should be considered in this area? In particular, while US military forces may be uniquely needed early in some types of crises, better provision for more rapid transition to civil authority could ameliorate the recent tendency for US military crisis response forces to become stuck as long-term presence forces. Do you have any recommendations in this area?

**Appendix G**  
**A REVIEW OF THE DETERRENCE LITERATURE**



## **Appendix G**

### **A REVIEW OF THE DETERRENCE LITERATURE**

This review examines some of the major works in the academic literature on conventional deterrence. The first section outlines several prominent theories of deterrence. The second section presents some of the evidence used to develop and test these theories.

#### **THEORIES OF DETERRENCE**

The deterrence relationships between a state and challenger can take one of three forms: 1) general; 2) immediate; or 3) extended-immediate. General deterrence involves states that maintain military forces that successfully dissuade challenges to the status quo. Immediate deterrence refers to a situation in which one state has overtly challenged another state and the other is threatening retaliation. And in the case of extended-immediate deterrence, one state is overtly challenging the ally (or “protégé”) of another state (the “defender”) and the defender is responding to the threat by mounting a threat of retaliation. Because of the methodological difficulties associated with evaluating general deterrence relationships, scholars have focused their research on cases of immediate or extended-immediate deterrence.

Deterrence theory has been developed primarily through two approaches. Some scholars have deduced their theories using a rational choice model to analyze the behavior of attackers and defenders in a crisis. Others have adopted an inductive approach, inferring their hypotheses about the determinants of deterrence success and failure through empirical analysis.

Two examples of the first method are Russett [1963] and Bueno de Mesquita [1981]. Russett proposes a simple expected utility model of extended-immediate deterrence. In such a crisis, a defender will threaten to retaliate if the benefits of successful deterrence (weighted by the probability of success and discounted by the cost and probability of war) exceed the costs of retreat. A challenger will proceed with its attack despite being confronted with a deterrent threat if the expected value of attacking exceeds that of the status quo. The expected value of attacking depends upon 1) the

benefits and probability of an attack that encounters no resistance, and 2) the cost and likelihood of war if the defender chooses to resist. Bueno de Mesquita develops a broader rational choice theory of why states go to war. The decision to initiate a conflict, according to Bueno de Mesquita, depends on the expected utility of attacking. Determinants of a state's expected utility in a bilateral<sup>1</sup> conflict include 1) the value of changing the policy of the adversary and the probability of obtaining such change, 2) the cost of failing to modify the adversary's behavior and the likelihood of failure, and 3) expectations about future gains or potential losses if no war occurs. States will proceed with an attack if this calculation produces a positive value. According to Bueno de Mesquita, this will also be true of a defender in an immediate deterrence crisis if it is rationally issuing a credible threat of retaliation in response to a challenge.

Subsequent research has identified other factors that may influence the prospects for successful deterrence. These include the role of negotiation and crisis bargaining and the attacker's choice of military strategy. Although this work does not explicitly draw on expected utility models of decision-making, it remains consistent with a rational choice framework.

Snyder and Diesing [1977] develop a model that focuses on the bargaining process between two states engaged in a crisis. According to their model, each state possesses an inherent amount of "bargaining power" consisting of its military capabilities (contextual factors, such as geography, are also important) and the interests (strategic, reputational, and intrinsic) that are at stake. What matters in a crisis, however, is the perceived bargaining power of a state—i.e., an adversary's estimate of its "resolve"—rather than its actual bargaining power. Such estimates of resolve are shaped by the nature of the bargaining process during a crisis. That process can involve accommodative, coercive, and persuasive dimensions and, within the latter two, states can use various tactics to: 1) increase their own credibility; and/or 2) reduce the critical risk (the cost of war and valuation of the stakes in the crisis) of their adversary. Through the bargaining process, the parties ultimately discover their mutual "resolve" and relative bargaining power. A settlement (whether compromise or capitulation by one side) is then reached based on the revealed power relations between the parties to the crisis.

---

<sup>1</sup> In a multilateral conflict in which a third party might intervene, states must also consider the utilities contributed by their allies and those of their opponents should they intervene in the conflict.

John Mearsheimer [1983] argues that the prospects for the success or failure of conventional immediate deterrence depend upon the military strategy available to the challenger. Deterrence is most likely to obtain when the challenger must employ a strategy of attrition because such a strategy will usually involve very high costs. Conversely, deterrence is most likely to fail when the challenger can pursue a blitzkrieg strategy because victory can be achieved swiftly and cheaply. A challenger can also adopt a limited aims strategy, seizing a piece of territory and then shifting to the defensive to hold on to the land it has acquired. The prospects for deterrence in this case are uncertain, hinging upon the probability that the defender will counterattack. The challenger's choice of strategy and estimate of success are, in turn, strongly influenced by geography and the preparations of the defender. Mearsheimer evaluates the effectiveness of four possible defensive options against the blitzkrieg and limited aims strategies: 1) static defense; 2) forward (mobile) defense; 3) defense-in-depth; and 4) mobile defense (deployed in rear areas). He finds that forward (mobile) defense and defense-in-depth are most likely to thwart a blitzkrieg strategy and that mobile defense (deployed in rear areas) and forward (mobile) defense offer the best prospects for defeating a limited aims strategy. Depending on the objectives of the adversary, these strategies offer the best prospects for successful deterrence.

Such deductive, rational theories of deterrence are not without critics. Some scholars acknowledge that the model identifies some of the determinants of successful deterrence and can serve as a starting point for policy-makers seeking to formulate strategy in a crisis, but they contend that the model also suffers from several limitations that limit its predictive and prescriptive utility. Its assumption of rationality—that a challenger will recognize and correctly interpret the threats and/or actions of the defender—is questionable. The theory is too general because it fails to specify the conditions under which it operates. Finally, the model is incomplete because it does not capture important components of a prospective attacker's calculus, such as its motivation to initiate a challenge. Critics of the rational model argue that deterrence theory must therefore be developed through an inductive approach, based on empirical analysis of deterrence success and failure.

George and Smoke [1974] use this method to identify some of the limitations of rational deterrence theory and develop a more comprehensive model of deterrence. First, their research suggests that numerous factors influence the decision to initiate a challenge in addition to those specified by the rational model, i.e., the challenger's estimate of a

defender's commitment and capabilities. For example, they find that one major factor shaping this choice is whether the challenger considers the risks of proceeding as calculable and controllable. Other variables that influence whether or not a state initiates a challenge include the defender's perceived motivation; initiator's belief that force is the only option, desire to change the status quo, and perception of time pressure; and the availability of side payments.

George and Smoke also identify three strategies through which a state may proceed with its challenge: 1) *fait accompli* (proceeding with a challenge in the absence of a commitment by the defender); 2) limited probe (the limited application of force to clarify the extent of the defender's commitment); or 3) controlled pressure (the careful application of force to undermine the defender's commitment). The challenger's choice of strategy depends upon its estimate of the defender's commitment as well as the other factors that influence its decision to proceed with a challenge.

Second, commitment theory—how defenders convey their commitment to a potential challenger—needs to be broadened. Less emphasis should be placed on establishing the credibility of a deterrence commitment. Rather, greater attention should be devoted to assessing the nature and valuation of the interests at stake of both sides in a crisis and to tailoring commitments to the options available to the challenger.

Third, a theory of how defenders respond to challenges is required. According to George and Smoke, the nature of the defender's response will depend upon the strategy being pursued by the challenger, how warning of a challenge is interpreted by the defender, and the likelihood of intelligence failure. They also identify a number of factors that hinder a defender's ability to recognize and correctly interpret evidence of an impending challenge and contribute to intelligence failure and surprise.

Jervis, Lebow, and Stein [1985] draw on historical case studies and theories from psychology to identify two additional problems with rational theories of deterrence. The first is the presumption that the decision by one state to challenge another is based primarily on an assessment of the defender's interests and capabilities. Jervis, Lebow, and Stein instead find that such decisions are driven mainly by challengers' perceptions of the domestic and international constraints that they themselves face rather than by estimates of the defender's willingness and ability to assist its protégé. Second, deterrence theory does not take into account the difficulties of communicating intent, capability, and resolve. Statesmen often fail to detect or understand the signals sent by other governments because they are distracted by other events and/or hold divergent views of

the context of a crisis. The latter can result from cultural differences, asymmetric assessments of relative military capability, and/or a lack of empathy for how an adversary might conceptualize a conflict. Thus, signals of resolve by challengers and defenders are frequently misinterpreted or overlooked.

## **EMPIRICAL ANALYSES—RATIONAL CHOICE**

### **Capability**

Mearsheimer's theory of immediate deterrence as a function of military strategy emphasizes the role of relative military capabilities in shaping the prospects for deterrence success or failure. To test his theory, he conducts case studies of World War II in Europe and the Arab-Israeli wars of October 1956, June 1967, and October 1973. With regard to the former, he argues that France and Britain were successfully deterred from attacking Germany from September 1939 to May 1940 because their political and military leaders expected to have to fight a war of attrition. Conversely, Germany's invasion of France in May 1940 is a case of failed deterrence because German military leaders gained confidence in the prospects of a blitzkrieg attack mounted against France's static defense. Mearsheimer also examines the Arab-Israeli wars. In the case of the Arab-Israeli wars, he finds that deterrence failed in October 1956 and June 1967 because the Israeli military was capable of implementing a blitzkrieg strategy and imposing a decisive defeat on Egyptian forces. In contrast, the ability of Egypt to pursue a limited aims strategy led to deterrence failure in 1973. Egyptian leaders believed that they could recapture a portion of the Sinai and then fortify their position to defend against an Israeli counterattack. Superpower intervention and Israel's reluctance to wage a war of attrition would keep the war from escalating further, enabling Egypt to achieve not only a limited military victory but also significant political benefits.

### **Capability and Resolve**

Rational deterrence theory focuses primarily on two variables—the relative military capabilities of the attacker and defender and the resolve of the defender—to explain deterrence outcomes. Proponents of the rational approach have therefore concentrated their empirical research on operationalizing these variables and deriving and testing various hypotheses from the theory—most often within an expected utility framework. For example, Russett [1963] conducted a comparative analysis of 17 cases of extended-immediate deterrence from 1935 to 1961. He found that parity in military

capability between that defender and challenger and military cooperation between the defender and protégé were necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for extended-immediate deterrence to hold.<sup>2</sup> Close economic ties between the defender and protégé were also crucial to success.<sup>3</sup> Conversely, neither the importance of the protégé to the defender nor a formal security commitment by the defender to the protégé significantly affected the prospects for successful extended-immediate deterrence.<sup>4</sup>

Russett [1967] tested his expected utility framework of extended-immediate deterrence through a case study of the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor. He found that the Japanese expected the US to fight if Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were attacked, because of the military and economic value of these colonies (consistent with his findings about the reinforcing effects of military and economic ties for deterrence). Moreover, the Japanese recognized US military superiority and expected to lose a protracted war if the United States chose to intervene (demonstrating that military advantage is not sufficient for deterrence to hold). However, Japanese leaders were also highly dissatisfied with the status quo. Russett concluded that the decision to attack Pearl Harbor was consistent with his expected utility framework of extended-immediate deterrence and recommended that the framework incorporate direct attacks by the challenger against the defender as well as against the protégé.

Huth and Russett [1984] developed further the initial research by Russett [1963]. According to their expected utility framework, an attacker first considers the utility of attacking if the defender intervenes on behalf of the protégé and if the defender fails to do so (weighted by the probability that the defender will or will not fight). The attacker will proceed with its challenge if the utility of attacking exceeds that of not attacking. This calculation is influenced not only by the military balance, but also by the attacker's assessment of the "motivation, commitment, and resolve" of the defender. Thus, they hypothesized that the past behavior of the defender and the extent of its political,

---

<sup>2</sup> Parity was determined by comparing both the capability resource base (population, natural resources, and GNP) and military force balances of the defender and challenger; military cooperation between the defender and protégé was coded as a function of foreign military sales and the presence of military advisors.

<sup>3</sup> Economic ties were measured by calculating the proportion of imports to exports between the defender and protégé.

<sup>4</sup> The measure of "importance" is a calculation of the capability the protégé could bring to bear to a defender-protégé security alliance. It is measured as a function of both relative population size and GNP.

economic, and military relationship with the protégé will also affect the attacker's estimate of the likelihood that the defender will intervene if its protégé is challenged. Huth and Russett constructed a logistic regression specification capturing the extended-immediate deterrence dynamic that consisted of 1) the military balances between the attacker and defender including the capability resource base, overall military balance, local capabilities, the protégés forces, and nuclear forces; 2) the past behavior of the defender (whether or not the defender has fought for the protégé in the past); and 3) the relationship between the defender and protégé (alliance commitments, the extent of trade between the two countries, and the level of arms transfers from the defender to the protégé).

To test the explanatory power of this specification they performed a probit analysis of 54 cases of successful and unsuccessful extended-immediate deterrence episodes from 1900 to 1984. In all of these cases, an attacker issued an overt threat of force (or show of force) against the protégé of a defender and the defender responded by overtly threatening retaliation. Deterrence is considered to have failed (i.e., the attacker has proceeded with its attack) if the attacker becomes engaged in combat with the protégé and/or the defender that results in more than 250 casualties. If no such attack has occurred, the deterrence has “worked” and its success is presumed to be due to the threat issued by the defender. Their results showed that three variables were significantly positively associated with deterrence success: the level of trade between the defender and protégé, the amount of arms transfers between the two countries, and the local military balance. In contrast, neither the defender's past behavior in behalf of support of the protégé, a favorable capability resource base balance for the defender, nor the defender's possession of nuclear weapons had a significant effect on the likelihood of successful deterrence. A formal alliance commitment between the defender and protégé was found to have a negative effect on deterrence success. In total, their specification of extended-immediate deterrence accounted correctly for 78% of the outcomes in the dataset. They concluded that close political and economic ties between the defender and protégé and a favorable local military balance are critical to the efficacy of extended deterrence.

### **Bargaining**

Other scholars have explored the role of bargaining in determining crisis outcomes. For example, Snyder and Diesing [1977] analyzed the bargaining process in 15 international crises over the period 1898 to 1973. They identify nine different types of

bargaining structures based on the parties' presumed ranking of crisis outcomes (win, lose, compromise, breakdown (war)). For example, the Agadir (1911), Berlin (1958–1962), and Yom Kippur (1973) crises are found to be examples of Prisoner's Dilemma, whereas Munich (1938), Berlin (1948), Lebanon (1958), and Iran (1946) correspond to a Chicken bargaining structure. The preference orderings of the two parties are identical in four of these bargaining structures and diverge in five of the structures. Each bargaining structure reflects a different combination of power and interests and has its own process of resolution and probable outcome.

They discover a number of patterns in the bargaining behavior of the states involved in these disputes. These include:

- A tendency for states to adopt coercive strategies and tactics at the outset of a crisis to clarify the relative level of resolve and determine the likelihood of breakdown (war)
- A cautious approach toward framing threats early in a crisis followed by more forceful language as the crisis progresses
- Efforts by states to minimize the likelihood of inadvertent escalation and war (rather than to “manipulate risk”)
- Use of both coercive and accommodative tactics in the confrontation and resolution phases of a crisis
- Challengers refraining from attempts to reduce the time available in a crisis

Their research also reveals that the outcomes of crises that were peacefully resolved correspond closely to the “inherent bargaining power” of the parties. Bargaining skill—in terms of communicating one's own interests and resolve while obtaining accurate information about that of the adversary—plays a significant role in shaping crisis outcomes. Perceptions of legitimacy (with regard to the defense of the status quo) are found to be especially important; in all of the cases examined by Snyder and Diesing, the defender of the status quo prevails unless there was agreement between both parties that the status quo needed to be modified. Recognition by others as “being in the right” therefore appears to be a powerful bargaining asset. The settlement of crises at certain prominent points (Schelling's theory of salience) [Schelling, 1960] only occurs in situations of genuine compromise. Such salient points are identified in the bargaining process, but are overridden when one party had an advantage in bargaining power over the other. Finally, the two crises that led to wars—the European crisis of 1914 and the US-Japan crisis of 1940–41—raise distinct issues about crisis escalation. The crisis in

Europe preceding World War I suggests that war is likely if misperceptions about intentions are not corrected before military plans that will lead to war are activated. The US-Japan crisis indicates that war will also result when the correction of misperceptions reveals that neither compromise nor capitulation by one side can provide a satisfactory resolution to a dispute.

Leng and Wheeler [1979] examine the importance of bargaining strategies (or “influence strategies”) in determining the outcomes of international crises. According to their model of crisis diplomacy/negotiation, states can pursue any of four influence strategies: 1) bullying (exclusively making use of threats); 2) reciprocating (practicing a “tit-for-tat” or a “firm-but-fair” approach); 3) appeasing (offering concessions to the adversary); or 4) trial-and-error (offering positive or negative inducements based on the response of the adversary to the previous influence attempt). Leng and Wheeler develop decision rules for each of the influence strategies and predict the outcomes that result from the interaction of these strategies in a crisis. These predicted outcomes lead them to offer three hypotheses about the effectiveness of various influence strategies, where an effective strategy is one that avoids diplomatic defeat or war (i.e., the result is either diplomatic victory or compromise). First, war is most likely when one or both parties pursue bullying strategies. Second, either a reciprocating or trial-and-error strategy is likely to be most effective when no prior information about the adversary’s influence strategy is available. Third, a reciprocating strategy is the most effective response to the pursuit of a bullying strategy by the opponent.

To measure the effectiveness of different influence strategies, Leng and Wheeler perform statistical and comparative analyses on a dataset of 20 cases of interstate conflict (9 of which resulted in war, 11 of which did not) during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. They find support for their first proposition about the increased probability of war when at least one party adopts a bullying strategy. War results in 6 of the 10 such cases, but only once among the cases in which neither side employed a bullying strategy. They also discover that a trial-and-error strategy appears to be the safest approach, with war avoided in all five cases in which the strategy was employed. A reciprocating strategy, in comparison, resulted in four diplomatic victories, six compromises, and three wars. The evidence also indicates that a reciprocating strategy is the most effective response to the use of a bullying strategy by the adversary, producing two compromise solutions (as well as two wars). In contrast, the employment of bullying or appeasement strategies led to either war or diplomatic defeat. Finally, the differences in effectiveness between some influence

strategies are statistically significant. These include either a reciprocating or trial-and-error strategy versus an appeasing strategy and a reciprocating versus a bullying strategy. Conversely, there is no significant difference between the least successful strategies (appeasement versus bullying) or between the most successful strategies (reciprocating versus trial-and-error).

### **Capability, Resolve, and Bargaining**

Paul Huth [1988] proposed a model of extended-immediate deterrence that brings together the factors identified in his previous research with variables drawn from the crisis bargaining literature. Huth hypothesized that the likelihood of successful deterrence is increased by: 1) a favorable military balance for the defender and protégé (especially the “immediate” and “short-term” balance);<sup>5</sup> 2) the existence of a formal alliance between the defender and protégé; 3) the dependence of the protégé on arms transfers from the defender; and 4) higher levels of foreign trade between the defender and the protégé. However, he also added the bargaining behavior of the defender to the model. Drawing on the work of Leng and Wheeler [1979] and others, Huth argued that extended-immediate deterrence is more likely to prevail when the defender employs a “firm-but-flexible” diplomatic strategy and a “tit-for-tat” strategy of military escalation against the challenger. A “firm-but-flexible” approach to crisis negotiation involves resisting the attacker’s demands while simultaneously offering a compromise solution based on reciprocity. In a “tit-for-tat” military strategy, the defender matches the challenger’s military actions with an equivalent response (alternatively, a defender may pursue a strategy of “strength,” and respond with greater force, or one of “caution,” and employ lesser force than the challenger). Finally, Huth hypothesized that a record of bullying or conciliation in previous confrontations would reduce the likelihood that extended-immediate deterrence would hold in future crises.

To test these hypotheses, Huth expanded the dataset previously developed with Russett from 54 to 58 cases over the period 1885–1984. He then conducted a logistic regression to assess the effect of the military balance (immediate, short-term, and capability resource base), relationship between the defender and protégé (trade, arms

---

<sup>5</sup> Huth defines the immediate military balance as the ratio of military forces between the challenger and the defender and protégé at the point of attack. The short-term military balance refers to the ratio of forces that could be engaged within a few months of the outset of a war. The defender’s forces are degraded based upon the distance between the defender and the protégé.

transfers, and alliances), and bargaining strategy on the prospects for successful extended-immediate deterrence. The results support his hypotheses about the importance of the immediate and short-term military balances and the defender's bargaining strategy in current and previous crises for deterrence success. With regard to effective bargaining strategies, Huth determined that a "firm-but-flexible" approach increased the probability of deterrence success by 32% compared with bullying or conciliation; a "tit-for-tat" strategy of military escalation increased the likelihood of successful extended-immediate deterrence by 33% compared with the alternatives of caution or strength; and a past record of bullying or conciliation or employing military strategies of strength or caution significantly undermined future deterrence efforts. Consistent with his 1984 study with Russett, Huth again found that a formal alliance does not contribute to effective deterrence. However, in contrast to the results of previous research, neither the level of trade nor the extent of arms transfers between the defender and protégé affect the likelihood of deterrence success. A specification that incorporated the immediate and short-term military balances, diplomatic and military bargaining strategies, and past defender bargaining behavior in a crisis with the same adversary correctly predicted 84% of the outcomes of the cases in the dataset.

In addition to the quantitative analysis, Huth conducted case studies to examine the role of military balances and bargaining behavior in crises involving extended-immediate deterrence. He examined three cases of successful deterrence (the Jordanian civil war of 1970, the Chadian civil war of 1983, and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1955) and three examples of deterrence failure (the Czech crisis of 1938, the Polish crisis of 1939, and the Korean War of 1950) to explore the significance of military balances in determining crisis outcomes. These studies suggest that immediate and short-term balances—and a tit-for-tat strategy of military escalation—contribute to deterrence by affecting the challenger's estimates of achieving a swift, decisive, low-cost victory over the protégé. To assess the importance of bargaining behavior in extended-immediate deterrence crises, Huth analyzed two cases of success (the 1885 Anglo-Russian crisis over Afghanistan and German support for Finland in 1940–41) and two cases of failure (the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War and the outbreak of World War I in 1914). This case study illustrated how a "flexible-but-firm" bargaining strategy may facilitate deterrence by reducing the attacker's estimate of the domestic and international costs of accepting the status quo.

## **EMPIRICAL ANALYSES—CRITIQUES OF THE RATIONAL MODEL**

The empirical research of other scholars suggests that the rational model of deterrence suffers from a number of shortcomings. George and Smoke's analysis of 11 cases of failed US deterrence efforts from 1948–1962 reveals a number of deficiencies with deterrence theory and strategy. For example, the divergence between American policy-makers' estimates of risk and that of their opponents in the Berlin crises, Korean War, and Cuban Missile Crisis raises questions about the presumption of a single rationality that operates across all actors. Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the effects of the Eisenhower Doctrine on politics in the Middle East, and the escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis all indicate that the scope and limits of deterrence strategy need to be carefully defined. In particular, these cases suggest that the employment of deterrence strategy in an inappropriate context can be counterproductive. George and Smoke also find that deterrence commitments are not dichotomous (as rational deterrence theory posits), but rather take multiple forms. They also caution against an excessive reliance on threats in response to challenges to US interests. As the Taiwan Strait (1954–55), Quemoy (1958), Middle East, Berlin (1961), and US-Japan (1941) crises suggest, threats may be irrelevant, provocative, or only temporarily successful at best. Rather than proceed solely on the basis of deterrence theory and strategy, a variety of policy measures should be considered and a broader "influence strategy" developed.

Stein [1985] examines Egyptian leaders' calculations over the period 1969–1973, during which they considered using force against Israel on five occasions. Rather than compare Egyptian and Israeli interests as deterrence theory predicts, Egyptian leaders focused almost exclusively on Egypt's strategic interests. Inattention to Israeli concerns, however, did not lead them to misperceive Israel's threat to retaliate. With regard to the military balance, Egyptian leaders recognized Israeli military superiority. Nevertheless, they sought to overcome their disadvantage through strategy and surprise, suggesting that military superiority provides a fragile basis for effective deterrence. The rational model of deterrence is also incomplete because it does not include consideration by the challenger of alternatives to the use of force. Stein finds that the availability of such options was an important element in Egyptian leaders' thinking about whether or not to challenge Israel. Finally, the decision-making process in this case departed significantly from a rational model of deterrence. Egyptian leaders focused primarily on the costs of using force versus inaction and failed to consider the probabilities of various outcomes or weigh the costs and benefits of using force.

Stein's analysis of Israeli decision-making from 1971 to 1973 illustrates the difficulties of signaling and interpretation. She discovers that Israeli leaders' assessments concentrated exclusively on the military balance. As a result, they underestimated Egyptian dissatisfaction with and motivation to challenge the status quo. Israeli leaders also miscalculated the likelihood of escalation. Fearing that Egyptian leaders would misconstrue defensive preparations as offensive measures and launch a preemptive attack, Israeli leaders chose not to pursue efforts to strengthen deterrence. Moreover, warnings of an Egyptian attack may have been discounted because of the "cry wolf syndrome." The credibility of warning of the attack in October 1973 may have been undermined by previous alarms of imminent attacks that had failed to materialize.

Finally, Lebow studies 13 brinkmanship crises and finds that states proceeded with challenges despite strong evidence of the defender's commitment and capability. In reality, states initiated challenges in these cases because of domestic political pressures or external security threats. The prescriptions of deterrence theory, which emphasize demonstrating resolve and capability, may therefore be flawed because such shows of force do not address the root causes of aggression. Lebow also examines the Falklands War and finds several inconsistencies with the rational deterrence model. Argentine leaders discounted ample evidence indicating that the United Kingdom was resolved to defend the Falklands. Instead, Argentine leaders were motivated primarily by domestic pressure to obtain sovereignty over the Falklands and their own political vulnerability due to economic difficulties. Likewise, British leaders underestimated Argentine leaders' willingness to resort to force and misinterpreted Argentine military preparations as a bluff. The British also failed to reinforce their deterrent threat to avoid provoking an escalation of the crisis. Domestic politics may also have encouraged British restraint because reductions in naval forces were planned at the time of the crisis. The deployment of the Royal Navy to the region would have raised questions about the wisdom of these reductions. The Falklands War thus suggests the primacy of domestic considerations in shaping the behavior of challengers and defenders in deterrence crises.

## **CONCLUSION**

As the preceding paragraphs indicate, there has been a substantial evolution in the scholarly literature on deterrence. Early formulations of deterrence theory were incomplete, but have been enriched through the addition of hypotheses on bargaining and decision-making. Scholars have also assembled a significant body of empirical data on

deterrence. Valid critiques of rational deterrence theory have been raised. However, these critiques do not call into question the fundamental logic of the theory. The wide net cast by Paul Huth, who has included hypotheses from military strategists, bargaining strategists, and political psychologists in the construction of a robust specification, exemplifies an inclusive approach to understanding the dynamics of deterrence episodes. In addition, it also provides the most comprehensive empirical analysis available to date and thus offers a solid foundation from which to determine the effects of presence on deterrence and to develop tools to inform the decision-making of policy-makers who may wish to consider alternative presence postures.

**Appendix H**  
**LIST OF CASE STUDIES FROM HUTH'S RESEARCH**



## Appendix H

### LIST OF CASE STUDIES FROM HUTH'S RESEARCH

<b>Case</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Attacker</b>	<b>Protégé</b>	<b>Defender</b>	<b>Outcome</b>
1	1885	Russia	Afghanistan	Britain/India	Success
2	1885	Bulgaria	Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Success
3	1886	Greece	Turkey	Britain	Success
4	1894	Japan	Korea	China	Failure
5	1897	Greece	Crete	Britain/Turkey	Success
6	1898	France	Egyptian	Sudan Britain	Success
7	1902	Germany	Venezuela	United States	Success
8	1903	Japan	Korea	Russia	Failure
9	1903	Colombia	Panama	United States	Success
10	1905	France	Morocco	Germany	Failure
11	1905	Germany	France	Britain	Success
12	1906	Turkey	Egypt	Britain	Success
13	1908	Serbia/Russia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Success
14	1911	Italy	Tripoli	Turkey	Failure
15	1911	France	Morocco	Germany	Failure
16	1911	Germany	France	Britain	Success
17	1912	Serbia/Russia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Success
18	1913	Rumania	Bulgaria	Russia	Success
19	1913	Bulgaria	Greece	Serbia	Failure
20	1913	Serbia	Albania	Austria-Hungary	Success
21	1914	Austria/Germany	Serbia	Russia	Failure
22	1914	Russia/Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Success
23	1914	Germany	France	Britain/Russia	Failure
24	1914	Germany	Belgium	Britain	Failure
25	1921	Panama	Costa Rica	United States	Success

<b>Case</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Attacker</b>	<b>Protégé</b>	<b>Defender</b>	<b>Outcome</b>
26	1922	Turkey	Greece	Britain	Success
27	1935	Italy	Ethiopia	Britain	Failure
28	1935	Japan	Outer Mongolia	USSR	Success
29	1937	USSR	Manchukuo	Japan	Success
30	1938	USSR	Manchukuo	Japan	Failure
31	1938	Germany	Czech	Britain/France	Failure
32	1938	Italy	Tunisia	France/Britain	Success
33	1939	Germany	Poland	Britain/France	Failure
34	1940	USSR	Finland	Germany	Success
35	1946	USSR	Iran	United States	Success
36	1946	USSR	Turkey	United States	Success
37	1948	USSR	West Berlin	U.S./Britain	Success
38	1950	China	Taiwan	United States	Success
39	1950	United States	N. Korea	China	Failure
40	1954	China	Quemoy-Matsu	United States	Success
41	1957	Turkey	Syria	USSR	Success
42	1961	Iraq	Kuwait	Britain	Success
43	1961	N. Vietnam	Laos	United States	Success
44	1961	India	Goa	Portugal	Failure
45	1961	Indonesia	W. Irian	Netherlands	Failure
46	1964	Indonesia	Malaysia	Britain	Failure
47	1964	N. Vietnam	S. Vietnam	United States	Failure
48	1964	United States	N. Vietnam	China	Success
49	1967	Israel	Syria	Egypt	Failure
50	1967	Turkey	Cypress	Greece	Failure
51	1970	Syria	Jordan	Israel	Success
52	1971	India	Pak. Kashmir	China	Success
53	1974	Turkey	Cypress	Greece	Failure
54	1975	Morocco	W. Sahara	Spain	Failure
55	1975	Guatemala	Belize	Britain	Success
56	1977	Guatemala	Belize	Britain	Success

<b>Case</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Attacker</b>	<b>Protégé</b>	<b>Defender</b>	<b>Outcome</b>
57	1979	China	Vietnam	USSR	Failure
58	1983	Libya	Chad	France	Success

This page intentionally left blank

**Appendix I**  
**VIEWS OF THE CHINESE SECURITY EXPERTS**



## **Appendix I**

### **VIEWS OF THE CHINESE SECURITY EXPERTS**

#### **SUMMARY**

This appendix is based on two trips to the People's Republic of China, one in August–September 2001, and the other in March–April 2002. Each visit involved discussions with members of China's community of security experts. (The names of these experts can be requested from IDA and provided on an "Official Use Only" basis.) There were consistent threads in the views of our Chinese interlocutors regarding the Asian security environment and US military presence in the region. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, and subsequent US-led antiterrorist campaign had little to do with any changes in Chinese thinking.

The most important security issue for this community of experts was unification with Taiwan and the potential for interference by the US in that matter. However, Taiwan did not always predominate in our discussions. Other security concerns were Korean unification, a resurgent Japan, a future Russian move to regain lost superpower status, the India-Pakistan conflict, the potential for nuclear weapon proliferation, ballistic missile defense, US presence in Central Asia, and a widening of US military presence in the Asia Pacific region. The views among the Chinese experts were significantly influenced by internal politics, especially because the discussions took place during the preparations for the 16<sup>th</sup> People's Party Congress, to be held in late 2002.

The majority of our interlocutors seemed most worried by what they viewed as an increasingly hard-line trend against China by the United States. In their thinking, aggressive rhetoric was being reinforced by US actions in the Western Pacific and Asia.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Extracts from an unpublished paper presented in April 2002 by a Chinese university lecturer are included as an attachment to this appendix. It presents particulars in three issue areas. These are consistent with the comments made by our Chinese interlocutors and are useful because they are in greater detail than the statements in any single discussion. The first issue area which provided detail was the Chinese perception of a hard-line trend; attachment contains a chronology of what is viewed as provocative US statements and actions.

The war against terrorism, many argued, was giving the US a ready-made excuse to continue to pursue an aggressive policy of global hegemony.

A small number of influential people among the security experts in China argued that the history of the US over the past 100 years was evidence that it is not inherently aggressive and does not seek hegemony over other states. Still, a key point is that the security experts in China wanted to know US *intent* and to have a better defined Sino-US relationship.

## **CHINESE SECURITY EXPERTS' VIEWS**

The balance of this appendix consists of distillations of the most important points made during discussions, meetings, lectures, and roundtable discussions on five topics:

- The security environment
- The US security role in East, South, and Central Asia
- Numbers and types of US military presence
- Korean unification
- Sino-US bilateral and multilateral military and naval cooperation

Each topic is addressed in the form of a notional statement that might have been made in discussion *by a member of the Chinese security community*. This presentation device reflects our recognition that, even more than in our discussions with other foreign experts, our Chinese interlocutors were presenting a common worldview.

On the two trips to China we met with the same members during the second trip as on the first, but we were joined by new members as well during the second trip. Between the first and second trips some positions modified somewhat while others became more fixed. The view presented in each notional statement reflects the more recent trip; footnotes are used to discuss differences with the earlier trip. Of course, not every interlocutor commented on every topic. Further, those who commented on a particular topic did not always speak with a unified voice; significant differences are noted.

### **Security Environment**

From a strategic perspective there are no new threats to China as a result of 9/11. The security situation is little changed, although the new position of the US in Central Asia is worrisome to many—but not all—in the Chinese security community. China sees itself as somewhat peripheral to the threat of terrorists, although China does have some problems in its western provinces. There are other criminal acts that have taken place in

China that could be terrorism. These are counterrevolutionary crimes, and the Chinese security community tries not to discuss them outside of official channels.

The main threat China sees is a confrontation with the US, particularly over Taiwan. In fact, members of China's security community feel that a general confrontation is taking place now as a result of US policies and actions against China. This is a new condition, but it has very little to do with the terrorist attacks. Other strategic concerns remain much the same as before, including worry over an Indian-Pakistani conflict, especially if it should involve escalation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Japan is a concern, primarily because China views recent Japanese deployments of military supporting forces as indications of possible aggressive intent or as steps to develop a deployment capability for the future. China has learned recently that Japan has a "virtual" capability to produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Also, Japan needs to have the courage to apologize for its actions in honoring war criminals.

Russia, to the extent that it wants to regain superpower status, also will be a concern to China. China has an agreement with Russia, and in the short-term the Chinese think it benefits China more than Russia. In the longer view, the Chinese are concerned. China notes that Russia has cooperated very closely with the US against terrorists, and that Russia is also becoming a good friend of NATO. Therefore, there is a concern too that China is being deliberately encircled.

China also remains concerned over the development and deployment of missile defenses (nuclear – NMD; tactical – TMD; and ballistic – BMD), both in the US and with its allies in the Asia Pacific region. Chinese arguments against NMD are well established.<sup>2</sup>

### **US Security Role In East, South And Central Asia**

China accepts that the United States is the world leader and basically can do as it chooses to do. Some in China are more accepting of the US leadership role than others, but everyone understands that the US is the sole superpower.

---

<sup>2</sup> NMD and TMD (for Japan, South Korea, and possibly Taiwan) still worried China in early 2002, but perhaps less than they did 6 months earlier. Before and during August–September 2001 a pro forma ballistic missile defense lecture was a normal part of a discussion with a member of the Chinese security community. Rhetoric on BMD, NMD, and TMD was noticeably muted in March–April 2002. It may be significant that the possible sale of an Aegis missile cruiser to Taiwan was not on the April 2002 list of provocative actions. Nonetheless, a detailed list of questions about responses to US NMD and TMD is included in the attachment to this appendix, reflecting thinking among Chinese security experts.

The US and China have fundamentally different approaches to security issues. There are two main areas of difference. First, China feels in general that countries should be responsible for their own security and not have to rely on others. However, the Chinese security community understands that some countries—allies of the US—have invited the US to station military forces in their countries. The second Sino-US difference is that the Chinese see the need for an overarching framework for Sino-US relations. In their view, the US cares little about the overall direction of Sino-US relations and would rather make agreements on and cooperate in specific situations. Thus the Chinese see the US, on the one hand, expecting cooperation from China on intelligence sharing regarding the 9/11 terrorists, but, on the other hand, thwarting China regarding Taiwan.

China accepts the presence of US forces in East Asia and other regions. The Chinese security community does not see that China has much choice in the matter in any event. Indeed, China sees some benefit to US military forces as regards Korea, Japan, and Russia. Its greatest concern, however, is US intent. If the intent of the US is to maintain stability and help preserve peace, then China has no qualms. But if US intent is to intervene against China over Taiwan, then China views US presence as a threat.

China is preparing for the 16<sup>th</sup> People's Party Congress (16<sup>th</sup> PPC). This is going to be a major political event and will see the beginnings of the fourth generation of Chinese leadership ascending to top positions. The 16<sup>th</sup> PPC is going to occupy a lot of the time of the Chinese security community in the next few months. The community is not as likely to pay as much attention to foreign affairs during this time as it will to internal political matters. For example, Hu Jintao, who is the putative successor to Jiang Zemin, may have some competition for the top spot. Also, even though the People's Liberation Army (PLA) budget is expected to have modest increases in the years ahead, the PLA is losing some of its political clout at the highest levels. Fortunately for the PLA, US hard-line rhetoric and military activities gives Chinese military leaders a lot of leverage with budget requests.

China has mixed feelings about US presence in South and Central Asia.<sup>3</sup> First, China is glad that the US has helped cool the conflict between India and Pakistan, and that it is going after terrorists. China supports US efforts against terrorism. But there is a concern that US influence in Central Asia will eventually turn against China's western

---

<sup>3</sup> The matter of Central Asia was a feature of discussions in March-April 2002. Except for reference to the Shanghai Security Cooperation Organization and the usual reference to "splittists" in western Xinjiang Province, Central Asia was not a topic during the earlier trip.

flank. Many in the Chinese security community believe that the US will end up with a large military presence in Central Asia. These Chinese recognize that there is a position in the US government against such a continuing presence, but if the US is invited to stay, how can it not do so and thus maintain a substantial presence? The Chinese think the US learned a lesson in regard to Pakistan, and that it will stay in South Asia with a sizeable presence.

### **Numbers and Types of US Military Presence**

China cannot overemphasize the need to come to some kind of Sino-US strategic understanding in order to achieve a level of cooperation that would allow such matters as the numbers and types of US military to be addressed. China does not have an adequate understanding right now regarding Sino-US relations. (When the particulars of US military presence came up, a member of the Chinese security community would almost always declare that he would not presume to tell the US its business regarding force structure or deployments in East Asia or anywhere else. He would then continue along the lines of the notional statement given here.) Perhaps it would be appropriate to organize a conference to begin a dialogue on this topic. (Some academics among the Chinese security experts suggested it would be appropriate to organize one or more conferences on this topic.)

Land-based versus naval forces depends on the location, terrain, threat and general situation. The Asia Pacific region almost mandates a large naval presence, but in Central Asia a land presence is understandable. China does feel that the US could do with fewer land-based forces in Korea and on Okinawa, however.

China is very upset over the stationing of three nuclear submarines near Guam. Outgoing PACOM, Adm. Dennis Blair, said the submarines are there as a deterrent to China regarding Taiwan. The recent Nuclear Policy Review (NPR) lists China as a potential target under conditions of conflict over Taiwan. First the NPR, then the US moves submarines to Guam—what is China to think? While one can understand the US need to balance forces while going after the terrorists, this kind of naval deployment is very troubling to China.

Also, China understands that the US is now seeking other bases in the Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia. The US says it is reducing forces somewhat, but it also is expanding and improving its capability. The US is back in the Philippines now. The Chinese security community knows the US is thinking about something with Vietnam,

and it wonders about Indonesia. So, in one sense, it looks like China is getting more “pressure from the sea” than previously.

US naval forces passing through the Taiwan Strait would be another in a series of provocative actions over Taiwan that the US has taken. Again, China doesn’t deny the US the right to be in the Asia Pacific region. China just would like to know the US intentions and to have a strategic understanding relative to Sino-US relations. Some among the Chinese security experts think that the US now views China as a rival. Others disagree but find it hard to counter the persuasive facts of US statements and actions.

### **Korean Unification**

On the surface, that is, from a diplomatic standpoint, China supports efforts to peacefully unify the two Koreas. However, Korean unification is not in the best interests of the US, China, or Russia. The Japanese are afraid of Korean unification, but they won’t say so publicly. North Korea doesn’t want to unify if it means a loss of their ideological position, and the South Koreans are afraid they can’t afford unification. It is a complex situation.<sup>4</sup>

The bottom line is that China will probably support some type of unification on the peninsula if it follows a South Korean model, but no one can say that publicly. China is more ideologically in tune with the North, but it is far more economically bound to the South. From a pragmatic standpoint, unification that favors more openness and good economic relations will also favor China. And, if the two Koreas do unify in a way that favors the South, then how can the US or anyone else stand in the way of a similar unification with China and Taiwan?

What has to happen for unification to occur is for North Korea to change. It has to become more open. China is liberalizing and supports greater openness on the part of the North.

If there is Korean unification, there will not be much need for US military forces in the region. However, China is not naïve about this. The Chinese security community knows that the US will continue to have military forces in the region as long as it is invited to stay. The antiterrorist campaign can be used as an excuse. What China will worry about is the intention of the US after the terrorists are no longer a threat.

---

<sup>4</sup> A related Chinese concern is the possibility of nuclear weapons in a unified Korea. North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons and has developed a ballistic missile capability. While South Korea does not have nuclear weapons, it has not totally eschewed them either.

## **Sino-US Bilateral and Multilateral Military and Naval Cooperation**

China has said many times that all it desires is a peaceful region where economic development and globalization can benefit countries and people. Some in China agree that the US is not seeking domination, but others view the US as acting like a hegemon. Until there is a better framework for Sino-US relations, it is going to be difficult to have cooperative military activities with the US, whether they are bilateral or multilateral. Nonetheless, there are—or soon will be—forums that can provide a basis for Sino-US activities on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

Also, in Central Asia there might be some areas for productive cooperation between the US, China, and the other countries in and near the region. Central Asia is important to China for its energy potential and for western flank security. It is conceivable that some sort of multilateral relationship can be established there, perhaps along the lines of the Shanghai Security Cooperation Organization (SCO), which might accept the US and Turkey as members under certain circumstances, or some other model. The Shanghai SCO isn't very different in concept from the model the US espouses for antiterrorist operations in the Asia Pacific region.<sup>5</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

A key point articulated by our interlocutors was that the Chinese security experts wanted to know US *intent* and to have a better defined Sino-US relationship. Our interlocutors seemed most worried by what they viewed as an increasingly hard-line trend against China by the US. The war against terrorism, many argued, gives the US a ready-made excuse to continue to pursue an aggressive policy of global hegemony.

The most important security issue for the Chinese security experts was unification with Taiwan and the potential for interference by the US in that matter. Other security concerns were Korean unification, a resurgent Japan, a future Russian attempt to regain superpower status, the India-Pakistan conflict, the potential for nuclear weapon proliferation, ballistic missile defense, US presence in Central Asia, and a widening of US military presence in the Asia Pacific region.

---

<sup>5</sup> Chinese leadership had an opportunity, through the offices of the Shanghai SCO, to become more involved in Central Asia in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks but did not, reportedly somewhat to their chagrin. This explains, in part, subsequent proactive visits by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji to the Middle East and Asia Minor, activities that were presented as an encouraging sign rather than a cause for concern.

The views among the Chinese experts were significantly influenced by internal politics, especially because the discussions took place during the preparations for the 16<sup>th</sup> People's Party Congress, to be held in late 2002. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack and subsequent US-led antiterrorist campaign did not change the thinking of our Chinese interlocutors between the two visits.

**Attachment**  
**EXTRACTS FROM AN UNPUBLISHED PAPER**  
**CIRCULATED AMONG THE CHINESE SECURITY EXPERTS**

An unpublished paper presented to IDA in April 2002 by a Chinese university lecturer presented particulars in three issue areas that are consistent with the comments made by our Chinese interlocutors but in more detail than such specifics were addressed in any single discussion. The three areas are the Chinese:

- Perceptions of a recent hard-line trend in US policy toward China,
- Concern about US national and theater missile defenses, and
- Views of the emerging Sino-US relationship

The first issue area in which the paper provided detail was the Chinese perception of a hard-line trend in US policy toward China. A chronology of “provocative” US statements and actions were listed as follows:

- *The April 1, 2001, collision over South China Sea shows the US government’s growing concern of China’s military deployment near Taiwan.*
- *Last April, President Bush’s announcement of defending Taiwan by doing “whatever it takes.”*
- *Last April, US announcement of a big package of arms sales to Taiwan, including offensive weapons.*
- *Last May, Chen Shui-bian was allowed to have stopovers in New York and Houston.*
- *US reiterated its security commitment to Taiwan while China cooperated with the US in the global campaign of anti-terrorism late last year.*
- *In Early March, the DoD’s “Nuclear Posture Review” calls for using nuclear weapons to resolve a possible crisis in the Taiwan Strait.*
- *A month ago, the US administration permitted Taiwan’s defense minister, Tang Yiau-ming, to visit the US to attend a defense conference in Florida.*

- *On March 20, Adm. Dennis Blair, outgoing commander of US forces in the Pacific, announced that the US would deploy three nuclear submarines to Guam in case of defending Taiwan.*
- *On April 4, the US president signed a bill supporting Taiwan as an observer in WHO and almost at the same time, referred to “the Republic of Taiwan” in his speech on “Trade Promotion Authority.”*

The second issue area in the paper, concerning Chinese responses to US national and theater missile defenses, was addressed as follows:

*China has to reassess its long-standing nuclear policy of minimal deterrent. China should never pursue unilateral nuclear advantages as the Soviet Union did in the Cold War, but to continue to adopt a minimum deterrence posture. Otherwise, the stable and asymmetrical nuclear balance will be broken by a US unilateral shift of nuclear strategy and China's national security and reunification will be in a more serious situation. Debates on Sino-US nuclear relations and policy choices are going on in China [addressing]:*

*Which is the first priority on the military agenda, conventional forces or nuclear-fighting capability?*

*Is it necessary for China to increase its deliverable nuclear warhead enough to negate US defense capability? And how many?*

*Should China establish more mobile land-based and sea-based ICBMs to increase survivability in circumstance of sudden attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?*

*To what extent should China develop missiles carrying multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs)?*

*How can China deter the US by means of nuclear forces when it prepares to use tactical nuclear weapons in China's civil war?*

*China is forced to seek to develop second-strike capability in order to continue the relationship of minimalism and mutual-destruction that maintained the nuclear peace during the Cold War.*

With respect to the third issue area, long-term Sino-US relations, the paper concluded:

*Unfortunately, the US is seeking absolute national security. With regard to Sino-US security relations, American policy toward China has changed...Although US officials did not mention the phrase of “strategic competitor” any more from the second half of last year for the sake of antiterrorist cooperation after the 9.11 tragedy, China is a de facto one in US specific policies over the Taiwan issue, non-proliferation, etc. DoD’s QDR and Nuclear Posture Review, and the NIC’s report about nuclear threats show that Sino-US relations have entered a period of confrontation, cooperation, as well as power struggle. The military relationship, particularly nuclear deterrence, is going to play a more and more important role in bilateral relations during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The American offensive strategic posture at the very beginning of the century is very worrisome.*

Even among peers in the Chinese security community, there is disagreement with some of these points. However, taken together they provide a concrete picture of the concerns that were expressed by our interlocutors in more general and diplomatic ways during the two visits. In particular, our Chinese interlocutors argued both the need for a better-defined Sino-US relationship and the hope that it will not be the one described above.

This page intentionally left blank

**Appendix J**  
**BIBLIOGRAPHY**



## Appendix J

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akst, George. 2001. A Summary of USN/USMC Analyses of Presence and Crisis Responsiveness. US Marine Corps.
- Allard, Kenneth. 1997. Information Age Warfare and the Navy After Next. In *Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future Prospects* by Dan Goure et al. The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Anderson, Jon R. 2002. Army Plans Massive Troop Relocation. *European Stars and Stripes*, June 30.
- . 2001. Germany-Based Apache Units Rank Higher Than Most in Preparedness. *European Stars and Stripes*, July 23.
- Art, Robert. 1992. A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War. In *America's Strategy in a Changing World*, edited by Sean M. Lynn Jones and Steven Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- . 1991. A Defensible Defense. *International Security* 15, No. 4.
- Asia Foundation. 2001. America's Role in Asia. February.
- . 2001. The Members of America's Role in Asia Task Force.
- Associated Press. 2001. Beijing's Olympic Bid Gets Taiwan's Backing. July 6.
- Atwell, Robert, et al. 1994. A Nontechnical Introduction to Aspects of TACWAR. IDA Paper P-3018. Draft Final.
- Balut, Steve. 1997. Reflections on Cost Analysis. *Phalanx*.
- Barnett, Sean, and James Thomason. 1999. Flexible Presence. *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter.
- Barone, Michael. 2002. Our Enemies the Saudis. *U.S. News and World Report*. June 3.
- Beck, Nathaniel, Gary King, and Langche Zeng. 2000. Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture. *American Political Science Review* 94, vol.1.
- Bell, James. 2002. A Review of Looney et al., White Paper, Institute for Defense Analyses.
- Bell, James. 1993. *Potential Economic Benefits of Forward Deployment in East Asia and the Pacific: A Preliminary Survey*. IDA Paper P-2804.
- Betts, Richard. 1992. Systems for Peace or Causes of War. In *America's Strategy in a Changing World*, edited by Sean M. Lynn Jones and Steven Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Binnendijk, Hans, editor. 1997–2000. *Strategic Assessment*. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
- Blechman, Barry, and Stephen Kaplan. 1978. *Force Without War*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Bowden, Mark. 1999. *Black Hawk Down*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Brooks, Linton. 1993. Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence. Occasional Paper. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.
- Brown, Ron, et al. 1997. Forward Engagement Requirements for US Naval Forces: New Analytical Approaches. NPS-OR-97-011 PR. Naval Post Graduate School.
- Buchanan, Patrick. 1990. America First, and Second and Third. *The National Interest*. Spring.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The War Trap*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Burgess, Lisa. 2002. U.S., S. Korea Set to OK Plan to Consolidate American Military Facilities. *European Stars and Stripes*, March 6.
- Bush, George. 2002. State of the Union Address.
- Carter, Clarence, et al. 1997. Dynamic Commitment, Strategic Forum, No. 131. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. November.
- Cebrowski, Admiral Arthur, and Captain Wayne Hughes. 1999. Rebalancing the Fleet. *Naval Institute Proceedings*. November.
- Central Intelligence Agency, Strategic Assessments Group. Proceedings of the Changing Dynamics of Deterrence Conference. June 5.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2000. *World Factbook* (“country data for key presence states”).
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2000. Joint Vision 2020.
- Chu, David. 2001. Reflections on Transforming the Army: A briefing (brief 32) to the IDA Transformation Panel for the Secretary of Defense. RAND. March 13.
- Cirafici, John L. 1999. SFOR in Bosnia in 1997: A Watershed Year. *Parameters*. Spring.
- Clarke, Michael (Director of the International Policy Institute, Kings College, London). 2002. A Presentation at IDA. April 8.
- Coalition against Trafficking in Women. 1997. In *Square One, US Military in the Philippines*. August.
- Collins, John. 1991. *America’s Small Wars*. Brassey.
- Congressional Budget Office. 2002. The Budget and Economic Outlook FY 2003-2012. ———. 2002b. Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force. March.
- Constable, Pam. 2002. When All Patients Are Created Equal: MASH unit in Afghanistan. *Washington Post*, March 10.

- Cope, John. 1995. International Military Education and Training: An Assessment. McNair Paper Number 44. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
- Costa, Keith, et al. 2001. Rumsfeld Orders Call-up of 50K Reservists. *Inside Defense*, September 17.
- Cox, Gregory. 1995. Overseas Presence: An Evaluation of the IDA/CORM Study, Center for Naval Analyses 95-870.
- Crane, Conrad. 2001. Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in SSCs During the 1990s (a white paper).
- Davis, Paul. 2001. Effects-Based Warfare. RAND.
- Department of Defense (ODUSD (I&E)). 2002. Base Structure Report, FY 2001 Baseline.
- , Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. *Department of Defense Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Department of Defense. 2002. Global Hawk Production Plan.
- . 2002. Selected Acquisition Reports.
- . National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of Jan 16, 2002.
- . 2001. Department of Defense FY2000 Performance Report. <http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2001/I.pdf>.
- . 2001b. Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
- . 2000. 1998 Personnel Stationed Overseas and Bilateral Cost Sharing Table. In Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense by the Secretary of Defense.
- . The National Military Strategy (selected years).
- . n.d. Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) Evaluation Plan.
- Department of State. 2000–2001. Selected Surveys of Foreign Attitudes toward U.S. Military Presence.
- DFI. 2002. Department of Defense Update—Budget Highlights. February 8.
- Dismukes, Bradford. 1994. *National Security Strategy and Forward Presence: Implications for Acquisition and Use of Forces*. CRM 93-192. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.
- . 1993. Making Forward Presence Work: A Survey of 14 U.S. Embassy Country Teams. CNA RM 93-55.
- Downing, Gen. Wayne, and James Thomason. 2001. A Special Operations Forces Enhancement Plan (an IDA briefing).
- Eltahawy, Mona. 2002. “My Islam, *The Washington Post*. January 2002.

- Fabrie, Robert. 2002. Memorandum to authors regarding A Study of US Military Component Command Headquarters. March 28.
- Fischerkeller, Michael. 2002. A Synopsis of Korean Crisis Incidents.
- , et al. 2001. The Interaction of Skill and Technology in Combat. *Military Operations Research* 7, No.1.
- Fisher, Franklin. 2001. U.S May Close 15 Major Bases in Korea, Consolidate Troops at One Location. *Pacific Stars and Stripes*. July 17.
- Flournoy, Michelle, editor. 2000. *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security*. National Defense University.
- Free, Dean. 1998. A Brief to MORS. Johns Hopkins Advanced Physics Lab, Laurel, Maryland. April 8.
- Frieders, Michael, et al. 2002. A "COST" Model Briefing. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. April 15.
- Friedman, Thomas. 2002. Suicidal Lies. *The New York Times*. March 31.
- Gaffney, Hank. 2002. *Available Warning Time*. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses. May 15.
- , et al. 2000. *U.S. Naval Responses to Situations, 1970–1999*. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses CRM D0002763.A2/Final.
- General Accounting Office. 1998. Overseas Presence, Review of Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa. NSIAD-98-66.
- . 1997. Overseas Presence.
- George, Alexander, and Richard Smoke. 1974. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gingrich, Newt. 1999. A Presentation to the Hart-Rudman Commission.
- Giordono, Joseph. 2002. Adm. Blair Reflects on Post-Sept. 11 Changes, Lauds Strength of U.S.-Japan Ties. *Pacific Stars and Stripes*. February 6.
- Gordon, Michael. 2002. N. Korea Cancels Trip by 4 Experts from the U.S. *The New York Times*. February 9.
- Goure, Dan. 2001. The Tyranny of Forward Presence. *Naval War College Review* 54, No. 3.
- , et al. 1997. *Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future Prospects*. The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Grey, Jerry. 2002. Transforming the Defense Dept. *Space News*. March 25.
- Grossman, Elaine. Senior Officer Sees Bahrain, Qatar Airbases as Backups to Saudi Arabia. *Inside the Pentagon*. March 14.
- Haass, Richard. 1999. *Intervention*. Revised edition. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

- Hawkins, Charles, and Stanley Horowitz. 2002. Major Conflict Divisions. IDA Paper P-3597. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- Hawkins, Charles. 2000. The People's Liberation Army Looks to the Future. *JFQ*. Summer.
- Hecht, Charles. 2002. China's Next Leaders (Hu Jintao). *Wall Street Journal*. January 13.
- Henningsen, J. 2002. A Dialogue on Analyzing Effects Based Operations (EBO). *PHALANX*. March.
- Henry, Ryann, and Edward Peartree. The Future of Naval Forward Presence. In *Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future Prospects* by Dan Goure et al. The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Heybey, Berta, and Stewart, Jessica. 2001. *Do Crisis Response Operations Affect Foreign Investment Decisions?* CRM D0003914.A1/Final (FOUO). Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.
- . 2001. Do Crisis Response Operations Affect Foreign Investment Decisions?" CNAC CRM D0004205.A1/Final.
- Hinkle, Wade P., Stephen D. Biddle, and Ramin Toloui. 1997. The Effectiveness of Military Coercion in Bosnia. In *Proceedings of the 65th MORS Symposium*. Alexandria, VA: Military Operations Research Society.
- , et al. *Measuring the Effectiveness of the Shaping Strategy*. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses Document D-2463 (Draft Final).
- Hiro, Dilip. 2002. Saudis Go Home? *The Nation*, March 11.
- History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. SFOR Informer Online. No date.
- Hoagland, Jim. 2002. Human Rights and Our Allies. *Washington Post*. March 10.
- Hong, Soon-il. 2000. US Military Presence (in Korea). *Korea Times*, August.
- Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. 1984. What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. *World Politics*. July.
- Huth, Paul. 1988. *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2001. *The Military Balance*. London.
- Japanese Forum for Strategic Studies. 2001. A Status Report. June 27.
- Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. 1985. *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Joint Staff (J5). 1995. Foreign Military Interaction—Strategic Rationale.
- . n.d.(1). MOOTW, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jrm/mootw.pdf>.
- . n.d. The Basic Brief. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jrm/jfe.pdf>.
- Kagan, Robert. 2002. Fightin Democrats. *Washington Post*. March 10.

- Kaiser, Robert, and David Ottaway. 2002. Oil For Security Fueled Close Ties. *Washington Post*. February 11.
- Keeter, Hunter. 2002. Navy Deep Blue Operations Group Supports War Against Terrorism. *Defense Daily*. February 14.
- King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2000. Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data. *Political Analysis* 9, no. 2 (December).
- King, Gary, et al. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton University Press.
- Kissinger, Henry. 2002. Answering the Axis Critics. *Washington Post*. March.
- Knowlton, Brian. 2002. U.S. Advises Europeans To Spend More On Militaries. *International Herald Tribune*. February 6.
- Korb, Lawrence. 2000. A Realistic Defense Budget for the New Millennium. *The Korb Report*. [www.businessleaders.org/blsp/content/korb\\_report.htm](http://www.businessleaders.org/blsp/content/korb_report.htm)
- Krepenevich, Andrew F. 1994. Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions. *The National Interest*. Fall.
- Kugler, Richard. 1994. *US Military Strategy and Force Posture for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. NDRI/RAND.
- . 1993. *US Military Strategy and Force Posture for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. NDRI/RAND.
- . 1992. The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe. RAND, NDRI, R-4194-EUCOM/NA.
- Leng, Russell J., and Hugh G. Wheeler. 1979. Influence Strategies, Success, and War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. December.
- Leonard, Michael, et al. 2000. QDR Options, An IDA Briefing. September 5.
- Lewis, William H., editor. 1993. Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead. McNair Paper 25. National Defense University.
- Longer Carrier Tours? *Navy News and Undersea Technology*. March 25, 2002.
- Looney, Robert, et al. 2001. Estimating the Economic Benefits of Forward-Engaged Naval Forces. *Interfaces* 31 (July).
- Looney, Robert. 2000. Market Effects of Naval Presence in a Globalized World. Naval Post-Graduate School.
- Looney, Robert, David Shrady, et al. 1997. Estimating Economic Benefits of Naval Forward Presence: A Brief Summary.
- Lowe, Karl. 2002. Army Redeployment/Reorganization Scheme, A white paper. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- . 2001. *Applying Rapid Decisive Operations: Possibilities for 2010*, IDA Paper P-3602. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- , et al. 1998. Relieving Stress on Army: Options for Change, IDA Paper P-3417. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.

- Mallaby, Sebastian. 2002. Split Screen on Aiding Nations. *Washington Post*. March 25.
- Mazzetti, Mark. 2002. The Thin Green Line—Some Missions Must Go. *US News and World Report*. April 8.
- McGrory, Mary. 2002. It's Still About Clinton. *Washington Post*. March 10.
- Mearsheimer, John. 1983. *Conventional Deterrence*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Menard, Scott. 2001. *Applied Logistic Regression Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Sage Publications.
- Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Miller, Jeffrey. 2002. Choosing New Fighter Tough Job for Korea (an Interview with Lt.Gen Lance Smith, 7<sup>th</sup> Air Force Cmdr). *Korea Times*. March.
- Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea. 2000. Defense White Paper.
- Miskel, James. 2001. 'Being There' Matters, But Where? *Naval War College Review*. Summer.
- Morgan, William. 1994. Let's Talk Deployment Arithmetic. CAB 94-23. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.
- . 1994. Rotate Crews, Not Ships. CAB 94-40. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.
- Murphy, Dan. 2002. Filipinos Grow Divided Over Return of US Military. *Christian Science Monitor*. February 8.
- National Defense University. 2002. Defense Horizons Symposium Proceedings.
- Navy Alters SEAL Structure—Will Have Sqdns of 6 Platoons, and Rotation Schedule. *Navy News and Undersea Technology*. March 25, 2002.
- Newman, Sally. 1997. Political and Economic Implications of Global Forward Presence. In *Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future Prospects* by Dan Goure et al. The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Nordlinger, Eric. 1996. *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century*. Princeton University Press.
- Norton, Rob. 2002. Every Budget Tells a Story, and This is No Exception. *Washington Post*. March 10.
- Nye, Joseph. 2000. Shaping the Pacific Triangle. *Blueprint Magazine*. January.
- , et al. 2000. *Governance in a Globalizing World*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press.
- . 1988. *Bound to Lead*. Basic Books.

- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1995. Strategy for East Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (remarks of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies/Japanese Institute of International Affairs Conference, San Francisco, March 29. In *Defense Issues* 10, No. 35.
- O'Hanlon, Michael. 2001. Come Partly Home, America. *Foreign Affairs*. March–April (<http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/ohanlon/2001foreignaffairs.htm>).
- Oh, Kongdan, and Ralph Hassig. 2000. *North Korea through the Looking Glass*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- On China. *The Economist*. June 30, 2001.
- Ottaway, David, and Robert Kaiser. 2002. Saudis May Seek U.S. Exit. *Washington Post*. January 18.
- Owens, Mackubin. 1997. Some Politico-Military Implications of Naval Forward Presence. In *Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future Prospects* by Dan Goure et al. The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Peace through Law and Education Fund. 2002. *A Force for Peace and Security*.
- Pentagon May Cut 6,000 Geographic Slots. *Defense News*. March 18, 2002
- Polich, J. Michael, et al. 2000. Small Deployments, Big Problems. RAND Issue Paper 197.
- Pomfret, John. 2000. Taiwan's Opposition to Shift China Stance. *Washington Post*. July 9.
- Porter, Gene. 2002. Review of Looney et al., IDA memorandum. January 31.
- Potomac Associates. 2002. A Survey of Korean Attitudes toward the United States.
- Powell, Colin. 1992–93. US Forces: Challenges Ahead. *Foreign Affairs* 71, no.5 (Winter).
- Quaintain, Anthony. 2002. And Nicaragua a Case In Point. *Washington Post*. March 25.
- Reiter, Janusz. New Map of the World. *Rzeczpospolita*. January 31.
- Rhodes, Edward. 1999. From the Sea and Back Again. *Naval War College Review* (Spring).
- Richardson, David. 2000. US Japan Defence Cooperation. *Parameters* (Summer).
- Richardson, Michael. 2002. US Wants More Use of South Asian Bases. *International Herald Tribune*. February 8.
- Richburg, Keith. 2002. NATO Stretching Its Reach into Old Soviet Territory: Baltics Considered Shoo-Ins. *Washington Post*. March 1.
- Roth, Stanley. 2001. U.S. Policy Toward Asia (a speech to the Asia Society. January 11.
- Ruggie, John. 1993. The United Nations: Stuck in a Fog Between Peacekeeping and Enforcement. In *Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead*, edited by William H. Lewis. National Defense University.

- Rumsfeld and Commanders Exchange Briefings. Washington Post. March 3, 2002.
- Ruskin, David. 1995. Carrier Force Levels and Crisis Response Capability. CAB-95-44.09. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.
- Russett, Bruce. 1967. Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory. *Journal of Peace Research*.
- Russett, Bruce. 1963. The Calculus of Deterrence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University.
- Schlesinger, James. 1998. The Role of Allies in U.S. National Security Strategy (keynote lecture). Georgetown University. <http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/schlesinger/1998/keynote.htm>.
- Schwartz, Peter. 1995. Warrior in the Age of Intelligent Machines (an interview with Andrew Marshall). *Wired*. April.
- Secretary of Defense. 2001. Annual Report to Congress.
- . 2001. Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. March.
- Seo Soo-min. 2001. 'Kim Il-Sung Accepted Presence of USFK' Carter Reveals in KBS Interview. Korea Times. August 8.
- Serwer, Daniel. 2001. The Balkans: What Has Been Accomplished - What is the Agenda for the Next Five Years? (testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on International Relations). July 11. USIP
- Seybolt, Taylor. 2001. What Makes Humanitarian Interventions Effective? SIPRI. Draft
- Shin, Paul. 2002. Bush to visit S. Korea Today. Associated Press. February 18.
- Siegel, Adam. 1991. Eastern Exit: The Non-Combatant Evacuation Effort (NEO) from Mogadishu, Somalia in January 1991. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965. In *Peace, War, and Numbers* edited by Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Sinnreich, Rick. 2000. Email communication to authors regarding what it takes to deter an aggressor, October 3.
- Sipress, Alan, and Tom Ricks. 2002. Pentagon Seeks Sinai Cuts. Washington Post. January 30.
- Smart Sanctions, Smart Exit. The Economist. July 7, 2001.
- Snider, Don. 1992-93. US Military Forces in Europe: How Low Can We Go? Survival. Winter.
- Snyder, Glenn H., and Paul Diesing. 1977. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stone, Andrea. 2002. Kuwaitis Share Distrust Toward USA, Poll Indicates. USA Today. February 27.

- Suryanarayana, PS. 1999. US Military Presence in AP Zone Beneficial. *The Hindu* 22. August.
- Taiwan's Defense Minister in Landmark Visit to U.S. *The Washington Post*. March 11, 2002.
- Tangredi, Sam [Capt., USN]. 2000. The Fall and Rise of Naval Forward Presence. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. May.
- . 1999. A Ship for All Reasons. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. September.
- The Nuclear Posture, editorial in *The Washington Post*. March 13, 2002.
- The White House. Anticipating, Preventing and Responding to Complex Foreign Crises. NSPD-xx, Draft.
- . The National Security Strategy (selected years).
- Thomason, James. 2002. Firepower-Personnel Trade-Offs (a briefing to Mark Cancian, OSD (PA&E)). Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. March.
- . 2002. Effects-Based Presence (a briefing to Ms. Cindy Williams). Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. March 15.
- . 2001. Risk Concepts (a white paper). Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- . 2001. Synopsis of Senior-Level Interviews Concerning Overseas Presence (a white paper). Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. June.
- . 2001. Presence Alternatives (a memo). Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. September.
- . 2001. Effects-Based Presence (a briefing to USD (P&R)). Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. Oct.9.
- . 2001. A New Approach to Achieving the Objectives of Presence (a briefing to OSD and the Joint Staff). June 4.
- . 2000. The US Commission on National Security/21st Century ("Hart Rudman"): Overview and Observations on Phase I (an annotated briefing). IDA Document D-2451. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- . 1998. The Cost-Effectiveness of Some Alternative Ways of Providing Overseas Presence (a briefing to a Military Operations Research Symposium Workshop at Johns Hopkins Advanced Physics Laboratory. April 8-9.
- Thomason, James, and Atwell, Robert. 2002. Effects-Based Presence Assessments, A Briefing. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. February.
- Thomason, James, and Bovey, Robert. 2002. Effects-Based Presence, An Overview Brief for Mr. Townsend. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. March.
- Thomason, James, and Michael Fischerkeller. 2002. Overseas Military Presence (with a Focus on Deterrence), A Briefing to General Welch. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. April 17.

- Thomason, James, et al. 2002. Effects-Based Presence (a brief to OSD (Policy). February.
- Thomason, James, et al. 2001. Executive Summary, Transforming Military Operation Capabilities (Transformation Study report) IDA NS-D-2631. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. April.
- Thomason, James, et al. 1998. *Quadrennial Review Process: Lessons Learned from the 1997 Review and Options for the Future*. IDA Paper P-3402. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- Thomason, James, and Sean Barnett. 1995. IDA Analyses of Overseas Presence for the Commission on Roles and Missions: An Annotated Briefing. IDA Document D-1725. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- Thomason, James, et al. 1995. *Presence Analyses for the Commission on Roles and Missions*. IDA Document D-1707. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- Thurber, Beverly. 2001. A Game Theoretic Model of Nuclear War Over Taiwan (a white paper). September.
- Tiboni, Frank. 2002. Transformation Office to Study Force Structure. *Defense News*. February 4.
- Tilelli, General John, and Major Susan Bryant. 2002. Northeast Asian Regional Security: Keeping the Calm (a Role of American Military Power monograph). Association of the U.S. Army.
- Tillson, John, et al. 1996. Review of the Army Process for Determining Force Structure Requirements (2 Volumes). IDA Paper P-3189. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
- Triggs, Staff Sgt. Marcia. 2002. New Incentives Set for Unaccompanied Tours. *Army Link News*. February 25.
- Ullman, Harlan. 1997. Power, Politics, Perceptions and Presence: What's It All About? In *Naval Forward Presence: Present Status, Future Prospects* by Dan Goure et al. The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- United Nations. 2002. East Timor, Background. May. <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>
- US Army News Service. 2000. Army Sets Five Year Balkans Rotation. December 4.
- US Army. 1999. PERSCOM-Stabilization Task Force. May 17.
- . 1997. The 100 Country Army. No. 97-54, June 4.
- US Central Command. 1994. USCENTCOM in Somalia: Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope. US CENTCOM History Office.
- US Landing Rights Pushed. *Philadelphia Daily Inquirer*. October 1997.
- US Navy. 2001. The Value of Forward Deployed Naval Forces.
- . 1999–2000. Combatant Commander Requirements for Forward Naval Presence. November–March.

US Sets Picket Line of Nuclear Sensors. *The Washington Post*. March 3, 2002, p. A19.

US, French Navies Lead Africa Training. *The Washington Times*. February 7, 2002.

USAREUR Retention Rates Well Beyond Goals. *European Stars and Stripes*. January 28, 2002.

Usrey, Sgt. Tim. 2002. New Brigades Will Offer Shoot and Move. March 2.

Wain, Barry. 2002. Singapore. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. January 31.

———. 2002. Strategic Alliances in Asia Aided US-Led Terror Fight: An Interview with Admiral Dennis Blair. *Wall Street Journal*. May 2.

Waldron, Arthur. 2001. A Report. Working Group on US Treatment of China. Summer.

Walsh, Phil, et al. 2001. *Integrated C4ISR Analytical Tool Set (ICATS): Concepts and Technical Specification for JSEAD/Strike Implementation*. Edition 1.0. IDA Paper P-3582. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.

Warner Says QoL for US Forces Korea Must Be Addressed. *Inside the Army*. March 18, 2002.

Welch, General Larry. 2002. Lessons from OEF, A Briefing. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.

Whiteneck, Daniel. 2001. *Naval Forward Presence and Regional Stability*. CRM D0000639.A2/Final. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses.

Winnefeld, James. 1994. Overseas Presence: The Leverage Afforded by FMI Programs and Activities. RAND.

———, et al. 1992. *A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension*. RAND, NDRI.

Winograd, Erin. 2001. Army Might Benefit from New Force Management Strategy. *Inside Defense*. June 4.

Wolfe, Frank. 2002. Blair: Terror May Require Bolstered Pacific Presence. *Defense Daily*. March 6, 2002.

Wolfowitz, Paul. 2002. Remarks on Transformation to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Washington, D.C. February 19.

Woods, Randy. 2002. CBO: Basing More Subs in Guam is Best Way to Up Sub Presence. *Inside the Navy*. March 28.

Wright, Robin. 2002. Don't Just Fund the War, Shell Out for Peace. *The Washington Post*. March 10.

Zakheim, Dov, et al. 1996. Maritime Presence: The Role of the Marine Corps. System Planning Corporation.

———. 1996. Political and Economic Implications of Global Naval Presence. System Planning Corporation.

Zygar, Mikhail. 2002. United States Follows in the Footsteps of the U.S.S.R.: Americans Are Interested in the Former Soviet Base at Cam Ranh. *Kommersant*. February 6.

**Appendix K**  
**GLOSSARY**



## **Appendix K**

### **GLOSSARY**

1AD	1st Armored Division
2nd ID	2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division
ACTORD	Action Order
ACTWARN	Action Warning
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
AF	United States Air Force
AF Tacair	United States Air Force Tactical Air Forces
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARCENT	Army Component Command of Central Command
ARGs	Amphibious Ready Groups
ASGs	Area Support Groups
AWACS	Advanced Warning and Communication System
BCTs	Battalion Combat Teams
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BP	British Petroleum
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
C3I Systems	Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
C <sup>4</sup>	Command, Control, Communications and Computers
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CBO	Congressional Budget Office

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CINCS	Commanders-in-Chief
CNAC	Center for Naval Analyses Corporation
CONUS	Continental United States
CoS	Chief of Staff
COST	Contingency Operations Support Tool
CVBGs	Carrier Vehicle Battle Groups
DAWMs	Defense Advanced Warfighting Modeling System
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DoD	Department of Defense
DoN	Department of the Navy
DoS	Department of State
DPRK	Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
EUCOM	United States European Command
FBF	Firm-But-Flexible
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEBA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FY	Fiscal Year
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
HSVs	High Speed Vessels
IBCTs	Interim Brigade Combat Teams

IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
III MEF	Third Marine Expeditionary Force
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munition
JTF	Joint Task Force
MARFOREUR	United States Marine Forces, Europe
MC	United States Marine Corps
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Med	Medium
MEUs	Marine Expeditionary Units
MIRVs	Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MPF	Maritime Prepositioning Force
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTWs	Major Theater Wars
N	North
N81	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVEUR	United States Navy, Europe
NDU	National Defense University
NEA	Northeast Asia
NEOs	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NMD	National Missile Defense

NPR	Nuclear Policy Review
NSC	National Security Council
NWDC	Naval Warfare Development Command
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD (P&R)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)
OSD AT&L	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
PACOM	United States Pacific Command
PBBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PPC	People's Party Congress
PR	Proportional Response
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
QoL	Quality of Life
RIB	Rigid Inflatable Boat
RoK	Republic of Korea
S	South
SCO	Security Cooperation Organization
SE	Southeast
SEA	Southeast Asia
SETAF	Southern European Task Force
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SJTFHQs	Standing Joint Headquarters

SOCEUR	United States Special Operations Command, Europe
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFAs	Status of Forces Agreements
SSCs	Small-Scale Contingencies
SSGNs	Guided Missile Submarines, Nuclear
SWA	Southwest Asia
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPFDL	Time Phased Force Deployment List
UAVs	Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle
UCAVs	Unmanned Combat Aerospace Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USCINCEUR	United States Commander in Chief, United States European Command
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corp
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VCoS	Vice Chief of Staff
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

This page intentionally left blank

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YY)  July 2002		2. REPORT TYPE  Final		3. DATES COVERED  (July 2001 – July 2002)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD, Volume I: Main Report				5a. CONTRACT NO.  DASW01 98 C 0067	
				5b. GRANT NO.	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NO(S).	
6. AUTHOR(S)  Dr. James Thomason, Dr. Robert Atwell, Dr. Robert Bovey, Mr. William Cralley, Mr. James Delaney, Dr. Michael Fischerkeller, Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig, Mr. Charles Hawkins, Mr. Gene Porter				5d. PROJECT NO.  BE-6-2046	
				5e. TASK NO.	
				5f. WORK UNIT NO.	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22311-1882				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NO. IDA Paper P-3707, Volume I	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness The Pentagon, Room 3E763 Washington, DC 20301				10. SPONSOR'S / MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)  OUSD (P&R)	
				11. SPONSOR'S / MONITOR'S REPORT NO(S).	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Volume II: Classified Appendix D issued separately; Volume III: FOUO Appendixes A and B issued separately.					
14. ABSTRACT  In QDR 2001, the Secretary of Defense declared that the department's presence posture was inappropriate to the new security environment and to DoD's strategy. He called for a number of posture changes as well as for the Services to prepare more options for him to consider. What process should the Secretary use to evaluate these options as well as to develop others? To gain insights for recommendations in this area, IDA conducted off-the-record discussions with a wide range of senior US security professionals as well as diplomatic and military elites from over 23 countries. In addition, IDA has developed and tested several new analytic approaches for assessing the value on the margin of a variety of potential alternative presence postures in promoting deterrence as well as combat performance should deterrence fail. Based upon its review, IDA recommends that the Secretary build and regularly employ an effects-based presence planning and evaluation process. The effects-based process outlined in this study would be structured to take full advantage of the capabilities of all the services and increasing advantage of what are considerable but today <i>unrealized joint</i> capabilities. It would draw systematically as well upon the resources of all relevant US government departments and agencies and of friends and allies in order to promote mutual security interests. Overall, A DoD-wide, effects-oriented approach would ask what outputs—results—DoD wants to produce vis-à-vis key objectives in a region. It would develop various options that DoD and the US government generally could use to promote them. It would explicitly compare these options with current practice (and each other) in terms of performance metrics such as combat and deterrence effectiveness, resource costs, stress on personnel, and implications for preparedness in other regions.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS  Overseas military presence, presence, shaping, engagement, security cooperation, forward presence, deterrence, assurance, dissuasion, winning decisively, military-to-military contacts, effects-based operations, effects-based assessments, Korea, Okinawa, Japan, Turkey, Kosovo, Iraq, Serbia, forward stationing, forward deployments, prepositioning, transformation, combat simulation, regression, Probit					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  UU	18. NO. OF PAGES  254	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Mrs. Jeanne Fites
a. REPORT  U	b. ABSTRACT  U	c. THIS PAGE  U			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 703-614-3970

